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

US ARMY
WAR COLLEGE
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Review Essays

Russell W. Ramsey, "Strategic Reading on Latin America: 1995 Update"
Charles R. Shrader, "Gulf War Logistics"
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"NOT TO PROMOTE WAR, BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE . . ."

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PARAMETERS
The US Army's Senior Professional Journal

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Parameters is a journal of ideas and issues, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

From the Editor

In This Issue...

Richard A. Chilcoat defines the challenges facing the War College as it adapts time-honored education methods to the Information Age. After tracing the institution's heritage and analyzing the skills and attributes most useful to future graduates, he describes how the college—even as it reaffirms its basic precepts—is using technology to enhance the learning process and prepare graduates for a world increasingly influenced by that same technology.

Ralph Peters touches all of the themes in the feature on intervention as he describes an environment in which the US military could be required to operate in the next several decades. He makes another call for attention to issues and challenges that many would rather ignore.

Richard Halloran examines Japanese perceptions of the need for more robust military forces in the context of the United States' role as guarantor of Japan's security. He analyzes recent tensions between the two nations that could affect long-standing assumptions about that role.

Michael H. Hoffman finds no justification for peace enforcement operations under the law of war or the law of peace. Concluding that many Chapter VII operations are in fact "interventional armed operations," he proposes to redefine them and manage them under the law of war.

John M. Collins offers a checklist for those who must plan and justify peace operations. In the absence of a standard analytical method for developing policy options for such operations, his list provides a basis for describing and preparing for them.

James T. Quinlivan briefly examines several stability operations as he defines and analyzes post-Cold War requirements for peace support. He then describes the effects of interventions on the relatively small number of soldiers and Marines in the active and reserve components capable of conducting them.

Richard K. Betts notes that intervention operations could produce vigorous reactions by or on behalf of the state in which the intervention takes place. He then asks what it would take to deter the United States from acting in its own interests in a crisis.

Michael R. Boldrick contends that there is much more and much less than meets the eye in the recent Nuclear Posture Review, noting particularly risks and vulnerabilities related to the triad and the industrial base.

Patrick J. Garrity's region-by-region analysis of nuclear policy options reinforces the theme of deterrence that preoccupies several authors in this issue. His article reminds us that the cost for any nation to acquire and maintain a modest nuclear capability is relatively cheap when compared to the cost to develop and maintain a conventional force for global or regional deterrence.

Donald W. Boose, Jr., recounts how the United States decided to occupy Korea in 1945, noting how certain decisions shaped later Cold War events. ❑

The "Fourth" Army War College: Preparing Strategic Leaders for the Next Century

RICHARD A. CHILCOAT

"USAWC . . . the nation's preeminent center for strategic leadership and landpower . . . a learning institution . . . preparing today's leaders for tomorrow's challenges . . . pursuing mastery of the strategic art through education, research, and outreach."

— US Army War College Vision Statement
April 1995

Alvin Toffler, addressing society in general, might well have aimed his remarks at the Army: "If we do not learn from history, we shall be compelled to relive it. True. But if we do not change the future, we shall be compelled to endure it. And that could be worse."[1] Toffler's admonition is taken seriously at the Army War College: faculty, students, and staff are dedicated to examining and helping to shape US defense posture for the early decades of the next century. This article describes how the Army War College, drawing upon the Army's Force XXI initiative, will use new technology to analyze and contribute to national security policy, strategy, and operations.

Secretary of War Elihu Root's vision, reflected in his remarks at the dedication of the College in 1903, continues to guide us: "Not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression."[2] The War College, he said, would become a place where the Army's future leaders could "study and confer on the great problems of national defense, of military science, and of responsible command."[3] These three imperatives have lent continuity to the evolution of the War College from its activation in 1903; they continue to guide us into the next century.

The War College is involved in a process of change distinctly different from the three clearly identifiable previous stages of its development. It will be useful to glance at each of those earlier stages, which for convenience

are referred to as separate colleges, and then describe how the Army is producing a "Fourth" Army War College.

Antecedents

The "First" Army War College, from its establishment by Secretary Root[4] until America's entry into World War I, reflected a tentative search for identity expected of an institution in its formative stage. Certainly there was a need to improve the professional preparation of senior officers—command and staff performance during the Spanish-American War had been notably poor[5]—but the ideal organizational solution was elusive. The College, located in Washington, became an element of the War Department General Staff itself, and performed war planning duties.

Those duties immersed students in practical military problems of the period with an obvious training payoff. While "learning by doing," reinforced by mentoring, was the prevailing teaching methodology, there was a risk that day-to-day contact with the general staff would dilute essential academic and theoretical concerns. The faculty sought to balance learning and doing by emphasizing map exercises, command post exercises, staff rides and analyses of Civil War battles, and maneuvers in addition to the day-to-day operational undertakings described above. During the early years, there was no formal academic instruction; the idea that the program should move beyond the concept of on-the-job training and into the realm of theoretical study and acquisition of knowledge took hold gradually. The curriculum emphasized high-level tactics, campaign planning, and war planning, but despite the experiences of the Spanish-American War, there was little attention to preparing for and executing a national mobilization. The immediate aim was to qualify students for service as general staff officers in the War Department and major commands.[6]

The "Second" Army War College emerged in the years following World War I, as the nation evaluated the lessons from its first Industrial Age conflict. The Second Army War College expanded and consolidated its role as an educational institution in which the presentation of formal instruction came to be recognized as paramount. And although the War College had been severed from the General Staff in 1916, vestiges of its original war planning function continued. The poor performance of the War Department General Staff in planning and carrying out a national mobilization for World War I had been a

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painfully visible weakness. Consequently when the Second Army War College opened in 1919, after a two-year interruption during World War I, the program of study emphasized preparing the nation for war, a topic that became paramount in 1938. In the meanwhile, instruction in "responsible command," the third of Root's defining imperatives, was officially incorporated into the curriculum. As early as 1920 the War Department had ordered greater emphasis on training for command, eventually leading to a course called "Preliminary Command." The College continued its goal of preparing officers for general staff duties in the War Department as well as for command and staff work at senior levels. Content began to include the political, economic, and social issues that create the context for decisions at the highest levels of government. Concurrently there was increased attention to the study and analysis of history; the Historical Section of the War Plans Division was transferred to the War College's control in 1921.[7]

The College shut its doors again in 1940. World War II marked the total mobilization of warring powers and the emergence of the ultimate expressions of industrial warfare—massed armor, high-performance aircraft, carrier task forces, and the atomic bomb. Despite the distractions of war and its turbulent aftermath, however, the nation's military leaders devoted a surprising degree of attention to realigning intermediate and senior education in the armed forces. An Army and Navy Staff College, activated in 1943, became the National War College in 1946. The Army Industrial College (established in 1924) became the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, also in 1946, while the Armed Forces Staff College was activated in 1947. The Army War College itself finally reopened in 1950, after a 10-year hiatus, having been displaced to Fort Leavenworth from its prewar home at Fort McNair. It moved to Carlisle Barracks, its present location, only a year later.[8]

The "Third" Army War College was distinctly the product of World War II, but the shaping reality throughout the 40 years of its existence was the Cold War. It was during the period of the Third Army War College that nearly all the institutional structures of today's War College finally coalesced. For example, the three resident teaching departments—National Security and Strategy; Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations; and Command, Leadership, and Management (corresponding to Root's national defense, military science, and responsible command, respectively)—assumed their present form.

Other modern features of the War College came into being as well. They include the Department of Corresponding Studies; the Military History Institute, housing one of the finest collections of military books, personal papers, and records of any reference facility in the world; the Strategic Studies Institute, providing the focus though not the sole expression of the War College's traditional role of conducting advanced studies for the Army; the Army Physical Fitness Research Institute; the USAWC Library, combining new and traditional principles and practices with technology to become the preeminent research and information center for landpower and strategic leadership; the Advanced Course

"The War College is involved in a process of change distinctly different from the three previous stages of its development."

Program, which enabled students to select a share of their courses from a menu of electives in addition to the mandatory core of basic courses; and *Parameters*, the Army's senior professional journal. Even the Center for Strategic Wargaming, precursor of the new Center for Strategic Leadership, progressed as far as feasible, given the divided and confined physical plant then available.

The Third Army War College's curriculum mirrored the evolution of US nuclear strategy, ranging from Eisenhower's massive retaliation in the early 1950s to the prevailing form of flexible response when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Even as it fought peripheral wars in Korea and Vietnam against Third World foes, the Army always saw its overriding priority as Western Europe. The type of warfare that NATO and the Warsaw Pact prepared to wage was the epitome of Industrial Age conflict, featuring the phased, sequential clash of huge armored and mechanized formations supported by air, artillery, and missiles relatively close to the line of contact. The ever-present threat of escalation to nuclear war conditioned all theater strategic designs.

Certainly a major aim of the Third Army War College was the immediately practical one of preparing graduates to assume high-level command and staff positions where they would plan and execute the type of warfare envisaged above. But this College went beyond preparing for the next war by undertaking to broaden and elevate the politico-military perspective of its graduates and by imparting a range of proficiencies that might more properly be thought of as purely educational. These advances were unique in the evolution of the College. Since the Cold War showed every promise of indefinite stalemate, the College began to adopt a longer view of the skills its graduates would need. New doctrine and the evolution of joint and alliance warfare required the Third Army War College to move beyond tactics and the field army to examine the operational art and theater strategy. But the College also taught national military strategy, grand strategy, and international security affairs, and introduced students to enlightened concepts for running large organizations. Time was made available in academic programs for students to develop their research, writing, thinking, analytic, and speaking skills. Through personal assessment inventories, students were encouraged in the process of personal growth and maturation.

The locus of instruction in the Third Army War College, the student seminar, took a form that promised to be durable. Each seminar—its 16 students a mix from Army branches, other armed services, government agen-

cies, and foreign armed forces—suggests the joint combined force acknowledged by doctrine as the prevailing model. The instructional methodology within the seminar became purposeful discussion, led by an experienced faculty team and shaped by reading assignments, oral presentations, short writing assignments, and the collective skills and experience of the students themselves. Seminar instruction was reinforced by occasional class lectures by guest experts and by a substantial research-based writing assignment requiring analysis of a pertinent military problem.

The personal computer made its appearance, and students quickly discovered they could not do without it. The card catalog was removed from the library, leaving computer terminals as the students' main conduit to research sources; students could sign up for their advanced courses only through the computer; they learned the value of using computers to prepare written assignments; and computer jargon appeared in the daily discourse of student and faculty member alike. As the Cold War ended and the Information Age began, the War College stood poised on the edge of its fourth incarnation.[9]

When General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USAWC Class of 1973, launched Operation Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia on 17 January 1991, he initiated a campaign that looked both backward and forward. Operations validated the AirLand Battle concept, the doctrinal evolution of the previous decade, and the technologies in which the services had invested so much human and industrial capital. Looking forward, General Schwarzkopf sought nothing less than total intelligence mastery, demanding an accurate picture of the battle area even while denying such a picture to his foe. He also wanted to execute his attack at such a rapid and aggressive tempo that the enemy commander's mental responses, and thus the physical reactions of his forces, would always be too late to be effective. General Schwarzkopf wanted precisely what the theater commanders of Force XXI will seek. The Army, however, lacked the fully digitized battlespace, the advanced data display capability, and the resulting total situational awareness that may provide to future leaders what was only an aspiration for the commander of Desert Storm and his predecessors.

A View of the Future

The "Fourth" Army War College (1990-ca. 2010) intends to use the microprocessor to help the Army develop and employ Force XXI. To support that goal, the Army War College has developed this vision statement: to be "the nation's preeminent center for strategic leadership and landpower . . . a learning institution . . . preparing today's leaders for tomorrow's challenges . . . pursuing mastery of the strategic art through education, research, and outreach." To achieve preeminence, the institution, its faculty, and its students will strive for national recognition in terms of three core programs: education, research, and outreach related to strategic leadership and landpower. It will seek to produce graduates who are effective practitioners of the strategic art, defined as the

skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend national interests. The college, with its special organizational culture and associated values, will be a learning institution. It will prepare its graduates—fully qualified in service and joint matters, competent with technology, and able to cope with the complexities of strategy at the highest levels of leadership—for their most productive years of service to the nation.

Military applications of the Information Age will enable soldiers —as part of the joint force—to contribute to an integrated information system for collecting, processing, selecting, distributing, and displaying essential digitized data in near-real time throughout the extended theater domain. The concept of domain ranges from out-of-theater support activities to any point in theater and to any point in between, from the ground to orbiting satellites, and from the theater to any target the joint force is authorized to engage. Such a concept can produce leaders trained and educated to exploit the vast new knowledge resources at their disposal.

In its effort to define the specific attributes of 21st-century leaders, the War College surveyed 432 generals and promotable colonels to learn what traits they felt would be required of senior officers in the following five to 15 years.[10] They named such attributes as flexibility, adaptability, communicative skill, political astuteness, ability to conceptualize, skill in dealing with officials from different governmental cultures, diplomacy, skill in resource management, cultural sensitivity, caring leadership, and a full range of technical, tactical, warfighting, joint, and coalition competencies. No one can quarrel with the inclusion of any of these attributes; indeed, most would have expected them in military leaders serving ten or even 25 years ago.

Based upon inferences derived from TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*,[11] plus the rapidly growing body of associated literature, it appears that strategic competence during the Information Age will require the following attributes:

- *Simultaneous Awareness of the Strategic and Operational Situation.* The 21st-century strategist will have to combine the ends, ways, and means at hand while coping with shared "situational awareness" on a global scale. The successful senior leader will be expert in service, joint, and combined matters; he or she will understand the political, economic, and social elements of power as well. Senior leaders and their staffs will practice the strategic art in an environment where the speed, complexity, and ambiguity of operations have accelerated beyond our ability to define at present and where the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war can at times be so compressed as to appear virtually as a single function.

Rather than the phased, sequential progress that often characterized earlier wars, where success was usually achieved linearly, theater war of the next century will be marked by simultaneous, coordinated battles: rear, inter-

mediate, and deep on land, in the air, at sea, and in space. Tomorrow's theater commander will be capable of visualizing simultaneous operations in all of those forms. He will need to devise command, control, and monitoring protocols for doing so successfully.

• *Managing and Responding to Change.* Strategic leaders of the 21st century must embrace change, think "outside the box," and adapt proactively. They must have the mental agility to forge fresh insights about probable future conflicts such as those discussed in Sam Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations" or Ralph Peters' "The New Warrior Class," "After the Revolution," and "The Culture of Future Conflict." Information-age leaders will fight and operate in various domains, to include low-tech as well as high-tech environments, and against nontraditional as well as traditional foes.

Our information edge—near-real time situational awareness—should allow the commander to take informed initiatives more quickly than the enemy can generate informed reactions. Some call this getting inside the opponent's decision loop. We recognize, too, that the advantage that accrues from information is transient. The search for commanders who can recognize the "unforgiving minute" will be as important in the next century as it was when Patton looked for such officers during World War II.

• *Knowing How to Lead in Learning Organizations.* Just as the Army is a "learning" organization rather than one that has settled on permanent solutions, so the various units and commands within the Army will be learning organizations, evolving toward an ideal that is itself constantly subject to revision. Successful command of such organizations will require assurance that though the force will fight smart today, it will fight still smarter tomorrow. The commander must embody in himself, and foster in his subordinate leaders, a determination to innovate, to trust subordinates to exercise initiative, to capitalize upon flux and uncertainty, to support risk-taking but to tolerate and learn when it goes awry, and to fight as one integrated team within the Army and with the other services.

• *Facility in Managing an Avalanche of Data.* The term "information overload," already a cliché by the mid-1980s, suggests the clogging of data circuits and the inundation of in-boxes with information faster than it can be assimilated and put to use. Consider, then, the scale of the potential problem early in the next century, when our capacity for data collection will have expanded geometrically. Fortunately, the problem is recognized; the Army and the other services are working to capture the relevant data for the right individual in a timely manner and display it in useful ways. Even so, there is no doubt that the strategic leader best adapted for the Information Age will be one with a retentive but discriminating mind, capable of separating the essential from that which is interesting and acting with confidence on his or her conclusions.

• *Knack for Exercising Enlightened Control.* The Army's goal for the digitized battlefield of the 21st century is to provide leaders at all echelons, from platoon to division and even higher, a common situational awareness.

The ability of platoon leaders to see much of what the division commander sees electronically raises important questions about leadership style at the division and higher levels. Some analysts of the Force XXI battlefield reason that since the lower-echelon commander will possess so much greater situational awareness, he should be empowered with far greater latitude and independence than in the past.[12] Armed with all the data and information available, they argue, he should be given scope to exercise his initiative to the fullest, in a sense revalidating the concept of *Auftragstaktik*.

But one can reasonably argue the other way. The primary reason for decentralizing battle authority in the past was that only the lower-echelon commander knew the local situation and could remain abreast of fast-breaking events. Thus he needed to be empowered to act on his unique awareness, always in consonance with the higher commander's general intent, so as to exploit any quick-developing opportunities. On the digitized battlefield, however, the lower-echelon commander's situational awareness will no longer be unique. Since his commanders may have the same picture, we could expect some senior commanders to exercise tight centralized control, assuring that every subordinate element operates in a carefully developed unified effort.[13] The most likely outcome is that the degree of control will vary according to circumstances.[14] It may prove wise, for example, for a commander to exercise tight control during the early stage of an offensive, gradually relaxing that control as units enter the breakout and pursuit phases.[15] The jury is still out as to which of these two views will prevail.

In either case, future theater commanders will have to be versatile in their approach to control, particularly as they school their subordinate commanders. In another of the paradoxes common to technology enhancements, improved command awareness could encourage commanders already given to over-control or offer opportunities for developing flexible techniques at all levels of command.

• *Psychological and Physical Stamina.* As the commander comes to rely on brilliant automated machines to supplement his physical and intellectual abilities, it may appear paradoxical—again—to be told that in some respects he is going to have to be mentally and physically tougher than his predecessors. But such is true—the brilliant machines never sleep. Assuming that our logistics and maintenance units can meet the demand, we will have the technological potential for operating 24 hours a day throughout a protracted campaign, regardless of the weather. The senior leader in such operations must possess the physical stamina to stand up to the strain, and he must organize and train his staff to do the same.

Information Age operations also will place a high premium upon psychological stamina. We have noticed the grinding pressures inherent in simultaneous battles and the effects of information flows that exceed our capacity to analyze and synthesize them. Consider the tempo of operations in a conflict that allows us to bring to bear all of our technology. Doctrine dictates a relentless assault on the enemy's reactive capabilities. If we are to capitalize on our information edge, then aggressive but informed battle initiatives must

be undertaken without let-up, as each commander tries to overwhelm and disrupt the enemy's command structures and neutralize or destroy his forces. Easy enough in theory, in practice it will require a senior commander and staff who possess the mental staying power, implacable will, and the organization and training to apply pressure around the clock, while pacing themselves for the marathon rather than the sprint.

We are also examining asymmetric situations, those in which our technology may not provide the edge we want. Recent experience in peace operations indicates that we need to prepare ourselves specifically for conditions common to many operations other than war. Peace operations, under the auspices of the UN or in a coalition, require special skills and can involve groups not encountered in traditional planning, training, and operations. The War College, led by its Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), is making a major contribution to understanding the requirements of peace operations, training soldiers and civilian counterparts in matters as diverse as the nuances of negotiations, conflict resolution between hostile factions, and coordination with humanitarian relief organizations and other government and nongovernment groups. Planning exercises related to peace and humanitarian relief operations are part of the core requirements for resident and nonresident students alike. I will have more to say about PKI.

- *Hands-on Skill at the Computer Terminal.* Unlike senior leaders of the past, the commander of the 21st century may have to confront the flow of information with little intermediation by assistants. Much of his picture of the battle area, his situational awareness, and the answers to his own queries for data will be conveyed to his eyes directly via images on the color monitor of his computer, either a PC in his command post or a laptop while he is mobile. He must therefore be computer literate. To the strategic commander of the Information Age, the laptop computer, or its successor, will be a natural extension of his mind, as familiar as the telephone, map, and binoculars. Aspiring future commanders who are not already computer literate take note.

- *Knowledge of Force XXI Doctrine and its Implementing Structures.* The period for reasonably meeting Force XXI objectives extends ten or 15 years, possibly longer if resources lag.[16] The point to understand about Force XXI, however, is that we shall never achieve the end-state as we know it today because the concept is continually evolving. The Army traditionally has changed in discrete steps, with division reorganizations determined by sporadic emergence of new systems of weapons, communications, transportation, and logistics that altered the concept of land warfare. New military applications of technology emerge so rapidly that a different mechanism for change has become necessary. No longer will military organizations change by dramatic, infrequent bounds; frequent small steps will be the norm. Change will be an iterative process in which experimentation, relying on live exercises as well as computer simulations, leads to successive refinements and adjustments. The pattern of prolonged

status quo, punctuated by massive change, will be replaced by a steady search for improvement. This new process has been institutionalized in the Army by such organizations as the Louisiana Maneuvers, the vehicle for generating purposeful change within the Army, especially with regard to Force XXI.

Since Force XXI will be continually evolving, it follows that operational doctrine will similarly remain in flux. This means that TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations* (plus the entire family of specialized doctrinal documents that will follow) will remain provisional, subject to constant refinement as tests are completed and experience accumulates. Unlike in the past, when an officer could learn Army organization and doctrine early in his professional schooling and expect to remain current for the following ten years or so, graduates of the Fourth Army War College in 2010 will have followed throughout their careers changes large and small in both.

The main lesson to be drawn from this excursion through the Army's concept of change and the way we plan to adapt physically and intellectually is simply this: the Army's management of change and the ensuing organizational and doctrinal innovations will be professional preoccupations. The leader who aspires to mastery of strategy will acquire knowledge not as a result of last-minute preparation. Rather he or she will need to grow into the culture from the beginning so that an understanding of how the Army changes—presently represented by Force XXI and its evolving doctrine—becomes integral to professional development throughout his or her career.

The Fourth Army War College

We have so far identified eight attributes required for senior command and staff activities over the next 15-20 years. It will be the task of the Fourth Army War College to help students acquire them—along with the traditional elements of senior officer education—by integrating necessary new material into time-proven academic programs. This concept is embodied in a useful formula: *change* (as dictated by the end of the Cold War and beginning of the Information Age) plus *continuity* (hearkening back to Elihu Root's enduring trinity of basic War College purposes) equals *growth* (in the College's capacity to promote personal and intellectual development). We cannot forget that "in order to get to the future we have to go through the present."[17] We must remain ready for today's wars even as we prepare for tomorrow's; the Fourth Army War College, and indeed the Army at large, will assimilate change in ways that maintain current operational effectiveness.

Some new elements of our academic programs are not defined by technology. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986, for example, whose effects even yet have not fully registered, mandated a series of measures designed to promote greater unity and coherence of effort among the services. Similarly, America's post-Cold War military drawdown and the frequency of United Nations peacekeeping initiatives have brought us to prefer alliances and coalition

operations over unilateral solutions to international challenges. These two impulses—the joint and the combined—are reflected in the expanded purpose of the Fourth Army War College: to prepare senior commanders and staff officers—all joint-specialty qualified, all competent in the strategic art—for service at high-level joint, combined, and interagency headquarters, capable of responding to general war, regional conflict, or operations other than war.

Just as Force XXI capitalizes on modern information technology in how to wage war, so the Fourth Army War College will use the technology to teach its students. The College will expressly encourage creativity, innovation, experimentation, intellectual outreach, and informed nonconformity in the classroom and in its administration—and in professional writing as well. As former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan often noted, "Disagreement is not disrespect."[18]

The laptop computer, provided to every student for use during the academic year, is the basic tool for interactive learning at the Fourth Army War College. Computers support our intent to evolve from an institution in which internal communications rely on the transfer of paper, to a near-paperless environment in which most internal communications are passed electronically. The computer terminal's ubiquity at the College serves the dual purpose of facilitating instruction while allowing students to develop skills they will later need as leaders. The majority of students arriving at the War College today possess basic automation skills, a change from our experience as little as three years ago.

The seminar group remains the basic learning unit at the Fourth Army War College. Seminars meet in rooms configured on our Classroom XXI model.[19] This classroom, the product of several years' study and experimentation, has been carefully designed to provide the latest instruction-enhancing technology while retaining the benefits of the seminar environment. Comparison of the level of automation in the War College with a report of how civilian universities are adapting to the Information Age reveals how well we have integrated technology into our education, training, and administrative functions.[20] The concept of Classroom XXI ensures that instructors and students alike will have ready access to every educational resource that contemporary science and engineering can provide.

The recently opened Collins Hall, which houses the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), is representative of our commitment to physical and intellectual change, continuity, and growth. The new facility has the dual mission of supporting education at the Army War College and planning and decisionmaking by DOD agencies. In support of the College's educational role, CSL greatly extends the seminar learning boundaries, providing new options for leader development at the strategic level. In support of DOD leadership, CSL serves as a high-technology "laboratory," focusing on improving decisionmaking processes at the operational, interagency, and strategic levels. This laboratory also supports Army component commanders and combatant and joint task force commanders through seminars, symposiums, round tables, conferences (both

on-site and remote via teleconferencing), exercises, computer simulations, wargaming, and in-house studies and planning.[21]

As an adjunct to CSL, the Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) serves as the focus of Army study and advice related to peace operations. A wide-ranging charter requires PKI to "refine the application of landpower in peace operations"; when PKI does so, it touches all of our interests in education, research, and outreach. Within DOD, PKI has led or supported staff development and training at unified, major command, and regional headquarters through role-playing and other support of staff exercises. On request, members work with units undergoing training at the Army's combat training centers. PKI helped to develop and conduct the first peace operations exercise involving the senior staffs of all unified commands, now an annual event at CSL, and the Institute has assumed responsibility for coordinating after-action reviews of US participation in peace and humanitarian relief operations.

PKI outreach activities include recruiting representatives of UN agencies and nongovernment organizations to join in Army training, and participation in meetings and colloquia in civilian and academic settings as diverse as the United States Institute for Peace and Harvard's John F. Kennedy Center. When the opportunity arose, PKI participated in the first predeployment training ever undertaken for UN staff personnel, preparing those who were to work in Angola and Haiti.

Perhaps our most significant contribution to understanding what one Army officer has called "savage peace"[22] is frequent participation on the ground in peace operations. PKI personnel have served as staff augmentees to the UN or other organizations in Cambodia, Kuwait, northern Iraq, Somalia, Macedonia, Rwanda, Angola, Haiti, and the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru. Their experiences help to shape our curriculum and influence training and education throughout the Army. The Peacekeeping Institute will remain fully engaged in the kinds of change, continuity, and growth that are emblematic of the Fourth Army War College.

Through instructional technology in Classroom XXI and Collins Hall, Army War College students learn much that is directly transferable to the next century's war rooms and command posts. Even more important are the academic courses themselves, both core and advanced. The core courses—Responsible Command; War, National Policy, and Strategy; Implementing National Military Strategy; and Regional Strategic Appraisals—are all designed to explore new issues and ideas even as they impart contemporary theory and practice.

Nearly 100 advanced courses are offered each year, enabling students to develop a deeper understanding of topics covered in the core curriculum. Many of these courses, which emphasize competencies associated with increased uses of technology, also look at aspects of the War College's enduring and special themes for academic work. Representative titles are Louisiana Maneuvers and Force XXI; Joint Crisis Action Planning for Operations Other Than War; Military

Space Operations; Training Force XXI (Directed Study); Revolution in Military Affairs–The Military Technical Revolution; Logistics Systems–Models and Simulations; Advanced Warfighting Studies; Information Management; Joint Land, Aerospace, and Sea Simulation–Northeast Asia War Game; Concurrent Campaign Planning Using Decision Aids; and Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence. Advanced courses are taught by faculty in the three resident teaching departments, the Department of Corresponding Studies, the Center for Strategic Leadership, the Military History Institute, and other elements of the College.

Other academic programs that contribute to the education of 21st-century leaders are the Strategy Research Program and the Strategic Crisis Exercise. The former, a major thesis-like research effort, encourages students to examine in depth a relevant topic of particular interest to them. Such a paper has the advantage of developing bona fide expertise in a particular facet of strategic endeavor while honing the student's skill in research, analysis, and writing. The Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE) serves as a capstone experience in which students translate theory into practice. Drawing upon their course work and research, students explore the interagency process by drafting Presidential Decision Directives, preparing strategic guidance, allocating forces, distributing strategic lift, and executing campaign plans through realistic scenarios involving regional conflict and operations other than war. For USAWC students, the SCE serves as their "Battle Command Training Program" at levels where political and military activities merge. In the virtual world of Collins Hall, they are able to practice what they have learned about the strategic art.

The Army War College recognizes the importance of the human dimension in the military profession, of examining second- and third-order effects as theory becomes doctrine. When we refer to the collapse of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war into a virtual single entity, we are describing the challenges facing a young sergeant whose mission to escort a convoy of relief supplies has encountered an unanticipated roadblock. He has been trained to take immediate violent action to clear the obstacle. His preparation for the peace operation, however, has shown him how to discuss, to negotiate. The eventual reply to his request for guidance may have reached the pol-mil level in theater or in Washington. The young sergeant's next actions can have strategic import.

Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer has observed that "Soldiers are our credentials." We are in the business of educating and training senior leaders in the nuances of policy, strategy, operations, and leadership so that the troops at the roadblocks can always count on the right answers. Graduates with those skills are *our* credentials.

A Way Ahead

The Fourth Army War College will become reality through a planning process that is orderly and continuous. The key document is the USAWC

Strategic Action Plan, now in preparation as a continuation of the process that shaped the College vision. The Strategic Action Plan represents a serious institutional effort to define our core businesses of education, research, and outreach. It sets forth the College's vision, mission,[23] and objectives, as well as our intent in establishing those objectives. Perhaps most important, the plan will match resources to requirements.

Work on the following institutional objectives should be completed within 12 to 18 months.

- Define the strategic art and its mastery.
- Develop an information technology and automation plan.
- Define strategic outreach for USAWC.
- Establish strengthened faculty development programs.
- Establish strategic planning process.
- Review USAWC educational objectives.
- Conduct an alternative curriculum review.
- Integrate USAWC and garrison master planning.
- Determine feasibility and desirability of granting graduate degrees, developing new concepts for administering advanced courses, strengthening faculty team teaching concepts, developing a continuing education program, and modernizing the Department of Corresponding Studies.

Each institutional objective will be assigned to a separate staff and faculty task force for planning and execution. A USAWC strategic planning office has been established to coordinate the entire effort. Some initiatives are already under way, and others will soon follow. For example, within certain advanced courses, the talents of students are being harnessed to examine and debate the issues raised by Force XXI. Results will be provided to the Army staff and published in military periodicals. Distance learning via electronic methods will soon be a reality for our nonresident students. Laptops, CD-ROM, and modems, combined with other informational technology, will help to reduce our sizable printing and mailing costs, enable the creation of virtual seminars among geographically dispersed students, and create a learning environment comparable in some ways to resident seminars. The Strategic Studies Institute is investigating whether the Army's venerable Principles of War require adaptation to meet the exigencies of the Information Age. The curriculum review task force, in addition to its other areas of investigation, will assure that as Force XXI evolves, appropriate instruction will be included in the curriculum. Another task force will enlist the help of corporate futurists in keeping the College faculty abreast of leading-edge information and educational technology. Such efforts are designed to ensure that the War College, the Army's senior educational institution, remains in the intellectual vanguard as Force XXI becomes a reality.

Dean Rusk once reminded us that "unless we can find some way to keep our sights on tomorrow, we cannot expect to be in touch with today."[24] He was profoundly right. Unless we know where we are going, or where we are

trying to go, each day's work will tend to be aimless and unconnected to our past or future, animated by no higher goal than simply emptying the in-box by quitting time. Carlisle Barracks has its vision, and we are creating the apparatus to guide and sustain progress toward attaining that vision over the long haul. By this means, we will explore, discover—and create—the Fourth Army War College.

NOTES

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1. Alvin Toffler, "Introduction: Probing Tomorrow," in *The Futurists*, ed. Alvin Toffler (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 3.
2. George S. Pappas, *Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College, 1901-1967* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Alumni Assn. of the US Army War College, 1967), p. 28.
3. Harry P. Ball, *Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War College*, Revised Edition (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Alumni Assn. of the US Army War College, 1994),p. 80.
4. Secretary Root signed the order establishing the Army War College in 1901, but the College was not activated until 1903.
5. Ball, pp. 44-47.
6. Ball, pp. 79-146, 493. I wish to thank Harry Ball for his idea of referring to the earlier colleges as the First, Second, and Third.
7. For details of the Second Army War College, see Ball, pp. 147-255.
8. Ball, pp. 257-80.
9. For the Third Army War College, see Ball, pp. 281-489.
10. USAWC General Officer Survey, October 1991-May 1992.
11. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century* (Ft. Monroe, Va.: Headquarters TRADOC, 1 August 1994). Force XXI is the Army's vision to ensure a trained and ready force capable of decisive victory into the 21st century. It will accomplish this through three complementary activities: redesign of the TOE force; redesign of the "institutional" Army; and evaluation of technology, initially through digitization of our organizations and institutions.
12. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, p. 3-4.
13. See Robert R. Leonhard, "The Death of Mission Tactics," *Army*, July 1994, pp. 15-18; and David Jablonsky, "US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Parameters*, 24 (Autumn 1994), 28.
14. See, e.g., TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, pp. 2-8, 3-5, 4-4.
15. See Leonhard's thoughts on this subject, p. 18.
16. Caleb E. Baker, "The Disconnect Between the Force and the Funding," *Army*, February 1995, pp. 35-38.
17. General Gordon R. Sullivan, meeting with students and faculty, USAWC, 6 January 1995.
18. General Sullivan, 6 January 1995.
19. Classroom XXI is designed around a compact console with a touch-screen panel through which students and instructors can control multimedia presentations. The overhead video projector is the primary display device; a 35mm slide projector is also available. The instructor's console computer as well as student laptops link through the local area network to military and civilian networks, both operational and informational.
20. David L. Wilson, "Extending the Web," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 11 August 1995, pp. A17-A18.
21. Collins Hall provides state-of-the-art automation, computer, and communications facilities, including gaming rooms, a video teleconference center, an executive conference room, access to the Defense Simulation Internet, and a node for the World Wide Military Command and Control System.
22. See Ralph Peters' review of Daniel P. Bolger's *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s*, on pages 159-61 of this issue of *Parameters*.
23. USAWC Mission Statement: To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic leadership responsibilities in military and national security organizations; to educate students about the employment of the US Army as part of a unified, joint, or multinational force in support of the national military strategy; to research operational and strategic issues; and to conduct outreach programs that benefit USAWC, the US Army, and the Nation.
24. As quoted in James B. Simpson, *Simpson's Contemporary Quotations* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), p. 368.

The Culture of Future Conflict

RALPH PETERS

The computer will not replace the book, and post-modern forms of conflict will not fully replace conventional war. We will, however, experience a bewildering expansion of the varieties of collective and factional violence. The computer expands our possibilities, and alters methods of working and organizing. So, too, the worldwide crisis in systems of social organization and belief broadens the range of challenges to global, regional, and local order. States and military establishments that restrict their preparations, initiatives, and responses to traditional patterns will pay for their fear of the future in blood, money, and quality of life.

Although man and his failings will remain at the center of war and conflict, a unique combination of factors will precipitate and shape events. At least into the 17th century, Western man believed planetary and stellar conjunctions were responsible for disasters upon the earth. Today, we face a constellation of crises much closer to home with profound strategic and military implications. The warning comet is already with us as we approach a dark new century.

Future wars and violent conflicts will be shaped by the inabilities of governments to function as effective systems of resource distribution and control, and by the failure of entire cultures to compete in the post-modern age. The worldwide polarization of wealth, afflicting continents and countries, as well as individuals in all countries, will prove insurmountable, and social divisions will spark various forms of class warfare more brutal than anything imagined by Karl Marx. Post-state organizations, from criminal empires to the internationalizing media, will rupture the integrity of the nation-state. Niche technologies, such as post-modern means of information manipulation and dissemination, will provoke at least as often as they produce, and will become powerful tools of conflict. Basic resources will prove inadequate for populations exploding beyond natural limits, and we may discover truths about ourselves that we do not wish to know. In the end, the greatest challenge may be to our moral order.

The incompetence of the state has been demonstrated along fault lines from the former Yugoslavia and desperate North Korea to Zaire and Liberia. The "state" as we revere it is a cultural growth and must develop organically—where it has been grafted it rarely takes. The Euro-American and East Asian state's civility as well as its authority rely upon expanding wealth, on a perceived community of interests that allows public compromise or acquiescence, and on individual and collective senses of responsibility. In many of the "states" that presently hold seats in the United Nations, per capita wealth is declining, there is no community of interests, nor is there an individual sense of responsibility for the common good. Even in Western states, the vital sense of generalized responsibility is deteriorating as interest groups promote factionalization and citizen expectations grow excessive and wantonly selfish.

In many "accidental states" shaped hastily in the recession of empire, state structures survived only through their ability to apply internal violence. Today, even these oppressive construct-states are breaking down as burgeoning populations make state-sponsored violence against their own citizens statistically ineffectual. Simultaneously, thanks largely to the temptress Media, worldwide citizen expectations of government have wildly surpassed the abilities of government to deliver (the gray area between possibilities and needs/wants is the age-old breeding ground of organized crime and political radicalism). This is true of the United States and of Algeria. Fortunately for us in the United States, our government's ability to deliver generally exceeds requirements, if not expectations. In Algeria, government shortcomings have led to a cultural struggle that has engulfed the state and threatens to destroy it.

Cultural failure has many historical precedents, from the collapse of the Hittite empire to the destruction of the Aztecs, but there has never before been a time when a single dominant culture and its imitators have threatened to overwhelm every other major culture on earth. Even in the great age of European empire, most of the conquered peoples remained free to practice their own religions and lifestyles, blissfully unaware of a seductive alternative model. Today, thanks to the distribution of addictively-Western films, videos, television, and radio to even the most obscure and hopeless backwaters, there

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is an unprecedented worldwide awareness of relative physical and cultural poverty within non-Western cultures. Western models of behavior and possession—often misunderstood—create crises of identity and raise appetites that local environments cannot sate. Increasingly, we live in a world where the Flintstones meet the Jetsons—and the Flintstones don't much like it. When they try to imitate our performance, they fail, except in the case of gifted individuals. When they try to secede from the West, they fail again. In the end, there is only rage.

Wealth polarization is worsening after a century of limited progress toward equalization. The West and some uniquely receptive Far Eastern nations have entered a wealth-generation cycle for which there is no predictable end, despite intermittent trade squabbles and recessions. But the nature of post-modern competition is such that membership in this club is closing. While some disciplined, culturally predisposed states may eventually join the rich West-plus, they will be exceptions. The value of manual and mass labor is plunging in a world of surplus population, while the skills necessary for successful economies and desirable jobs increasingly rely on the total environment in which the individual lives and learns, from infancy forward. In the past, fortunate individuals could jump from pre-modern to modern. But the gap between pre-modern and post-modern is too great to be crossed in a single leap. The economically vibrant jobs of the next century will demand "transcendent literacy": the second-nature ability to read, write, think abstractly, and manipulate information electronics. This fateful shift is already creating painful dislocations in our own country and threatens to create an expanded and irredeemable underclass. Its effect on the non-Western world will be to condemn states, peoples, and even continents to enduring poverty.

Social division is the obvious result of the polarization of wealth. Although most of the world's population always has been condemned to poverty, a combination of religious assurance, ignorance of how well others lived, and hope of a better future more often than not curbed man's natural rage at wealth discrepancies. Now the slum-dwellers of Lagos are on to the lifestyles of the rich and famous, while hopes of prosperity even for a future generation dwindle. In the West-plus this bifurcation into skilled and well-off versus unskilled and poor has created archipelagoes of failure in a sea of success. The rest of the World contains only fragile archipelagoes of success in vast, increasingly stormy seas of failure. Occasionally, the failures attack us at home, staging events, such as the World Trade Center bombing, that are as spectacular as they are statistically ineffective. More often, these unmoderns usually take out their inchoate anger on the nearest targets—rival clans or tribes, citizens of minority religions or ethnicities, or their own crumbling governments. Intermittently, these local rages will aggrieve our extra-territorial welfare—primarily our economic interests—and we will need to intervene. In the 20th century, the great wars were between ambitious winner-states. In

the coming century, the routine conflicts to which we will be party will pit those same winner-states, now reconciled, against vast "loser" populations in failed states and regions.

The rise of the anti-state in various forms has been and will be the result of the failure of governments to cater to basic needs and to satisfy expanding desires. The anti-state can take many forms, from media conglomerates that determine what the world should know, through much-maligned, peace-preferring multinational corporations, to webs of criminality expanding across oceans, enterprise disciplines, and cultures. In the world of the anti-state, international criminals often cooperate more effectively and creatively than do states. Criminal enterprise mirrors legitimate enterprise in its focus on secure profits, but its "integrity" exceeds that of the greatest multinationals because the criminal anti-state has a galvanizing enemy: the state fighting for its life. It is in the adaptive nature of the post-modern anti-state that it can even develop a symbiotic relationship with a formal government it strategically penetrates, as criminal anti-state webs have done in Russia, Nigeria, Mexico, and numerous less-spectacular examples. Anti-states also take the forms of pre-modern structures, such as tribal or religious identifications. At the high end of development we are witnessing the birth of new "tribes" based on skills, wealth, and cultural preferences. As with the old, enduring tribes, the geographic domain of these new communities rarely matches the contours of existing state borders.

We are entering an era of multidimensional, inter-penetrating structures of social control, wealth allocation, and even allegiance. The decline of the state, real or relative, accelerates under *knowledge assault*, as new structures of knowing outpace the ability of traditional governments to process and respond to information. The modern age was the age of mass efficiencies. The post-modern age is the age of mass inefficiencies, wherein bigness equals clumsiness and lethargy. Ours is increasingly an age of neo-anarchic "cellular" accomplishment that, at its best, gives us enhanced microchips and, at its worst, turns the world's cities into criminal harbors. Reduced to the fundamentals, we face a conflict between blood ties and knowledge ties. Ours is a world whose constituents may lurch backward as well as forward, but in which nothing can remain unchanged.

Decisive technologies, from the birth control pill to the computer, have exploded traditional forms of organization, behavior, and belief in our lifetimes. Technology can lead to enhanced environmental mastery—but it can also lead to fatal dependencies. The best example of this pits the computer against the television. A skilled computer user is an active "techno-doer." Unless he or she is particularly creative, this computerist is the post-modern blue-collar worker, the new machinist. This computerist adds value in the classic sense enshrined by Marx, Keynes, and Schumpeter. On the other hand, the passive television viewer, especially one possessing a VCR, confuses us

because we imagine he is mastering technology. On the contrary, the technology is mastering the human. The passive techno-user adds no value and may even lose operative abilities and initiative, becoming a "self-sucking vampire." This is not an attack on television in general, which can be a powerful tool for the dissemination of information; rather, it is a warning that technology consumers do not necessarily become technologically capable. *A society must produce techno-doers*, and all technologies, active and passive, must find a healthy integrative level. Otherwise, the force of technology is destructive, if deceptively comforting in its amusement value. Dangerous for segments of our own society, this addictive passivity can be fatal to noncompetitive cultures.

Rich issues also arise out of our attempts to redefine "military technology" in the post-modern age, but there is one respect in which all relevant branches of Westernness, from the military through business, are alike. Increasingly, we take our entire environment with us when we go. From techno-gypsies working their laptops in jungle backwaters to the military that fought Desert Storm, we are learning to insulate ourselves as never before from the inefficiencies of the non-West. This is the first, unavoidable step toward an enclavement of our civilization that excludes the noncompetitive.

Resource scarcity will be a direct cause of confrontation, conflict, and war. The struggle to maintain access to critical resources will spark local and regional conflicts that will evolve into the most frequent conventional wars of the next century. Today, the notion of resource wars leads the Westerner to think immediately of oil, but water will be the fundamental need of some states, anti-states, and peoples. We envision a need to preserve rainforests, but expanding populations will increasingly create regional shortages of food—especially when nature turns fickle. We are entering the century of "not enough," and we will bleed for things we previously could buy.

Gross overpopulaton will destroy fragile possibilities for progress in much of the non-Western world, and much of this problem is the West's fault. Our well-intentioned introduction of relatively crude concepts of sanitation and disease control, combined with our determination to respond generously to local famines, has allowed populations to explode. Changes in public health so small a Westerner would not notice them can have spectacular effects in underdeveloped societies. For instance, reductions in infant mortality can occur swiftly, but it takes generations for societies to adjust to the value-challenging concept of family planning—and some refuse to adjust. Thus, populations increase geometrically as behavior lags technology. These population increases lead to greater urbanization, as the countryside and traditional structures cannot support the additional surviving offspring and the city appears to offer economic opportunity and a more attractive lifestyle. But few economies outside of the West-plus can create jobs as quickly as they are creating job-seekers. Even rates of economic growth that sound remarkable leave Third World countries with ever-greater unemployed and underemployed masses. The result is an even further breakdown

"We are entering the century of 'not enough,' and we will bleed for things we previously could buy."

of traditional structures and values. In the end, the only outlet for a lifetime's frustration is violence.

Now and future plagues are the present nightmares of choice on the bestseller lists and movie screens of the United States. The general scenario has a new disease exploding out of its previously isolated lair in the Third World and hopping a flight to Gringoland, where it behaves with the random destructiveness of an inner-city teenager. Certainly, this is a plausible scenario, and one against which we must guard. But the real threat to this planet's future may be just the opposite: disease is one of nature's many corrective mechanisms. *Our battle against disease may prove too successful,* resulting in populations the earth's resources cannot sustain and precipitating literally endless human misery and conflict. While the pandemics of the past were tragic for countless individuals, they were only rarely tragic for societies or cultures—and never for mankind as a whole. Indeed, epidemic disease may have been our dark, unrecognized friend, not only as a population regulator but even as a catalyst for dynamic change. Certainly, there has never been a single disease, not even the oft-cited Black Death, that seriously threatened to wipe out mankind—only human beings know how to do that.

So what does it all mean? There will be fewer classic wars but more violence. While conventional war will remain the means of last resort to resolve inter-state confrontations, the majority of conflicts will be asymmetrical, with a state or coalition of states only one of the possible participants. The rise of non-state threats is a tremendous problem for Western governments and militaries because we are legally and behaviorally prepared to fight only other legal-basis states—mirror images of ourselves—at a time when state power and substance is declining worldwide.

"Survivalists" in North America have it exactly wrong. While they fear a metastasizing, increasingly intrusive, globalizing state, the world is fracturing, and our own government has less control over the behavior of its citizens than at any time during the 20th century. *The survivalists fear excessive lawfulness, when the problem is exploding lawlessness*—or the inability to enforce existing laws. While our state occasionally falters, foreign states are collapsing, and we face constituencies of the damned, of the hopeless, from

whose midst arise warrior classes for whom peace is the least rewarding human condition. As we in the West enter the post-modern age, much of the non-West (starting at the borders of the former Yugoslavia) looks like the Trojan War with machine guns . . . and, perhaps eventually, with nuclear weapons.

What will future conflicts look like? Traditional forms of warfare will remain, with the Middle East and the Asian landmass as their primary cockpit, but these conventional wars will be supplemented with new and hybrid forms of conflict. *Civil wars*—usually distinctly uncivil in their conduct—are a growth industry, as cultures and societies attempt to resolve their threatened, globally incompetent identities. While these civil wars will intermittently threaten Western interests, rule-bound military interventions will not be able to bring them to closure. Today, many human societies are cultural ecosystems striving to regain equilibrium, often through gruesome civil wars. The introduction of powerful foreign elements only further upsets the equilibrium and guarantees exaggerated bloodshed after the intervening power has withdrawn.

Dying states will resort to violence against their own populations in last-gasp efforts to maintain power, spawning expanded *insurgencies*. Elsewhere, state inefficiencies and the lack of ethnic or cultural harmony will spark revolts and terrorism. Massive criminal insurgencies are a new method of challenging the state through violence. In Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle and in the Andean Ridge, druglord insurgencies have moved from defying laws to denying great tracts of territory to the state. In Russia, a confluence between organized crime and government in lucrative spheres constitutes a quiet criminal coup. Nigerian criminality looks to exceed oil income as the primary revenue of the state in the future. In the past, insurgencies were easy to recognize—the rebels marched on the presidential palace. Today, some of the most threatening criminal insurgencies in the non-West will be conducted by officials already *inside* the presidential palace. We cannot respond to such top-down insurgencies under international codes of law designed for a world run by Woodrow Wilsons.

Aftermath instability is already a pernicious problem and will worsen. In the wake of high-level agreements to resolve conflicts, most broken states or territories cannot reabsorb the human detritus left behind by waves of violence. With a previously inadequate infrastructure further degraded by conflict, even individuals who desire to live in peace often cannot find shelter or adequate food, much less employment. For those who have become habituated to violence and its quick rewards, post-conflict societies often have nothing to offer that can wean these warriors back to constructive patterns of behavior. As populations expand and hatreds deepen, we will find that while a swift, determined military intervention may bring a formal end to some conflicts, informal conflict will persist indefinitely, destroying any hopes for local societal healing.

Intercultural struggles, with their unbridled savagery, are the great nightmare of the next century, and a great deal has been written about them, either warning of the "Clash of Civilizations" à la Huntington, or in outraged, well-intentioned responses that assure us that everybody will get along just fine if the West sends money. While we may dread the moral and practical issues intercultural competition poses, this struggle is already upon us, with parties hostile to the West forcing the issue to the extent of their still-limited competencies. If present conflicts evolve toward open warfare, this could be the defining struggle of the next century—as ideological competition was for the 20th century. The question is whether we can manage such conflicts with nonmilitary means, or if they will deepen and spread until they require a general military response. At present, it appears likely that our military will find itself drawn into intercultural struggles in future decades—if only because it will be impossible to appease challengers bent upon supplanting us, punishing us, or destroying us. If there is a single power the West underestimates, it is the power of collective hatred.

Cataclysm response will continue to demand military participation. Traditional natural disasters, short of world plagues, are ultimately manageable, and do not fatally divert military resources. Manmade cataclysms are another matter. Even peacekeeping is a form of cataclysm response—and a very expensive one. Further, the proliferation and terrible condition of nuclear facilities in much of the northern hemisphere make Chernobyl look like a precedent rather than an anomaly. We also will see a growing cross-fertilization between cataclysm and conflict, with one feeding on or aggravating the other. While past wars often spread famine or plague in their wakes, we may be entering a period of renewed spoils-taking or even wars of annihilation. From Kuwait to Rwanda, the comfortable modern boundaries between manmade and natural disasters already have begun to break down in post-modern confusion.

The strategic military implications are clear—at least in part. But those implications can be more easily discussed than practically addressed. First, we will see an *expeditionary West*, condemned to protect its distant interests. Given our finite resources, we will have to weigh national interests against human interests, not only in asking ourselves whether or not to intervene for humanitarian reasons, but because our national interests may be contrary to non-Western human interests. We are not going to get off easily in the conscience department. We often will have to redefine victory in an era of unwinnable wars and conflicts. Sometimes the dilemma will be whether or not there is an advantage to an intervention that only delays resolution. We may have to recast traditional military roles when faced with criminal insurgencies or foreign corruption so wildly out of control it threatens our national interests. We will face a dangerous temptation to seek purely technological responses to behavioral challenges—especially given the expense of standing forces. Our cultural strong suit is the ability to balance and integrate the technological with the human, and

"We will fight in cities, and this brutal, casualty-prone, and dirty kind of combat will negate many of our technological advantages while it strains our physical and moral resources."

we must continue to stress getting that balance right. We must beware wonder weapons that offer no significant advantage in a changing world.

There are practical military considerations, as well. We will fight men who do not look, think, or act like us, and this can lead to a dangerous dehumanizing of the enemy, just as it will make it more difficult for us to understand him. We will fight in cities, and this brutal, casualty-prone, and dirty kind of combat will negate many of our technological advantages while it strains our physical and moral resources. Technology will continue to pile up new wonders, but we will find that there are sharp limits to what technology can add to our effectiveness in asymmetrical conflicts. The quality of leaders and soldiers will become even more important as we fight in smaller increments, whether on an "empty" post-modern battlefield or in the overcrowded, dysfunctional cities of failing states. We will encounter unprecedented densities of noncombatants stranded in the maelstrom of urban combat. And we will try, whenever possible, to cocoon our forces in "moveable fortresses"—not classic fortresses with physical walls but transferred environments, with electronic, missile, and fire barriers, antiseptic support environments, and impenetrable information structures. This will work best in conventional warfare, but our efficacy in setting the terms of involvement will deteriorate the farther down the scale of organized conflict we must descend. No matter how hard we try to take our world with us, we will still find we sometimes must fight the enemy on his ground, by his rules. This is the hardest form of combat for the United States, because our own rules cripple us and, at worst, kill us.

The new century will bring new weapons, and some of those weapons will bring moral dilemmas. For example, suppose that discoveries in fields as seemingly diverse as evolutionary biology, neurology, complexity studies, advanced sonics, computerization, and communications allowed us to create a "broadcast weapon" that could permanently alter human behavior without causing physical harm. We would immediately face protests from concerned parties to whom it would, paradoxically, be more humane to kill an enemy than to interfere with his or her free will.

Other new weapons will require the military to expand its skill range, and leader-to-led ratios will need to be increased in favor of low-level leaders,

due both to those new skills required by technological advances and because of the compartmentalization effect of urban combat and the dispersion of the conventional battlefield. The oldest forms of warfare, such as in-close individual combat, will coexist with over-the-horizon cyberspace attacks. And, again and again, we will face well-intentioned interlocutors who insist that, since the military never did that, they shouldn't be allowed to do it now. An enduring tension between expanding missions and traditional strictures will hamper military operations. We will face repeated situations in which we are asked to send our soldiers into conflicts for which they have been physically well trained, but in which the rules we impose upon them leave them practically defenseless. We must learn as a country to identify that which we truly need to achieve, and then to assess honestly the necessary means of getting to that achievement. It is the duty of our military leadership to inform that debate.

How will our 21st-century world look? For the successful, it will be an age of nontraditional empires. The United States in particular, and the West in general, currently possesses a cultural and business empire that touches all parts of the globe. It is far more efficient and rewarding than any previous form of empire has been. The Russian Federation is trying to build an empire on the cheap, in a less-benign form, in which regional political, military, economic, and resource hegemony take the place of large armies of occupation, waves of colonization, and expensive local administrations. Traditional colonies have disappeared not because of liberation ideology but because they were ultimately unprofitable and too difficult to manage. The new empire largely manages itself.

As noncompetitive regions decline, wealth enclaves will emerge, primarily in the West-plus. The "colonies" of the future will be controlled economically and "medially," not politically, and will focus on resources and markets. The political and then the military arms of West-plus governments will become involved only when business encounters disadvantageous illegal behaviors or violence—today, the flag follows trade. West-plus governments will police physical and digital "safe corridors" for resource extraction, general trade, and information ranching, but in failed countries and continents, the West-plus will be represented primarily by post-modern traders.

The great dangers that could spark broad conventional wars will be resource competition and cultural confrontations—or a volatile combination of both, which could arise, for instance, in the Persian Gulf/Caspian Sea macro-region. Worldwide social bifurcation will lead increasingly to a triage approach to diplomacy, aid, and interventions, and a sobered West will prove necessarily selective in its military deployments, concentrating on financial interests and lifestyle-protection.

By the middle of the next century, if not before, the overarching mission of our military will be the preservation of our quality of life. ❑

Japan's Military Force: Return of the Samurai?

RICHARD HALLORAN

For the first time in 50 years, the Japanese are showing signs that they might build an armed force that would be commensurate with their economic strength and size of population. Those signs are no bigger than the proverbial hand on the horizon and, in any event, would lead only to a self-reliant defensive force intended to ensure regional security and support United Nations operations. The chances of a resurgence in the ultranationalistic militarism of yesteryear are somewhere between remote and nil.

Even so, the indications are in subtle contrast to the situation a year ago, when it was possible to say there was little evidence that Japan would acquire military power befitting its economic prowess.[1] Why the change?

Most important, the credibility of the United States as the protector of Japan has been eroded by continuing economic friction, political Japan bashing, and cutbacks in American military power. Japanese and American strategic thinkers have long asserted that Japan would not need more than its present small force so long as it could count on the United States under the mutual security treaty between the two nations. Thus the key to a Japanese decision to forge a large military force lies more in Washington than in Tokyo, and Japanese have begun to question whether Americans would sacrifice blood and treasure to defend them. Japan's Ambassador to the United States, Takakazu Kuriyama, said in Honolulu in June: "I am seriously concerned with the erosion of trust."[2]

For their part, Japanese have become nervous as China has modernized and enlarged its armed forces, notably at sea. Japan's 1995 White Paper on defense indicates that the Japanese worry about Chinese threats to the South China Sea, through which passes Japan's oil lifeline from the Persian Gulf. Tension on the Korean peninsula next door causes more anxiety, as does the still formidable Russian force in its Far East.[3]

Further, Japan has been politically paralyzed since the death of Emperor Hirohito, known posthumously as the Showa Emperor, in 1989. The nation's politics have been wracked by the corruption that led to the downfall of the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled for most of the postwar period, and by the inability of subsequent coalition governments to rule effectively. Voter apathy was evident during gubernatorial elections in April and Diet elections in July 1995, when a record low of 44 percent of the voters went to the polls; usually, 70 percent of Japanese voters turn out.[4] This has raised the question of whether the Japanese might turn to a strong-arm leader to escape from their political morass. Some Japanese of the wartime generation worry that younger generations, not having been well-educated on Japan's mistakes of the 1930s and 1940s, may stumble down the same path.

Similarly, Japan has failed to recover from the excesses of the "bubble economy" of the late 1980s. Banks that made bad loans then are on thin ice now, with one bank and a credit union being the first to have failed since World War II; pension plans are also weak; the stock market has gyrated downward; small businesses have failed by the tens of thousands; unemployment is up. The Japan Economic Institute (JEI), a research center in Washington financed by the Japanese government, reports: "Japan now has endured more than four years of economic performance far below what it enjoyed prior to 1991." The outlook is for "continued slow growth by historical standards for the rest of the decade."[5]

Nationalism may drive Japan into assembling a major military force if that is seen as the price of admission to the world's high councils. The Japanese want international recognition for their economic accomplishments and have mounted an insistent campaign to be given a permanent seat along with Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States on the United Nations Security Council. Nationalism manifests itself in Japan's continuing ambivalence about its responsibility for aggression and atrocities before and during World War II, which implies that military power again would be acceptable to the Japanese, although not for aggressive purposes. The JEI pointed to "the pronounced split between those Japanese who regard their country's behavior from the late 19th century through the mid-1940s as a

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source of shame" and those who contend that Japan was only engaged in the same empire-building as Western nations then.[6] That was borne out by the marked differences among Japan's political parties in their August statements commemorating the end of World War II. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party said only, "We must reflect upon the past war." The Social Democratic Party acknowledged that Japan committed a "war of aggression against China and other Asian nations" and should apologize. One of the new parties, Sakigake, said: "We cannot build trust with Asia and the world without reflecting upon Japan's past actions and apologizing frankly." Another new party, Shinshinto, called for reflection on "past actions of aggression and colonial rule" that brought "great suffering" to Japan's neighbors.[7]

Lastly, what is known as the Okinawa rape case has weakened the already frayed cords that tie Japan to the United States; if they are broken, that would add one more reason for Japan to enlarge its armed forces. Two US Marines and a sailor have been accused of raping a 12-year-old Okinawa girl, causing an eruption not only of rage for that alleged crime but of deep-seated resentments generated by the 50-year US military presence on the island. Okinawan political leaders have fanned emotions to enhance their campaign against the national government in Tokyo for what Okinawans consider second-class treatment by mainland Japan. In Tokyo, the political left has further aggravated emotions to generate anti-American sentiments. The damage is likely to be felt for a long time, even if it is not fatal.

Altogether, the economic, political, and security perils confronting Japan, while still relatively bland, are just reminiscent enough of the troubled 1930s to cause anxiety. In those days, resentment against the United States for imposing trade embargoes, threats to the oil lifelines, political unrest, and economic depression gave rise to the militarists who led Japan into World War II and disaster. The chances of this tragedy repeating itself are far distant—but Japan's Asian neighbors continue to express anxiety over a possible return of the samurai. They would have little to fear from the samurai of old, the soldiers of the 12th to 19th centuries who were governed by an evolving code of ethics that came to be known in the 17th century as "bushido," the way of the warrior that emphasized honor, duty, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and other attributes that American soldiers today would applaud. In contrast, Asians have every reason to remember with horror the corrupt militarists who led Japan into aggression, atrocities, and eventually disaster in the modern period.

With half the population and an economy 60 percent of that in the United States, Japan has the people, technology, industry, and funds to assemble an armed force of one million men and women equipped with modern conventional and nuclear weapons. It would take an estimated $250 billion a year, five times current spending, for ten years to get there.[8] Japan's social order would be wrenched because conscription would be necessary. The economy would be stressed because military spending would rise to three to

Military Budgets: Where the Dollar & the Yen Go

(Percentages of Defense Budget FY95)

Expenditure	United States	Japan
Personnel	27.9	43.9
Support US Forces	0.0	11.2
Operations & Maintenance	37.3	17.6
Procurement	17.6	18.4
Research & Development	14.0	3.0
Military Construction & Family Housing	3.5	4.6
Other	0.1	1.3

Numbers may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. Sources: US, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress 1995*. Japan, *Boei Hakusho, Heisei Nananen-ban* (Defense White Paper, 1995 edition).

Table 1. Comparison of US and Japanese Defense Expenditures.

five percent of gross national product from its current one percent of GNP, putting Japan at the same percentage as other industrial countries.

On the other hand, Japan lacks the natural resources to sustain a modern military force independent of external sources of supply. The Japanese know, too, that geography works against them; they live in a tight, island nation that is highly vulnerable to conventional and nuclear attack from large, powerful neighbors.[9]

The main obstacle to an expansion of Japan's Self Defense Forces, as the Japanese army, navy, and air force are called, is a severe lack of political will among Japan's leaders and public. Despite the tiny warning signs, little in government policy or public indicators suggests that more than a handful of Japanese seek a return to the militaristic past. "The Japanese people were traumatized by World War II and the humiliation of Japan's defeat," says a report from the Pacific Forum in Honolulu. "Post-war educational pacifism has insured that the vast majority of Japanese people still maintain a strong aversion of anything military."[10] Everyone over the age of 60, including many of those who are prominent in Japan today, remembers the devastation of 1945.

Equally important, so long as the American shield remains in place, the Japanese have no real need for a large military force. There is no place for it to go nor anything for it to do unless the Japanese decide to invade other parts of Asia as they did in the 1930s—and they have no reason for that, given their economic preeminence in Asia. If Japan sought to invade other nations in Asia today, it would clash with four of the world's strongest armed forces in Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and China, plus the modern forces of Taiwan, Vietnam, and others in Southeast Asia. As Robert Scalapino, the prominent scholar on Asia at the University of California in Berkeley, has said: "The Asia of the 1990s is not the Asia of the 1920s and 1930s. There is no vacuum of power

on the continent. There is no physical Japanese empire to defend. And there is no region to liberate from Western imperialism. Moreover, to 'go it alone' is less and less feasible for any nation, even the United States."[11]

Arrayed against such an expansion are a constitution that forbids a militarized Japan, law that precludes it, and political leaders and an adamant public who oppose it. Only last year did the Social Democrat Party, part of Japan's ruling coalition, reverse itself and declare the nation's Self-Defense Forces to be constitutional. At the same time, the party called for cuts in personnel, weapons, and defense spending over the next ten years. Even Ichiro Ozawa, a controversial conservative seen as perhaps the most forceful advocate of a greater Japanese role in security, says: "The only overseas uses of force that we can permit our nation are peace-keeping activities that take place under the flag of the United Nations."[12]

This opposition is rooted in Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, the famed "no-war" clause, adopted in 1947. It says:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency will never be maintained.

Article IX has been open to many interpretations, most of them asserting that Japan has retained the right of self-defense—but no more. General Douglas MacArthur, who commanded the American occupation under whose auspices Article IX was drafted, said in his 1950 New Year's message: "By no sophistry of reasoning can the constitutional renunciation of war be interpreted as complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack." More important, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 recognized Japan's right to self-defense.

The first Basic Policy for National Defense, written in 1957, said: "The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression but, once invaded, to repel such aggression." Japan took the unusual and perhaps unique position that it would depend on another nation, the United States, for its defense. The policy said Japan would deal "with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-US security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations."

The legitimacy of the Self-Defense Forces has long been fought in Japanese courts. The Supreme Court said in 1959: "Certainly there is nothing in [the Constitution] which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power." But the District Court in Sapporo, on the northern island of Hokkaido, ruled in 1973 that the Self-Defense Forces violated Article IX. That view has not prevailed.

"So long as the American shield remains in place, the Japanese have no real need for a large military force."

In 1967, the cabinet of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato said Japan would not make, acquire, or allow nuclear weapons to be introduced into Japan. The Japanese, however, did not agree to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until 1976 because Tokyo asserted that the treaty discriminated against non-nuclear nations and would inhibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, a tacit transit agreement with the United States made in 1960 permits American warships to carry nuclear weapons in and out of Japan, but not to store them there nor to deploy them from Japan.[13] That issue became moot when President Bush ordered nuclear weapons removed from US warships.

The cabinet of Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976 limited military spending to one percent of national wealth. Successive cabinets have kept it in that range. Mr. Miki's cabinet also forged a National Defense Program Outline; it said Japan would acquire only enough military power that would be needed, with the help of the United States, to repel an armed invasion. Under American pressure, Prime Minister Zentaro Suzuki pledged in 1981 that Japan would acquire sufficient forces to defend its sea lanes for 1000 miles from shore. Japan has been slow to fulfill that commitment.

President Reagan's Administration applied mild pressure on Japan to assume a greater share of the military and financial burden for defense. Japan's defense spending thus began to creep up. In 1988, it went over one percent—1.004 percent, to be exact. That Tokyo carried the figure out three decimal points indicated the sensitivity of the issue. For the next two years, defense spending was in that range, then slipped back under one percent in 1990 and has remained there since.[14]

A debate over Japan's role in Asian and global security was triggered partly by the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989, which marked the passing of Japanese wartime leadership. New leaders with no memories of World War II began coming to the top in politics, the bureaucracy, business, the universities, and the press. Many thought that Japan's economic strength entitled their nation to more respect among the world's other leading nations.

Mr. Ozawa reflected some of the new generation's sentiment in his book, *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation.* "Like it or not," Ozawa said, "it is clear that Japan has become a global power that cannot avoid the responsibilities that come with power."[15] Many Japanese—and other

Asians—have expressed the fear that the United States was becoming protectionist and isolationist and therefore could not be relied on to keep its commitments in Asia. Further, some thought a sovereign nation should not rely on others for its security. That idea, however, has not gained much currency. As Mr. Ozawa wrote: "Japan does not have the capability to assume the defense of the nation independently."[16]

Deliberations accelerated during the Persian Gulf crisis when Japan was embarrassed by the derision with which its low profile was received internationally. After nearly two years of debate, a law enabling Japanese troops to take part in peacekeeping operations was passed in June 1992. Even so, such deployments are closely constricted. A cease-fire must be in place at the site in question, the Japanese must be invited by the parties involved, and the operation must be sponsored by the United Nations. Japanese troops are limited to nonmilitary assignments, such as humanitarian relief, but have served well in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Japan is scheduled to dispatch a 50-man peacekeeping unit to the Golan Heights in February 1996.[17]

Even so, Japanese anxieties erupted when two Japanese on peacekeeping missions were killed in Cambodia in 1993. The press called for Japanese forces to pull out, but an appeal by the father of one of the young men, who said he was proud that his son had sought to bring peace to Cambodia, calmed things down.

A fresh statement on Japanese defense came in August 1994, when a blue-ribbon commission of senior business executives and retired government officials recommended only moderate changes in Japan's 40-year-old security posture.[18] The Advisory Group on Defense Issues, led by Hirotaro Higuchi, chairman of Asahi Breweries, said Japan should continue to rely on the United States. The group recommended, however, that Japan also become active in regional security and United Nations peacekeeping operations.

In a shift in nuance from the Defense White Papers, the commission said: "The ultimate foundation of security lies in the determination of a people to defend themselves and in holding the appropriate means of doing so." For Japan's own part, the group suggested that the Self-Defense Forces improve intelligence operations, including the use of satellites, and build a missile defense. The Self-Defense Agency announced in August that it would develop an air defense missile like the Patriot and deploy it in 2003 at a cost of $1.3 billion.[19] To protect sea lanes out to 1000 miles, the commission said Japan should acquire aerial tankers to refuel patrol planes, buy AWACS warning planes, and expand its fleet of destroyers.[20] The government decided, however, to cut back the production of the new FSX fighter, which is being developed jointly with the United States, to 80 planes from the 120-130 that had originally been planned.[21]

Public opinion, as measured in polls, is set against Japan acquiring a large armed force. Those polls have consistently shown that large majorities of

Military Forces: The World & Asia

Rank.	Nation	Armed Forces
1.	China	2,930,000
2.	Russia	1,714,000
3.	**United States**	**1,650,000**
4.	India	1,265,000
5.	North Korea	1,128,000
6.	South Korea	633,000
7.	Pakistan	587,000
8.	Vietnam	572,000
9.	Ukraine	517,000
10.	Iran	513,000
11.	Turkey	503,000
12.	Egypt	440,000
13.	Taiwan	425,000
14.	France	409,000
15.	Syria	408,000
16.	Iraq	382,000
17.	Germany	367,000
18.	Brazil	336,800
19.	Italy	322,300
20.	Myanmar(Burma)	286,000
21.	Poland	283,000
22.	Indonesia	276,000
23.	Thailand	256,000
24.	Britain	254,000
25.	**Japan**	**237,700**
26.	Romania	230,500
27.	Spain	206,500
28.	Morocco	195,500
29.	Mexico	175,000
30.	Cuba	173,000
31.	Israel	172,000

Other Nations in Asia and the Pacific

Sri Lanka	126,000
Bangladesh	115,500
Malaysia	114,500
Philippines	106,500
Cambodia	85,500
Canada	78,100
Australia	61,600
Singapore	54,000
Laos	37,000
Nepal	35,000
Mongolia	21,250
New Zealand	10,000
Brunei	4,400

Source: *Military Balance 1994-1995* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994)

Table 2. Relative Sizes of Armed Forces.

the Japanese think the Self-Defense Forces should be kept at the present level or reduced. In one poll, 69 percent said Japan should continue to rely on the United States and the SDF for the nation's defense. Some 20 percent said they didn't know, while seven percent said Japan should seek unarmed neutrality and only four percent thought Japan should go it alone.[22] Large majorities have said the most useful function of the SDF was not defending the country but helping to recover from a natural disaster. Yet the SDF was reluctant to respond to the earthquake in Kobe in early 1995 for fear of criticism for interfering in a civilian matter. Emperor Akihito made clear during his coronation in 1990 that he fully embraced the Constitution and its spirit, including the antimilitary clauses, for which most Japanese have applauded him.

Numbers are not everything in measuring military strength, but they do count, and they show little Japanese inclination to become a military power. Japan's armed forces today have an authorized strength that places them 25th on a list of world military forces, in the neighborhood of Thailand, Britain, and Romania.[23] Japan has no forces that would enable it to project military power, no long-range bombers, no long-range missiles, no aircraft carriers, and little transport to carry ground forces. Japan's high-technology weapons, such as F-15 fighters, are configured for defense, not offense.

Moreover, Japanese enlistment figures are consistent with public apathy. Their volunteer force, which was authorized 273,800 men and women in 1995, is 12.5 percent under strength. The ground force accounts for most of the shortage, having only 151,155 soldiers, only 84 percent of its authorized 180,000 people.[24] Acknowledging this, the Advisory Group on Defense Issues recommended that total authorized strength be reduced to 240,000.[25]

Much is sometimes made of Japan's defense budget, which is on a par with those of Britain, France, and Germany. Any discussion of Japanese statistics in dollars these days must be viewed warily, because gyrations in the yen-dollar exchange rate make Japanese costs seem even higher than they already are. Nonetheless, the numbers are useful gauges so long as they are not taken literally.

Japan's defense costs are astronomical, and Japanese get less military power for their money than any other major nation. Japan spent 43.9 percent of its $52.5 billion defense budget in 1995 on personnel and another 11.2 percent to support the 47,000 American troops in Japan.[26] Thus, Japan had spent 55 percent of its military funds before it bought the first bullet, bean, or band-aid. In contrast, the Pentagon spent only 28 percent of its 1995 budget on personnel, with 37 percent spent on operations and maintenance, and 17.6 percent on procurement of weapons and equipment.[27]

Procurement costs are extraordinarily high in Japan because the SDF is deprived of economies of scale. Procurement took 18.4 percent of the budget in 1995 and orders for weapons were small. Moreover, Japanese law forbids the sale of weapons to other nations, which further increases unit costs. Thus, 20 Type 90 tanks cost $10.5 million apiece, or about twice what a comparable tank would have cost in the United States. The same was true for Japan's five F-15 fighters priced at $120 million each and one destroyer at $714 million.[28]

In other elements of modern military power, Japan has attained a world-class reputation for developing technology, much of which could be transformed into military equipment. In communications, where Japan's Self-Defense Forces are said to lag, a particular effort would be required. At least one analyst, however, is skeptical of Japan's ability to take part in the so-called "revolution in military affairs" that has caught the imagination of strategic thinkers in the United States. This revolution centers on sophisticated sensors, swift gathering and dissemination of intelligence, and weapons that strike with precision.[29] Arthur J. Alexander of the Japan Economic Institute has written:

"The pacifist environment of today's Japan severely compromises the ability of both industry and the military to conceive of and design advanced systems and concepts. The feedback necessary to inform military judgment is missing." He concludes that Japan "is an improbable source of a military-technical revolution in the future."[30]

In the nuclear field, it is widely accepted that Japan could acquire nuclear weapons quickly if Tokyo decided to do so. Seizaburo Sato, an influential analyst of foreign and security policy, has asserted that "we could build a nuclear bomb within six months."[31] Today, 28 percent of Japan's electrical power is generated by nearly 50 nuclear power plants; Japan plans to generate 45 percent of its electricity from nuclear power by the year 2010. Japan has begun to import plutonium waste to reprocess it into nuclear fuel; critics fear Japan may be stockpiling material that is near-weapons grade. In August, the Japanese began operating a prototype fast breeder reactor that produces plutonium, the critical ingredient in nuclear weapons.[32] At the same time, Japan decided to postpone plans to build an advanced thermal reactor that would lead to reactors producing more plutonium than they burn; the advanced thermal reactor was too expensive for now.[33] Some Americans have speculated that Japan would go nuclear if North Korea was proven to have built nuclear weapons. Senior Japanese officials, however, scoffed at this so long as the American nuclear deterrent remained credible. One official said: "We have lived next door to a nuclear-armed China for years, and Russian submarines with nuclear weapons regularly cruise down our coasts—only not so much anymore. The North Koreans would be nothing new." Many Japanese, however, worry that hostilities on the Korean peninsula could produce a flood of refugees headed for Japan by boat.

To field a capable force armed with conventional weapons, Japan can produce almost everything that would be needed. The Japanese turn out fighter planes, warships, diesel-electric submarines, tanks, trucks, and electronic apparatus. The defense industry in Japan is small, with arms makers incorporated within large companies whose main business is civilian goods. Those factories could be converted to produce weapons, but not without wrenching industry and the economy, with its consequent political and social disruption.

Even with its economic problems, Japan could raise the funds for a first-class military force. Its foreign exchange reserves are among the world's highest, its savings rate is high, and its balance of international payments runs heavily in Japan's favor. Without question, Japan could raise its defense spending to three percent of gross national product. The financial disruption would be painful, however, as the Ministry of Finance would require a hefty raise in taxes. That would cause a large drain on funds that otherwise would go into investment, social welfare, education, and public works.

A modern armed force requires young men and women who can read with comprehension, master complicated technology, and think under pressure. Japan's high standards of education, which make more than 99 percent of the

people literate, and the discipline of everyday Japanese life, would make training a competent armed force relatively easy. If the United States can field a force of two million, Japan, with half the population, could reasonably produce a force of one million, which would make it the world's sixth largest military force. Perhaps the biggest factor to overcome would be a projected drop in the number of young men and women of military age, usually considered between the ages of 18 and 26. Young men of military age in Japan peaked at nine million this year; projections show that number dropping to about 6.4 million in the year 2008. For that reason, Japan has recruited more women into the Self-Defense Forces. A naval training ship calling at Pearl Harbor in October included, for the first time, 13 newly commissioned female officers in the ship's complement.

Japan's natural resources are limited and must come from overseas; that was among the primary causes of Japanese military ventures during World War II. Japan remains as vulnerable as it was then, when American submarines cut its oil, raw material, and food lifelines to Southeast Asia. Japan today imports all but a teacup of its oil, all of its iron ore for steel, most other metal ores and raw materials, and large quantities of food. Contrary to a widespread view held in the United States, Japan's economy is driven by imports, not by exports.

As Japan's neighbors have acquired ever greater military power, Japan has geographically become even more vulnerable. It has few natural defenses beyond the narrow straits that separate it from the mainland. Japan is especially vulnerable to conventional and nuclear attack from the air and sea because the nation's people, industry, and agriculture are concentrated in a belt about 100 miles wide running from Tokyo to Nagasaki. Nuclear weapons could rain down on that area like an artillery barrage.

With all this, a Japanese decision to acquire military power will still depend greatly on what Washington does. Thus the question of Japan's alliance with the United States flowed through a symposium arranged by the Japan-America Societies of the United States and the America-Japan Societies of Japan in Honolulu in June 1995. Specifically, the recurring issue was whether bitter economic disputes would spill over into the realm of politics and security.

During the Cold War, conventional wisdom held that politics and security took precedence over economics because of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. With the end of that conflict, critics of the Washington-Tokyo connection argued that the rationale for an alliance had disappeared. That was contrary to the view held in the symposium; both Americans and Japanese believed the national interests of their respective nations were best served by a strong trans-Pacific alliance.

The concern expressed by Ambassador Kuriyama reflected a widespread fear that an erosion has already started. The recent agreement on exports of American automobiles to Japan is not likely to alleviate the problem as other trade frictions, such as that over photographic film, will continue.

This is "a dangerously volatile situation," said Nagayo Homma, executive director of the Japan Foundation's Center for Global Partnership, a grant-making foundation in Tokyo. He blamed "weak political leadership and short-sighted bureaucracy" on both sides of the Pacific.

In a similar vein, James A. Kelly, the president of the Pacific Forum, a research organization in Honolulu affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, contended that "the reasons for preserving and strengthening the alliance that we have are compelling." He lamented that "these reasons have not been aired thoroughly—on either side of the Pacific."

Yukio Okamoto, a former diplomat and now a consultant in Tokyo, was forceful: "Our future is precarious, to say the least. The present inflammatory rhetoric across the Pacific is a body blow to the basic fabric of the relationship." He concluded: "We are almost in a fist-fight with each other."

There were some voices of cautious optimism. Professor Scalapino said "there are good reasons to believe that for both countries, a close working relation will remain of critical importance despite the difficulties." For the future, he said, "while this will be a troubled marriage, there cannot be a divorce."

Another prominent scholar, Akira Iriye of Harvard, contended that "the partnership has been as solid and durable as it has been because it has been built not just on the mutually felt security needs of the two nations." He emphasized "the sharing of cultural experiences by Americans and Japanese." Yukio Matsuyama, former chairman of the editorial board at the Asahi newspaper, agreed and concluded: "What is needed now is not more economic negotiations but more gatherings like this."

Even so, anxieties won the day. Sozaburo Okamatsu, former vice-minister for international affairs in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, said that trade disputes have become politicized and emotional. As a result, he said, "mutual distrust between Japan and the United States [has] gradually increased."

James Auer of Vanderbilt University, a specialist on Japanese defense issues, was critical of both governments for having focused too much on economic matters. Therefore, he said, "security ties have been endangered." Instability in various parts of Asia, he argued, "makes the US-Japan [Mutual Security] Treaty more important for Washington, Tokyo, and the rest of the world."

Toward the end of the conference, Ambassador Kuriyama was pressed on the question of whether trade disputes would affect political and security ties. At first he was exquisitely diplomatic, noting that the question had come up in the summit meeting in Halifax, Canada. "Prime Minister Murayama and President Clinton agreed not to let trade disputes affect the whole range of relationships," he said. Then the Ambassador reverted to the candor for which he is known: "It is one thing for the President and Prime

Minister to say that trade disputes should not spill over into politics and security. It's another thing to say that they will not. It naturally will affect the security relationship."

NOTES

1. See Richard Halloran, "Is Japan a Military Threat to Asia?" *Arms Control Today*, November 1994, p. 12.
2. At the Japan-America Society Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 1995.
3. *Boei Hakusho, Heisei Nananen-ban* (Defense White Paper, 1995 edition).
4. *JEI Report*, 28 July 1995.
5. *JEI Report*, 11 August 1995.
6. "War Resolution Falls Short of Settling Japan's Historical 'Debt,'" *JEI Report*, 7 July 1995. For a thoughtful essay on the same issue, see "The Japan that Cannot Say Sorry," *Economist*, 12 August 1995, p. 31. See also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 August 1995, pp. 18, 30-31, and "Memory and Apathy," p. 36.
7. *Japan Times Weekly International Edition*, 21-27 August 1995.
8. I have been unable to find an authoritative Japanese or US estimate of what it would cost to build a Japanese military force roughly 60 percent the size of the US armed force. Therefore, I constructed a notional Japanese force, weighted slightly in favor of naval forces for a maritime nation, and assigned to it US costs. That produced a conservative estimate because American military costs are far lower than those in Japan. Thus the $250 billion figure should be taken as indicative, not as precise. Ten years is calculated on the time it would take Americans to design, build, and stand up seven aircraft carriers, 50 nuclear powered submarines, a fleet of bombers, tankers, and transports, and the other weapons and equipment of modern armed forces. Thus, suggestions that Japan could expand its armed forces swiftly are well off base.
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15. Ozawa, p. 21.
16. Ibid., p. 107.
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18. *Nihon no Anzen Hosho to Boeiryoku no Ari Kata: Nijuichi Seiki e Mukete no Tenpo* (The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century), Advisory Group on Defense Issues, Cabinet Secretariat, August 1994.
19. Japanese Self-Defense Agency, 14 August 1995.
20. *Nihon no Anzen Hosho to Boeiryoku no Ari Kata*, pp. 39-50.
21. *Japan Times Weekly International Edition*, 21-27 August 1995.
22. *Boei Hakusho*, p. 378.
23. See *Military Balance 1994-1995* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 1994).
24. *Boei Hakusho*, p. 360.
25. *Nihon no Anzen Hosho to Boeiryoku no Ari Kata*, pp. 19-21.
26. *Boei Hakusho*, p. 337.
27. US Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, February 1995, p. B-1.
28. *Boei Hakusho*, pp. 333-34.
29. See Michael J. Mazarr, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning," US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
30. Arthur J. Alexander, "Japan's Potential Role in a Military-Technical Revolution," *JEI Report*, 13 January 1995, p. 2.
31. Interview with Eugene Brown, 8 June 1992, as disclosed in Dr. Brown's report, "Japan's Search for Strategic Vision: The Contemporary Debate," US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 25 February 1993.
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War, Peace, and Interventional Armed Conflict: Solving the Peace Enforcer's Paradox

MICHAEL H. HOFFMAN

The situation demanded international action. Some of the toppled hierarchy were hostages; others had been murdered by the new regime. The Western world recoiled when jails became abattoirs, their floors slippery with the blood of hundreds of priests, nobles, dissidents, and street criminals hacked, stabbed, shot or clubbed to death as enemies of the state. It was Paris in August 1792.[1] The French Revolution, a clear threat to international peace and security, had to be stopped.

The King of Prussia's armies were already moving into France that month to put down the threat. By September their uncertain advance stopped for good at Valmy where, thanks to innovative military technologists in service to the revolution, they were exposed to the most intense cannonade yet seen in the history of warfare. The vigorous resistance from men imbued with a new patriotic fervor proved too much for them. The Duke of Brunswick and his befuddled Prussians left the field light on casualties, but heavy with the conviction that they had been beaten. The revolution was saved.

Peace enforcers can be viewed as modern counterparts of those Prussian invaders, dispatched to put down a new order of things. The Duke of Brunswick had crossed into France to crush an ideological and military threat to the European monarchies and the social and political order backing them. Peace enforcers today are sent across borders to put down threats to the modern nation-state structure and the humanitarian values intensely championed since 1945.

What is Peace Enforcement?

The absence of agreed international terminology for post-Cold War military intervention operations conducted in the name of peace continues to pose problems for policymakers, planners, and commanders.[2] The US Army has taken a valuable step forward by defining peace enforcement as "The application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."[3] This definition is useful, but politics often militate against a clear statement of the scope of operations conducted under the heading of peace enforcement.

The peace enforcer's problem is particularly acute in situations which often, almost by definition, carry a high probability of armed conflict in at least the low to mid range of the spectrum of violence. This circumstance is complicated because some of the strongest advocates of peace enforcement activities are found in the leadership of humanitarian organizations. Many in those organizations find it difficult—given personal and institutional commitments to nonmilitary solutions—to concede that some interventions will inevitably have a military, rather than a humanitarian, foundation. In the worst case, the two perspectives can become irreconcilable.

Policymakers may be reluctant to address peace enforcement as requiring a conventional application of military force, lest domestic opposition disrupt their plans. Other resistance may come from leadership in the state that is the destination of the intervention force. Objections to characterizing an intervention operation as a military action may include the appearance of submitting to an occupation force or a requirement to recognize the intervening troops as belligerents under the laws of war.

Peace enforcers themselves may be tempted or required to deny the operational reality before them. Conceptual haze can seep into the planning process and deny policymakers and planners a realistic operational model. Peace enforcement, an obscure concept, is still a new tool of statecraft; its operational antecedents, however—combat and military occupation—are anything but obscure.

It has been observed that peace enforcement operations "demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. [They] are conceived in uncertainty, and conducted often with precari-

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ous responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions." [4] When those observations were published in 1940, the authors had in mind 45 years of American experience with intervention operations in the Philippines, China, and the Caribbean. Peace enforcement was recognized neither in concept nor in practice. The Marine Corps called these interventions "small wars."

Operations by the Army and the Marines before World War II frequently were conducted to establish political stability and a foundation for long-term nation building. It was well understood, and accepted by all involved, that peace enforcement is a form of war.

Origins and Constraints

Contemporary peace enforcers are yoked to a massive paradox. They deploy to defend a system—the international legal system and the values it promotes—which never anticipated and consequently makes no allowance for their work. There is a poor fit between the operational realities of peace enforcement and the uncertain powers vested in commanders of such operations.

Peace enforcers seek to protect the vision of a 17th-century Dutch scholar, Hugo Grotius, honored as the father of modern international law, whose treatise "On the Law of War and Peace" contained a vision of an impartial international legal system, structured with states as the players. Grotius proposed a law of peace with consistent rules for international dealings, and a separate law of war that offered moral parameters for the conduct of war.[5]

That vision was reinforced when the Thirty Years War ended in 1648. The Peace of Westphalia marked the beginning of the modern, state-centered concept of world order. It gave the Holy Roman Empire's formerly subservient members the right to forge their own alliances. From that beginning comes our concept of world order, predicated on the existence of stable nations, with governments in control of their own territory and engaged in peaceful, cooperative relationships with other states. Since 1989, however, the number of fragile and collapsed states has increased significantly, threatening the Grotian-Westphalian order. Meeting that threat is an important motivation for peace enforcement.

Peace enforcers also deploy to protect the more recent phenomenon of an international human rights structure. Mass murder, extreme brutality toward captives, and other massive violations of humanitarian norms by the Axis Powers during World War II were recognized as a threat to the international legal system that had been built up by the 1930s. Those trauma eventually produced an unprecedented international system of human rights treaties and an international structure for their enforcement.

Change began with the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, followed in 1948 by the UN General Assembly's adoption of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and the "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

the Crime of Genocide." Other landmarks include the General Assembly's adoption, in 1966, of the "Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" and the "Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." These were followed in 1984 by the "Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment." Treaties, new international tribunals, diplomatic debate, official resolutions, and heightened press coverage have elevated human rights to unprecedented importance in world attention. Private initiatives, reflected in the worldwide proliferation of private volunteer organizations (PVOs) dedicated to humanitarian activities, have mobilized many able, articulate champions in the cause.[6] Military professionals should be aware of these powerful new intellectual, political, and operational developments, because they drive many peace enforcement missions.

While UN-sanctioned coalition operations in Korea and the Persian Gulf were the international community's response to naked aggression, contemporary Chapter VII operations are frequently spawned by challenges to human rights and humanitarian standards. Neither Somalia nor Haiti were strategic prizes or of significant interest to most of the participants. Nonetheless, an aroused international community authorized peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to end a massive humanitarian relief crisis in one and human rights depredations in the other.[7] Conversely, human rights violations elsewhere—Ngorno-Karabach, Afghanistan, and Sudan by way of example—did not elicit comparable reactions. War in the former Yugoslavia illustrates the full range of behavior to which the international community has declared itself opposed, by law and custom, since the end of World War II.

Enter the United Nations

When conducted by nations for their own strategic purposes, intervention operations are easy to categorize under traditional rules of international law. Forces engaged in these missions are looking after their own state interests, usually at the expense of other states. Participants are belligerents, bound by the law of war embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

From the earliest days of the UN's interest in peace enforcement, however, it has been argued that military operations conducted under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter are not covered by the Hague or Geneva Conventions. Because the UN is not a state, it is ineligible to adopt those treaties. It follows that military forces are not traditional parties to a conflict when operating under UN Security Council resolutions based on Chapter VII. Forces committed to a Chapter VII operation do not take sides in any conflict; in principle they are intervening in a state or region to end a threat to international peace and security. Because they are not parties to a conflict, they are held not to have a vested interest in how it ends. Consequently,

military forces committed to peace enforcement under Chapter VII are not covered by the law of war. These arguments have been raised as an objection to applying the law of war in any peace enforcement operation.[8]

Theoretical as they may appear, the foregoing constraints have direct and immediate consequences for those who plan and carry out peace enforcement operations. Ambiguous mandates and uncertain authority create real operational problems for Chapter VII peace enforcement commanders. It is useful to recall that international coalitions under US leadership and control in the Korean and Persian Gulf wars, sanctioned by the Security Council, were governed by the law of war.

The Law of War Does Not Sanction Peace Enforcement

The father of peace enforcement seems to have been Mo Tzu, a leading philosopher of China's turbulent Warring States era. During his lifetime, the fifth to fourth centuries B.C., China was fragmented; control was scattered among incessantly warring kingdoms. Even as Mo Tzu exhorted the rulers of these kingdoms to avoid the evils of aggression, he was sending his own followers to rescue small states that were under pressure from their neighbors. His vision did not outlive him.[9]

Two millennia later, the Peace of Westphalia enjoined all parties to settle differences peacefully, and bound them all to make war together against any one of their number that resorted to force. That call to arms was never invoked, but this treaty contains the first hint of peace enforcement as a tool of statecraft.[10] The modern law of war evolved in the following centuries, in a form not entirely compatible with contemporary notions of peace enforcement.

The law of war derives in essence from the customary behavior of soldiers. By the late 1700s a sophisticated system of unwritten practices of war was well known to the armies and navies of Europe. Civilians were generally spared from depredations, while enlightened self-interest tended to ensure that prisoners of war were treated reasonably. Armies of the time were small and relied heavily on a mix of aristocrats and mercenaries. Each group could identify with counterparts on the other side. This well-ordered, closed system began to unravel toward the end of the century, however, when people's armies replaced royal armies. A soldier's anger was harder to control in wars fueled by ideology than in the wars of kings.

By the 1860s early effects of strategic warfare became apparent as the Union Army began to target civilian infrastructure in the Confederacy. The legal structure to cope with the implications of such changes, measured in historical time, developed rapidly. Prodded by the founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross, states agreed in 1863 to establish a network of National Red Cross Societies to aid wounded and sick soldiers. The first Geneva Convention for wounded soldiers, adopted by a diplomatic conference just one year later, marked the beginning of our present network of treaty-based

protection and Red Cross services for victims of war. Such efforts to alleviate the suffering of war are sometimes referred to as "Geneva Law."

The first Geneva Convention applied only to international conflict. It would have been unimaginable at the time for any state to commit itself to international standards for handling a domestic insurrection. In 1868 another piece was added to the modern law of war matrix when a diplomatic conference adopted the Declaration of St. Petersburg, renouncing the use of explosive bullets, thereby starting the modern system of arms control treaties.[11] Two major peace conferences subsequently were held at The Hague; the second, in 1907, produced conventions that still regulate means and methods of maritime and land warfare. The conventions, still applicable only to conflict between states, had no standing in any other form of conflict. They are described as "Hague Law."

Rejection of rules for internal wars was made express at the International Red Cross Conference of 1912, where a US proposal to extend the reach of Red Cross services to internal warfare was firmly rejected by state representatives.[12] States at war then, as now, were considered belligerents. This status gives rise to the duties falling on nations at war, and the protection due from both sides to nationals of enemy warring states. States not parties to the conflict were expected to keep out, and elaborate laws of neutrality regulated their behavior. Nothing in this matrix of custom and treaty anticipated the appearance on future battlefields of neutral, international armed forces fielded by nonstate organizations—forces charged to compel compliance by belligerents with the wishes of the international community.

Against this backdrop of Hague, Geneva, and neutrality law, Britain, France, and Italy formed small international units to police plebiscites after World War I. In 1921 an allied force of 20,000 patrolled the Upper Silesian plebiscite. As the participants all represented the former Allied powers, their credibility as an impartial international force was not compelling. The League of Nations fielded only one military force. From 1927 to 1930 it maintained a small Railway Guard of French, English, and Belgian troops in the Saar; its size and composition changed in the mid-1930s to a force of 3200 composed of British, Dutch, Italian, and Swedish contingents.[13] These examples provided a narrow base of experience for the ambitious vision set forth a decade later in the UN Charter.

A new, replacement Geneva Convention for wounded and sick soldiers was adopted in 1929, along with a new treaty protecting prisoners of war. Both applied only in international conflicts. In the 1930s a convention for civilians was under discussion in international Red Cross circles, but World War II prevented further development of this initiative.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 reflected a major reappraisal of Geneva Law, with two new, updated conventions for the protection of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked soldiers and sailors and one for prisoners of war, and an

entirely new convention for civilians. While the conventions remained broadly applicable only to conflict between states, there was one significant change from previous practice. The delegates adopted Common Article III, a condensed statement of protections for internal armed conflicts. Sometimes referred to as a mini-Geneva Convention, Common Article III binds states and those in insurrection alike to a general prohibition against murder, mistreatment, torture, taking of hostages, and denial of due process. All sides are similarly bound to humane treatment of captives, wounded, and noncombatants.

Common Article III was an extraordinary stretch for many states. It still represents the outer conceptual boundary for the application of the law of war, addressing as it does conflicts within, as opposed to between, states. Geneva Law and Hague Law define the law of war in place today.[14]

A sophisticated set of rules governs interstate wars, generally referred to as international armed conflicts. A much smaller set of rules applies to intrastate wars, generally referred to as internal armed conflicts. This system does not anticipate nor does it address military interventions launched or sanctioned by international organizations for purposes impartial to the issues in dispute among warring parties. This is the first half of the peace enforcer's paradox: there is no place in the law of war as presently construed for peace enforcement.

The Law of Peace Does Not Sanction Peace Enforcement

The law of peace offers no more support for the commander of a peace enforcement operation. For example, peace enforcers may have to exert some degree of civil authority in their area of operations. If the law of war is the accepted model, then the rules for military occupation apply. If the law of war does not apply, then the law of peace offers the only alternate models.

There are three basic models for extraterritorial control in peacetime, only one of which remains extant. Each model assumes that normal functions of a state, including enforcing laws, assuring public protection, and carrying out other civic responsibilities, never existed or have ceased in the region in question. These three models have been the large exceptions to a general rule, namely, that states have no right to assert such power beyond their own border.

- The oldest model, colonial domination, is unacceptable in the modern world. The prime legal model of this form derives from the Berlin Conference of 1885, at the high water mark of collective international land-grabbing. The conference generated a treaty protecting freedom of trade in the Congo basin and bound its signatories to stamp out the slave trade. As the desired end state for peace enforcement operations these seem plausible objectives, but there was more to this treaty.

With Article 35 the signatories also pledged their recognition of "the obligation to ensure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African Continent sufficient to protect the existing

rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed upon."[15] This model offers no guide to peace enforcers. They are not sent to conquer, and no sensible Chapter VII force commander would expect to assume, even briefly, the powers of a colonial governor.

- The second model, involving a system of temporary protectorates, was crafted for the Covenant of the League of Nations. "Mandates" were established to help former provinces and territories of the vanquished Central Powers acquire statehood. As set forth in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, tutelage was furnished to those peoples considered as "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world."[16] The League of Nations mandates were designed to protect regions and peoples as they established their right to admission to the Grotian order of nation-states.

The mandates were broken into categories. Class A mandates, in the Middle East, were scheduled for independence after a brief, developmental phase. Class B mandates, the central African territories wrested from Germany, were thought to be further away from the kind of national identity that would establish them as nation-states. Class C mandates, which included Southwest Africa and many Pacific Islands, had no identity separate from that of the states charged with their governance.[17] Timetables for admission to the nation-state system were never established by the League of Nations. Most of the mandates were still in place when the League disbanded in 1945.

- The third model for peacetime control over foreign soil is found in the UN trusteeship system, established by Chapter XII, Article 76, of the UN Charter. The UN Charter replaced the League's mandates with a system of trust territories, administered in the interest of international peace and security, to promote the advancement of the inhabitants of those territories and to encourage respect for human rights. Contrary to the practice under the League Covenant, the UN Charter also expressly tasks trustee states to promote "progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate." The UN has never shown the League's penchant for long-term governance, rather than independence, for the territories and peoples under its protection.[18]

The historical and contemporary legal models available for conducting peace enforcement operations do not fit the tasks faced by peace enforcers. This outcome highlights the other half of the peace enforcer's paradox: the law of peace provides no legal basis for any state or organization to assert authority over the population of a failed or weakened state in peacetime. Commanders are left with no legal framework for their authority and no guidelines for exercising it.[19]

Conclusions

In the first decades of this century, the United States applied the law of war where it fit during operations in the Caribbean, without regard to the

formal divisions of subject matter in international law. Quoting once again from the *Small Wars Manual*:

> The fact remains that the commander must govern and he must utilize military form of control. Therefore, he will be justified in adopting any reasonable measures necessary to carry out the task or mission that has been assigned him. The commander's policy should be to enforce the laws of war but only to such extent as is absolutely necessary to accomplish his task.[20]

Commanders of peace enforcement operations are on the horns of a dilemma. They are not colonial satraps, nor do they possess the authority of the governor of a UN trust territory. And unless the United Nations were to establish that a fragile or collapsed state had been made a de facto trust territory for the duration of the operation, then the law of peace would offer commanders no guidelines for dealing with armed resistance nor the authority or means to assert control over territory or populations in peacetime. The presence in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia of a personal representative of the UN Secretary General has done little to help commanders escape their dilemma.

Conversely, the law of international armed conflict has not been applied to peace enforcement operations because such operations are assumed to be uniquely impartial and internationalized. Furthermore, the law of internal armed conflict applies only to warring factions within a state, not to foreign military elements that deploy there. Consequently, nothing in the law of war guides or empowers the commander in peace enforcement operations. As operations in Somalia and Bosnia demonstrate, that commander therefore has:

- no power to detain or try common criminals, members of opposing forces, or other individuals that pose a security risk to the nation or the intervention force;
- no authority to regulate any aspect of civil life for the good of the population of the country; and
- no privileged combatant status to protect wounded or captured peace enforcers.

Operation Restore Hope and the follow-on UN operation were bedeviled by the absence of a legal framework for action. Captured Somalis could not be held under the law of war, but there was no authority to hold them under the law of peace. Civilian communities were not regulated under the law of war, but there was no authority to intervene in any aspect of civilian life under the law of peace. Crimes of rape, murder, and pillage in Somalia went unpunished because there was neither an effective police force nor a functional judiciary in the country—and the military commander lacked the legal authority to intervene in civil matters.

Operational guidance was equally obscure in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The international armed intervention to control a politically explosive situation, accomplished by the threat of force, was not expressly

conducted under the law of war. As in Somalia, deployed units lacked a clear operational context. If they were not considered invaders and occupiers under the law of war, then what status did they have under the law of peace?

The following conclusions seem to be supported by experience in so-called peace enforcement operations:

- Peace enforcers are expected to uphold humanitarian standards in conditions of hostility, imminent or actual conflict, political disintegration, and both active and passive opposition to their mission. They lack a legal basis to do so.
- The UN has the power to correct this situation in any resolution that establishes the terms of reference for a peace enforcement operation. The first measure required is to acknowledge that the operation is an armed intervention, undertaken with full appreciation of the risks and costs inherent in intruding militarily in any state's affairs. The second should specifically authorize the application of the laws of war during execution. Another option may be to declare a failed or failing state as a de facto trust territory for the duration of the operation. If this can't or won't be done, then the law of war needs to be applied—nothing else is available to aid the peace enforcer.
- Understanding that peace enforcement constitutes an armed intervention, potentially involving combat, will bring much-needed clarity to our strategic and operational planning. We ought not to send troops on such missions, regardless of what we call them, if we cannot accede to that reality. When that reality is denied, lives are lost in consequence.
- In the absence of extraordinary revisions to the law of war and peace, commanders can only assert the legal authority they need to control the civilian population in a failed or weakened state through an army of occupation. Substantial responsibilities accompany the power to control. Our officers and their civilian counterparts in armed interventions will have to be educated in those responsibilities if the UN invokes the law of war.
- Once on the ground in an armed intervention operation the peace enforcer is a combatant. Recent attempts to slide UN forces into Bosnia with a mission somewhere between passive peacekeeping and more aggressive peace enforcement defy all knowledge of human behavior on the battlefield. It is not in the nature of things for an indigenous belligerent force to accept peacekeepers as military observers one day and gracefully allow them to obstruct its operations the next.

Interventional Armed Conflict: A Way Ahead

In December 1994 the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.[21] Ratifying states commit to protecting United Nations and associated personnel deployed on UN operations against crimes of violence, and to punishing those who commit

such crimes. Article 2 provides that the Convention will not apply to Chapter VII enforcement actions where "the law of international armed conflict applies." However, UN member states have yet to concede that the law of international armed conflict applies in lower-intensity peace enforcement operations authorized under Chapter VII. While the Convention might be applied—albeit awkwardly—in de facto combat environments, doing so could advance the misleading notion that peace enforcement is akin to law enforcement. The Convention, which addresses the security of UN personnel in a law enforcement context, doesn't reach the military heart of the matter.

Neither advanced technology, characterized by current interest in "less-lethal" means of violence,[22] nor the best intentions of those who hope to transform a failed or weak state through personal commitment to humanitarian goals or nation-building, will alter the experience of centuries of conflict. Untested peace enforcement concepts and techniques will not, in the foreseeable future, cause the harsh realities of war—the most likely environment of armed intervention operations—to conform to personal visions of a peaceful world.

Peace enforcement has been marked by continuous, overt antagonism, sporadic hostilities, ambiguous civil-military relationships, deceit, and the type of adversary characterized in Ralph Peters' "The New Warrior Class."[23] These conditions were familiar to those who examined US small wars before World War II. Peace enforcement troops are not parties to an internal armed conflict, and they do not qualify as belligerents under the rules of international armed conflict. They should maintain their status in a law of war category of their own, operating by a set of rules developed especially for them. That category can well be described with a term coined here, "interventional armed conflict." Specifically:

- In all engagements with organized military forces during the execution of a Chapter VII operation, peace enforcers will operate in accordance with the law of war as applied in international armed conflict.
- Whenever Chapter VII forces attempt to control a zone populated by civilians, or to detain belligerents or civilians, such activities will be carried out in accordance with the law of war as applied in international armed conflict.
- Drawing on the precedent of Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1949 for internal armed conflicts, the international law of armed conflict could be applied in full, or adapted to the particular circumstances of interventional armed conflict. By way of practical example, UN forces do recognize and honor the right of the International Committee of the Red Cross to carry out its impartial humanitarian work in peace enforcement environments.[24]

The peace enforcer's mission often demands measures that are recognized in any other context as conventional military operations. We should stop denying that reality. Facing the military facts of peace enforcement operations will clarify behavior appropriate to armed intervention forces, enhance the peace enforcer's privileged status as a combatant, and provide the

legal basis for commanders to implement the terms of the authorizing Security Council resolution. Only with a strong law of interventional armed conflict can we solve the peace enforcer's paradox.

NOTES

1. Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1989, pp. 632-39.

2. Timothy L. Thomas, "Peace Operations: The Terminology Challenge Before the International Community in a Period of post-Cold War Cooperation," US Army Combined Arms Command, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1993.

3. See FM 100-23, p. 111. "Peacekeeping," as that term is usually understood, generally can be accommodated in the existing legal structure, as it requires first an end to a conflict, then the consent of all parties to the role of the peacekeepers, and finally a passive role for the peacekeepers themselves. While peacekeeping missions frequently take place in hostile and dangerous environments, they are analogous to peacetime deployments under a status-of-forces agreement. Peacekeeping operations are viable only as long as the consensus for them continues among all parties to a conflict. While that consensus remains, peacekeepers will not be considered belligerents.

"Peace enforcement," however, is much harder to accommodate under the existing framework of international law. Chapter VII of the UN Charter furnishes a legal basis for "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Article 42 specifically empowers the Security Council to authorize "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations." Peace enforcement units operate under Chapter VII, at the behest of the world community. They do not represent the interests of a single state, and participants are not accorded belligerent status; their mission is not to join a conflict, but rather to end one.

4. US Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (rpt. of 1940 ed.; Washington: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Dept of the Navy, 1987), para. 1-6.

5. Arthur Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations* (rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 111-14.

6. See Peter J. Spiro, "New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decisionmaking Institutions," *Parameters*, 25 (Spring 1995), 43-54; and in the same issue, Andrew S. Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Response System," pp. 68-81.

7. UN Security Council Resolution 794 (3 December 1992) and Security Council Resolution 940 (31 July 1994).

8. D. W. Barnett, *United Nations Forces: A Legal Study* (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 500-01.

9. Cyrus Lee, *Mo Tzu The Great Educator and his Educational System* (Taipei, Taiwan: Universitas Series No. IV, 1969), pp. 90-93.

10. Nussbaum, pp. 116-17.

11. Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, eds., *The Laws of Armed Conflicts* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), pp. 101-02.

12. Andre Durand, *From Sarajevo to Hiroshima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1984), pp. 18-20.

13. Barnett, pp. 8-11.

14. Sometimes Geneva Law is also known as international humanitarian law. Some argue that international humanitarian law covers Hague Law as well, but there is no agreement on that point.

15. Fred L. Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648-1967* (New York: Chelsea House, 1967), II, 1098.

16. For pertinent extracts from the Treaty of Versailles see Green Hayward Hackworth, *Digest of International Law* (Washington: GPO, 1940), I, 103-04.

17. Ibid.

18. See Charter of the United Nations, Ch. XII, International Trusteeship System, Article 76(b).

19. See S. L. Arnold and David T. Stall, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters*, 23 (Winter 1993), 4-26; F. M. Lorenz, "Law and Anarchy in Somalia," *Parameters*, 23 (Winter 1993), 27-41; and Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," *Parameters*, 23 (Winter 1993), 42-58.

20. *Small Wars Manual*, paras. 13-25.

21. General Assembly Resolution 49/59 (9 December 1994).

22. Frederick M. Lorenz, "'Less-Lethal' Force in Operation United Shield," *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1995, pp. 69-76.

23. Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters*, 24 (Summer 1994), 16-26.

24. UN forces in Somalia, for instance, gave the ICRC full access to detainees under their control. This pragmatic adaptation was made without regard to the legal ambiguities surrounding that mission.

Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations

JOHN M. COLLINS

Circumstances under which the United States should intervene militarily on behalf of threatened US interests overseas became the subject of intense debate in 1984, when Secretary of Defense Weinberger prescribed six preconditions that received mixed reviews.[1] Disputes within and between the executive and legislative branches have intensified since post-Cold War complexities replaced the US-Soviet confrontation.[2] Criteria for employing US armed forces as foreign policy instruments are still in flux.[3] It is possible to identify considerations that might help US leaders determine whether military power is appropriate in any given instance, including cases that are benign to begin with. Insights in seven categories familiar to strategists—national interests, threats, political-military objectives, policy guidance, planning options, resources, and public opinion—could help underpin decisions to intervene or abstain and to ascertain whether ongoing military operations seem warranted. Policymakers must determine which interests are worth a fight, relationships between political objectives and the means to attain them, and alternatives in the event that preferred options fail.

Key Considerations

Whether, where, when, and how to intervene militarily pose problems that call for subjective judgments. Secretary Weinberger prescribed "six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad": the presence of "vital" US or allied interests; clear intent to win; precise objectives and ways to accomplish them; "reasonable" assurance of public support; military action as a last resort; continual reassessment and adjustments as events unfold. The considerations identified below, unlike Weinberger's preconditions, recognize that there are no immutable and universally applicable rules for decisions about interventions. Each case is unique. The following checklists therefore pose questions rather than answers.

National Interests

Military intervention in the absence of highly valued interests often is difficult to justify. Interests that directly affect US national security normally take precedence over all others. The only *vital* interest is national survival with sovereignty, territorial integrity, fundamental institutions, and values acceptably intact. Other *valid* interests, including traditional life styles and concerns for international order, are worth preserving. The advisability of military action is most evident when practical political or economic interests are strong. International interests in petroleum, for example, helped create a potent coalition after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, whereas mainly humanitarian motives thus far have failed to solidify unilateral US or multilateral support for military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Intangible interests nevertheless may sometimes prove compelling. National credibility, a necessary asset for any nation that wants to lead, is among them.

A checklist that connects national interests with military intervention might typically include the following entries:

- ✓ Which US and allied interests are pertinent? Are they compatible?
- ✓ Which of them are worth spending US lives for?
- ✓ What is their order of precedence?

Threats to National Interests

Threats to valued national interests vary with regard to imminence and intensity. Decisionmakers who hope to avoid wrong wars at wrong times with wrong enemies cannot rationally conclude that military initiatives would be best until they consider alternatives, appraise probable risks, and prioritize each threat. Those processes first demand intelligence estimates that evaluate enemy capabilities, limitations, and potential responses to US options, supplemented by net assessments that dispassionately compare friendly and enemy postures, with particular attention to geographical contexts.

A checklist that connects threats with military intervention might typically include the following entries:

- ✓ Which perceived threats menace US national interests most severely?
- ✓ Which of those threats are susceptible to mainly military solutions?

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- ✓ How do enemy cultures, capabilities, and geography affect the ability of the United States and its allies or prospective coalition partners to counter threats militarily?
- ✓ What might be the long-term consequences of an opponent's success?

Political Aims and Military Missions

Political aims and military missions prescribe for US armed forces what must be done to safeguard national interests against perceived threats. Like interests, they should be prioritized to allow the application of resources for the most important purposes. Explicit statements are commendable, because unrealistic tasks and speculative requirements otherwise result. Political aims and military missions are best developed in collaboration to ensure compatibility; the US experience in Vietnam, for example, was adversely influenced by senior commanders and their civilian superiors who pursued incompatible outcomes. While it is a truism that no plan survives contact, decisionmakers must nevertheless guard against so-called "mission creep," which incrementally (sometimes inadvertently) amplifies ends well beyond the original intent of a plan and hence the ways and means available to attain them. Humanitarian purposes, for example, initially inspired US operations in Somalia; the subsequent switch to peacemaking and nation development opened a gulf between goals and deployed capabilities. Disputes among the United States, the United Nations, NATO, and other allies can be dangerously disruptive if unresolved, as in Bosnia where some prefer peacekeeping while others believe peace enforcement should be the main goal.

Desirable objectives seek a better situation than prevailed before US armed forces intervened. Military victory is only one satisfactory end, despite General MacArthur's admonition that there is no substitute for it. As defined in this article, success is attained if the United States achieves sound objectives in acceptable time at acceptable costs.

A checklist that connects political aims and military missions with military intervention might typically include the following entries:

- ✓ Are political aims clearly expressed and militarily attainable?
- ✓ Are the aims of the United States, the UN, and allied or coalition partners harmonious?
- ✓ Are political objectives and military missions mutually supportive and reinforcing?
- ✓ Would attainment of US aims alleviate the most serious problems in the afflicted state or region?
- ✓ What political-military and economic costs would accompany failure?

Strategic and Policy Guidance

Strategic and policy guidance, including military rules of engagement, can simplify or complicate the preparation of plans and the attainment of

objectives. US policymakers were relatively unconcerned about damage and enemy casualties during World War II, because unconditional surrender was the goal in a "total war" and our principal allies were fighting for survival. US leaders, in sharp contrast, imposed strict restrictions on military operations throughout the Cold War to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union. Manchuria remained a "privileged sanctuary" while combat raged in Korea. President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara personally directed US naval blockades during the Cuban missile crisis. Restraints tightened to prevent a wider war after US forces intervened massively in Vietnam. Sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were long off limits to US forces; President Johnson picked many targets; graduated responses seemed to apply military power grudgingly. US policymakers, most prominently since Desert Storm, have been reluctant to engage in any armed conflict that promises to be protracted, cause even a few US casualties, or endanger noncombatants. They are prone to consider force only as a last resort, although early decisive action occasionally might quell incipient crises before they become intractable.

A checklist that connects strategic and policy guidance with military intervention might typically include the following entries:

- ✓ Are policies compatible with political aims and military missions?
- ✓ Could some policy restrictions be safely relaxed?
- ✓ Should a time limit be placed on military operations?
- ✓ What costs are acceptable in terms of resources and casualties?

Planning Options

US national security planners balance interests and capabilities against risks and costs, taking policy guidance into account, as they search for feasible, suitable, flexible, and politically acceptable solutions to intervention problems. They advise decisionmakers about the relative roles that diplomacy and military power should play, which missions US armed forces might most appropriately perform, and which might better be left to allies. DOD routinely prepares contingency plans to avoid injurious surprise if crises erupt on short notice, but since precise circumstances are unpredictable, planners cannot anticipate every eventuality. Prior planning nevertheless enables senior officials to reach sound broad conclusions about military intervention much sooner than starting from scratch.

Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, in his treatise entitled *Military Strategy*, identified "planning for certitude as the greatest of all military mistakes."[4] Judicious planners consequently ask themselves "What if this or that happens?" and carefully consider alternative courses of action even when response times are short, then devise substitute Options B, C, and D for implementation if preferred Option A is precluded or fails to produce expected results. One school of thought contends that no action at all is preferable to interventions that risk failure, because accompanying costs would be too high. George Shultz, when he was Secretary of State, spoke for a second school whose members believe that

appeasement may invite aggression; that the United States is morally obligated to assist allies with whom it has security commitments; and that it "must bear responsibility for the consequences of its inaction. . . . We cannot opt out of every contest," he continued. "If we do, the world's future will be determined by others—most likely by those who are . . . most hostile to our deeply held principles."[5]

A checklist that connects planning options with military intervention might typically include the following entries:

- ✓ How might adversaries react to any given option advanced by the United States and its allies or coalition partners?
- ✓ How could US, allied, or coalition forces best share the burdens of an intervention?
- ✓ What alternatives appear most attractive if preferred options fail?
- ✓ What political and economic price may be incurred for inaction?

Resources

Competition for scarce resources always is fierce, but the best laid plans are useful only if ends (specified as desired outcomes) and means (forces and funds) match reasonably well, with enough in reserve to cope if other current threats loom large. Shortfalls create risks. Reconciliations are required whenever the military balance becomes so unfavorable that important US interests appear vulnerable, objectives appear unrealistic, and commanders anticipate excessively high casualties. Improvements then await decisions to reduce ambitions, add assets, or both.

Repeated operations not directly related to US security, though of value, may expend so much of our operations and maintenance (O&M) funds that little is left to invest in future readiness. The choice then is to cut commitments, increase resources, or both. Multilateral participation might be imperative, although allies and coalitions often impose constraints and require a political or economic quid pro quo.

A checklist that connects resources with military intervention might typically include the following entries:

- ✓ Are allocated resources ample for the current contingency?
- ✓ Could remaining resources handle other likely crises?
- ✓ How many reserve component forces of what kinds would be needed?
- ✓ How could allies or coalition partners contribute? Should they? Would they?

Congressional and Public Support

The extent of popular and congressional support ideally should be clear before we undertake a military intervention, but that may not always be the case. Circumstances could force action before approval can be determined; approval also could prove to be transitory. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 10 August 1964,

which endorsed intervention in Vietnam, received only two dissenting votes in Congress, but enthusiasm faded fast after the Tet offensive in 1968. The task of statesmanship therefore is to develop and sustain support for foreign policy initiatives that will involve armed intervention. Compelling interests, sensible objectives, and reasonable prospects for success usually are required to sustain the opinion of the American people and US allies.

The news media exerts a powerful influence on US and world opinion by deciding which crises to publicize and which to ignore. Real-time pictures of starving Somali children, for example, helped spur decisions to intervene, while famine in inaccessible Sudan still receives scant notice.

A checklist that connects public opinion with military intervention might typically include the following entries:

- ✓ Has the President clearly explained the purposes of intervention?
- ✓ Did prior consultation indicate congressional approval?
- ✓ Are US interests and objectives sufficiently compelling to attract and retain public support?
- ✓ Has media coverage overemphasized the crisis concerned?
- ✓ How important is public support to our likely adversaries? Are they better able to develop and sustain it than the United States and US allies?

Reappraisals

Military intervention operations, no matter how innocuously they begin, may eventually make US soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen lay their lives on the line. The President, Congress, and their advisers therefore would be wise to repeatedly scrutinize pertinent national interests, threats, objectives, policies, plans, resources, public opinion, and priorities before and after military intervention begins to ascertain whether corrective actions are required. A composite checklist comparable in function to those in this article could assist such assessments.

NOTES

1. Media response to Weinberger's "tests" is available in *Secretary Weinberger's National Press Club Speech*, Washington, Current News Special Edition No. 1244, DOD, 8 January 1985. That speech plus nine other official views are reproduced in Stephen Daggett and Nina Serafino, *The Use of Force: Key Contemporary Documents*, Rpt. Nr. 94-805F, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 17 October 1994.

2. For some contemporary points and counterpoints, see US Congress, House Rept. 104-18, Parts 1, 2, 3, *National Security Revitalization Act*, Report Together With Additional and Dissenting Views, 104th Congress, 1st Session, 6 February 1995, 166 p.; Ann Devroy, "President, Dole Divide Over Foreign Policy," *The Washington Post*, 2 March 1995, p. 1; Senator Bob Dole, "Shaping America's Global Future," *Foreign Policy*, No. 98 (Spring 1995), 29-43.

3. Past practices are summarized by Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert L. Goldich in *Use of Force by the United States: Case Studies, 1950-1991*, Rpt. Nr. 92-757, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 14 October 1992. Stanley R. Sloan analyzes present trends in *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence?*, CRS Rpt. Nr. 94-581S, 20 July 1994.

4. J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1967), p. 85.

5. "Shultz vs. Weinberger—When to Use Power," *U.S. News & World Report*, 24 December 1984, pp. 20-21.

Force Requirements in Stability Operations

JAMES T. QUINLIVAN

Military requirements for the post-Cold War environment are the central question of a large, somewhat disorganized, debate. The concept of conducting frequent and extended "peace operations" has produced a significant effort to understand both their political context and their military requirements. One category of peace operations, interventions to restore and maintain order and stability, continues its prominence as current news and as a recurring theme in nightmare visions of the future.

It is sometimes difficult to anticipate the force size and the time required to restore and maintain order in a failed or failing state. The force size is driven by two demographic revolutions of the last decades: dramatic growth in the populations of troubled states, and the movement of a considerable portion of that population to the cities. The movement from rural to urban settings is so significant that the populations of some cities exceeds that of many states. The duration of such operations is affected both by their inherent difficulty and by the implicit need in most cases to recreate internal forces of order. Duration adds another dimension, defined by the force available to conduct the intervention and the duration of each unit's stay in the region.

This article investigates the numbers required for stability operations, both for entire countries and individual cities, and explores the implications of those numbers for deployment, rotation, readiness, and personnel retention.

Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, defines the general concept of "peace operations." Within the broader category, "peace enforcement" is further defined as

> the application of armed force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to authorization, to compel compliance with sanctions or resolutions—the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community.[1]

Within the general definition of peace enforcement, "restoration and maintenance of order and stability" are those peace enforcement activities in which

> Military forces may be employed to restore order and stability within a state or region where competent civil authority has ceased to function. They may be called upon to assist in the maintenance of order and stability in areas where it is threatened, where the loss of order and stability threatens international stability, or where human rights are endangered.[2]

In this article, the term "stability operations" refers to operations in which security forces (combining military, paramilitary, and police forces) carry out operations for the restoration and maintenance of order and stability.[3]

The Problem of Numbers in Stability Operations

There are no simple answers to the question of how many troops are required for any sort of military operations. However, the purpose of stability operations—to create an environment orderly enough that most routine civil functions could be carried out—suggests that the number of troops required is determined by the size of populations. This section discusses the general rationale for such an approach, illustrates the range of force numbers that have been used in military operations that seem to correspond to the definition of stability operations, and suggests implications for current population sizes in operations now described as peace enforcement.

From the start, practitioners of counterinsurgency have been clear in stating that the number of soldiers required to counter guerrillas has had very little to do with the number of guerrillas. As Richard Clutterbuck wrote of Malaya in 1966,

> Much nonsense is heard on the subject of tie-down ratios in guerrilla warfare—that 10 to 12 government troops are needed to tie down a single guerrilla, for instance. This is a dangerous illusion, arising from a disregard of the facts.[4]

Conversely, a "hearts and minds" counterinsurgency campaign places the focus on the people, the military consequences of which are requirements for population control measures and local security of the population. Population control measures and local security both demand security force numbers proportional to the population. The static forces that protect the population from

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insurgents and cut off any support the population might provide to them are essential to the campaign. Consequently, in any stability operation it is almost certain that the force devoted to establishing order will be both larger in numerical terms than the forces dedicated to field combat and more aligned to political aspects of a "heart-and-minds" concept of operations.

This requirement for forces other than in the jungle or its equivalent is a general condition. Over a range of stability operations in which opposition has not progressed to the stage of mobile warfare by main force units, the size of stabilizing forces is determined by the size of the population and the level of protection or control that must be provided within the state. Simply generating forces does not guarantee success. Forces in a stability operation serve a broader political-military approach than simply countering or eliminating insurgencies. The ability to generate forces for a stability or peace enforcement operation is a most necessary condition for success—for even successful political strategies in such situations have a military component. The generation of forces is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving stabilizing objectives.

This proposition is illustrated rather than proven through some historical examples, each of which is described briefly below. Figure 1, on the next page, shows historical cases of forces devoted to particular stability operations. The figure relates force size to population, showing the security force size per thousand of population. The figure portrays a range of situations, from enforcing the laws in a generally ordered society to situations of maintaining order where the rule of law has collapsed. The numbers shown are simply the aggregated number of police and army (the "security forces") used in particular cases to achieve results that do not always equate to "victory" or "success." The cases are suggestive rather than definitive, but they provide a sense of scale for the resources required in various situations.

- *Force ratios of one to four per thousand of population.* At the low end of the force requirement scale are the police present day-to-day in generally peaceful populations such as the United States. Overall, the United States is policed at a ratio of about 2.3 sworn police officers per thousand of population. If the ratio is calculated to include the civilian support apparatus of police departments, the ratio increases to 3.1 law enforcement personnel per thousand.[5] Similar numbers are found in the United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland) and other European countries.

There are applications of numbers of this scale to military stability operations. The occupation of Germany immediately after the surrender used nine US divisions in the American Zone. In October 1945, policy changed and the operation shifted to a "police-type" occupation. This change led to the creation of the United States Constabulary (organized as a single large division) charged with the internal security of most of the American Zone of



Figure 1. Security force numbers used in past stability operations.

Occupation. The constabulary was created on the basis of one constable for every 450 German civilians (2.2 per thousand).[6] The force was entirely adequate to its limited objectives of enforcing public order, controlling black market transactions, and related police functions.

The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) deployed about 20,000 security forces (16,000 troops and 3600 civilian police) for a variety of duties that included supervision of the cease-fire and voluntary disarmament of combatants, supervision of about 60,000 indigenous police to provide law and order, and administration of a free and fair election. In a population of roughly 9.1 million, the UN force had a force ratio of about 2.2 per thousand of population. By itself, the UN did not have a presence outside of large population centers nor a plausible capability for coercion, control, or protection of either the combatant factions or the civilian population.

• *Force ratios of four to ten per thousand of population.* A number of operations have used security and military forces at such force ratios:

Ongoing operations in India's Punjab state against Sikh militants deploy a security force of about 115,000 (regular troops, paramilitary security formations, and police) to secure a population of about 20.2 million, giving a force ratio of 5.7 per thousand.[7] The counterinsurgency campaign in the Punjab has been denounced as routinely violating human rights by causing hundreds

of disappearances and summary executions. In the face of some popular support for the insurgents, even such a harshly punitive campaign has required large forces to protect and coerce.[8]

In 1965, the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic to stave off an incipient civil war. The United States deployed soldiers and Marines to separate the protagonists and assumed responsibility for stability in much of the country, particularly the capital. Peak deployment of US forces brought 24,000 to stabilize a population of about 3.6 million, giving a force ratio of about 6.6 troops per thousand.[9]

- *Force ratios above ten per thousand of population.* Force ratios above ten per thousand have been mounted in stability operations. In 1952 the British forces in the Malayan Emergency deployed close to 40,000 regular troops from Britain and the Commonwealth as well as the regulars of the Malay Regiment itself.[10] At the same time, the police force had 29,800 regular police together with 41,300 special constables,[11] for a total full-time security force of more than 111,000. With a population at the time of 5,506,000, the British generated a force ratio of about 20 per thousand of population. If the Home Guard force of 210,000 (1953 strength, not all of whom were either armed or active at any given time) were added to the previous figure, the force ratio would be even higher.

In Northern Ireland the British government deployed for more than 25 years a security force of around 32,000 (including both British military forces and the Royal Ulster Constabulary) to secure a total population of just over 1.6 million, giving a force ratio of about 20 per thousand. The British have recently reduced their military forces as part of an ongoing peace process.

Implications of Force Ratios Based on Population

These population-driven force ratios have a number of implications. For total populations, they imply that stability operations could demand large numbers of peacekeeping forces. For urban populations, they suggest that initial commitments could also be large. Finally, these ratios indicate that long-term commitments might be difficult to sustain without exacting unacceptable tolls on readiness or retention.

Implications for Entire Populations

The populations of countries in the underdeveloped world have expanded markedly relative to the population of the United States. More particularly, the populations of Third World countries have expanded even more dramatically relative to the size of the American military.

Figure 2, on the next page, shows the population of various states on the framework used in Figure 1 to illustrate the historic force requirements for stabilization operations. The figure suggests two implications. First, very few states have populations so small that they could be stabilized with modest-



Figure 2. Security force size as a function of force ratios and current populations of representative countries.

sized forces. Second, a number of states have populations so large that they are simply not candidates for stabilization by external forces. Between the two extremes are countries large enough that only substantial efforts on the part of great powers or substantial contributions from many states could generate forces large enough to overcome serious disorder in such populations. Consider, however, that even many of these countries have populations so large that relatively modest per capita force deployments would entail moving, sustaining, and employing tens of thousands of troops in what the Army calls a "bare-base environment." The more rustic the environment, the larger the logistics tail needed to sustain the force.

Implications at Smaller Scales, Problems with Cities

Some might propose avoiding the problem of total populations by dealing with entire countries a little at a time in some updated version of an enclave or oil spot approach. But the current sizes of starting points or regions in too many states create problems comparable to operations that undertake to deal with the entire state. If we assume that among the first operational tasks of a stabilizing force is securing the capital, entry ports, and principal cities, we must bear in mind that many of those cities are now so large that they themselves constitute major problems for stabilization.

Country	Population (millions)	Capital	Population of Capital (millions)	Capital's Population as percent of total
Colombia	34.0	Bogota	5.0	15%
Cuba	10.9	Havana	2.2	20%
Dominican Republic	7.6	Santo Domingo	1.3	17%
El Salvador	5.0	San Salvador	0.4	8%
Guatemala	10.3	Guatemala City	1.2	12%

Table 1. Populations of Capital Cities as Percentages of Total Populations. (Estimated populations circa 1993. Source: *Europa World Yearbook*, 1995.)

In interventions before World War II, the populations of countries in which the United States intervened were such that a small landing force of Marines and sailors often could secure the entry port. The populations of those ports and of the capital cities were generally small and in need of protection from the rural insurgents whose activities motivated the American intervention. Today that situation has changed significantly: capital cities and entry ports now have large populations frequently numbering over a million and, rather than being centers of stability on the fringe of disordered interiors, such cities are now more likely to be the center of disorder.

The problem of numbers is illustrated in the table above, giving the populations of some Caribbean and Latin American countries and their capital cities. Not only are the capitals heavily populated in absolute numbers, but many also contain a sizable percentage of the entire population of the country.

Beyond the absolute numbers of people in such cities, the cities themselves have developed in ways that complicate military operations. Much of the population of Third World cities lives in densely packed squatter settlements on the fringes of the core cities. As we discovered in Somalia, these aggregations of people in flimsy but densely packed shelters, clustered in areas without designed road access, are extremely difficult to patrol or control.[12]

The problem of numbers in the capital city or principal entry port presents an intervening power with a situation quite different from that of a traditional insurgency: Unless the capital city is quickly brought under both control and visible order, the credibility—locally and globally—of the intervention as a force for stability drains away together with whatever political legitimacy the intervention possessed. Therefore, establishing control over the large populations of such cities must be a major objective at the start of any operation, from which the conclusion is that any intervention force must have large numbers at the outset of operations.

The Problem of Numbers for Sustained Operations

The requirement for forces may extend well beyond the anticipated conclusion of an intervention. The United States tends to expect that the forces of other nations will replace American forces soon after initial operations. If such expectations are not met, American military forces can face substantial and long-term commitments. To sustain a force in a stability operation for any length of time, other forces must be available—either preparing for deployment to the operation or recovering and retraining from deployment. The ability to sustain an intervention force depends on the total number of available force units of the desired kind, the number of such units committed to the operation, the time required for training and deploying for the mission, and the time needed for recovery and retraining for the units' conventional missions.

All recent peace operations have relied on infantry-heavy units, either pure infantry or mechanized infantry. Other types of units, such as military police, civil affairs, and psyops, have carried out critical functions, but in manpower-intensive situations such as stability operations there has been simply no alternative to drawing on infantry for the bulk of the force. Other units—engineers, aviation, artillery—can provide support as in regular operations where appropriate, or with proper training they can substitute for infantry. Furthermore, in bare-base regions, the logistics support force requirement will be substantial.

Table 2, below, shows the total numbers of infantry battalions and other units available within the existing force structure for both the Army (active and reserve) and the Marines (active).

There is an intimate connection between the total force size, the numbers deployed to an operational tour, the length of an operational tour, and the time before a unit or an individual next faces an operational deployment.

In Vietnam, American soldiers and Marines had operational tours as long as 12 or 13 months. In recent history, Western governments have been unwilling to impose such protracted tours. European countries and the United

Type of Unit	Active Army	Army Reserve or National Guard	Active USMC
Infantry battalions	42	56	24
Mechanized Infantry battalions	26	42	
Non-divisional Military Police companies	49	110	
Terminal Operating companies	4	4	

Table 2. Total 1995 Force Inventories for Some Representative Units.
(Source: Program Analysis & Evaluation Directorate, OCSA, US Army.)



Figure 3. Time between deployments determined by the fraction of the force deployed.

States now generally accept that units will conduct intervention operations in six-month increments (or less). Pure peacekeeping tours such as the US peacekeeping operations in Sinai and Macedonia have been six-month deployments. The same has held true for Marine deployments on presence operations. Commitment to peace enforcement operations, where the prospect of active combat is one of the conditions of the intervention, may develop a shorter rotation cycle.

Figure 3, above, shows the time between operational tours as a function of the total fraction of the units (or personnel) of the given type deployed to the operation compared to the duration of the operational tour.[13] The time between operational tours is an important measure of the effect of the operation on the entire force in two ways:

- It defines the total time available for training, both that training required for the unit's stability role and the retraining required to prepare the unit for its original mission upon completion of the intervention operation.
- Over a sustained period, it represents the time available for relief between intervention operations for the now relatively large portion of the enlisted force which has chosen the military as a profession.

The general character of Figure 3 shows that, with short operational deployments, the time to next deployment rapidly decreases with the fraction of the force deployed. With one-fifth of the force deployed on this or related operations, the time until the soldier's next deployment is 16 months (with

four-month operational deployments) or 24 months (with six-month operational deployments). With a third of the force deployed, the time to next deployment plummets to eight months (for four-month operational tours) or 12 months (for six-month operational tours).

These tour lengths have important implications for readiness and quality of life. If units have only a little more than a year for a cycle of retraining to original role, maintaining skills within their original role, and then training to special deployment tasks, it seems unlikely they will have time to progress to highly integrated combined arms training. This will affect even units that are not deployed; for example, an armored brigade that has had its mechanized infantry battalion deployed to an operation will not be able to train at brigade level or even be able to train battalion task forces by cross-attachment of mechanized companies to armor battalions.

The combination of force ratios, current populations, the size of existing infantry forces, and the implications for rotation can be astounding. Force ratios larger than ten members of the security forces for every thousand of population are not uncommon in current operations (Northern Ireland, or even Mogadishu). Sustaining a stabilizing force at such a force ratio for a city as large as one million (or for a country as small as one million) could require a deployment of about a quarter of all regular infantry battalions in the US Army. With current force sizes this means that within two years, every infantry soldier in the US Army would have been cycled through an operational deployment and many would have started on second deployments to the operational area.

The human consequences are potentially more grave. It is sobering to realize that, at a minimum, any extended commitment to a particular operation could mean many individuals would expect a deployment to that operation every year. It is difficult to predict the full range of effects on family life caused by frequent absences of military family members and their frequent exposure to combat-like conditions. While some might imagine that success in such ventures could breed praetorian ambitions in the military, this is hardly the most likely outcome of frequent returns to combat-like short tours. Those with experience of the Vietnam decade see such commitments leading to retention problems and the attendant increases in training costs, as well as the wearing away of the professional force so painfully established since the mid-1970s.

Implications

In the past decade, as civilian populations in underdeveloped states have exploded, the size of American and allied military forces has declined significantly. Interventions to restore and maintain order and stability place military forces squarely at the juncture of these two trends. As practiced in recent

decades, intervention operations are troop-intensive, with the forces required related closely to the size of the populations in the failed or failing states.

The populations of many countries are now large enough to strain the ability of the American military to provide stabilizing forces unilaterally at even modest per capita force ratios. Many countries have populations so large that the United States could participate in their stabilization only through multilateral forces that bring together major force contributions from a large number of countries. And we must finally acknowledge that many countries are simply too big to be plausible candidates for stabilization by external forces.

If a stability operation must be sustained for an extended period, the rotation of forces can have a pronounced effect on the readiness of the rest of the force for other military missions. At the same time, the troops may face repeated deployments to combat-like tours for what appear to be less-than-vital national interests. The effects on retention and ultimately the professionalism of the force seem likely to be adverse.

NOTES

1. US Army, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations,* December 1994, p. 6.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. This expression reuses the early doctrinal term "stability operations" which is no longer a part of the lexicon. As defined in 1967, "stability operations" was that type of internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved. US Army, FM 31-23, *Stability Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine* (Washington: GPO, 1967). The term is relevant to this article in that it provided analytical and logical continuity between the conditions under which earlier operations were conducted and our present concepts of peace enforcement.
4. Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 42-43. See also the discussion of such "tie-down ratios" in Larry E. Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 81-83.
5. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, *Crime in the United States 1993, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 1993* (Washington: GPO, 1994).
6. Earl F. Ziemke, *The United States Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, GPO, 1975), p. 341.
7. Interview with Punjab's Director General of Police, Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, *Jane's Defence Weekly,* 23 January 1993, p. 32.
8. Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1994: Events of 1993* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), pp. 162-63. Amnesty International, *An Unnatural Fate: "Disappearances" and Impunity in the Indian States of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab* (New York: Amnesty International, 1993).
9. Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966 (Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988).
10. Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs, The Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1971), pp. 156-57.
11. Federation of Malaya, *Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1953* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1954), p. 223.
12. Problems of urban insurgency are overviewed in Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, *The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-398-A, 1994).
13. The fraction deployed may be different depending on whether it is calculated on the basis of units or personnel. The fraction of personnel of a certain type deployed will be smaller than the corresponding fraction of units deployed because of the additional personnel slots for such personnel in other than TO&E units.

What Will It Take to Deter the United States?

RICHARD K. BETTS

Americans have gotten used to thinking about deterrence, but usually in terms of what it takes us to deter an adversary. Few Americans like to think about being deterred by others. It offends their sense of righteousness: good guys deter, bad guys are deterred. It offends their sense of honor: wimps or bullies are cowed by threats, not brave souls like we are. But the logic of deterrence has no moral content. Deterrence should work against anyone, anytime, and anywhere that the costs of the action being deterred outweigh the gains.

What will it take to deter the United States in the future? Short answer: Maybe less than we think, maybe more than it should. Less than we think if policymakers base their decisions on cost-benefit calculations of material national interests; more than it should if policymakers act on the basis of Cold War tradition and emotional concerns about honor and prestige.

Without a superpower adversary competing for global domination in the post-Cold War world, the stakes for the United States in most international conflicts—and hence the benefits for fighting over them—will be low. Logically, therefore, the price that we should be willing to pay for those benefits should also be low. So if an adversary can pose even modest costs as the price of involvement, he should be able to deter us.

American policymakers, however, do not always make decisions by carefully calibrated cost-benefit analysis. When emotions, feelings about national honor, or domestic political sensitivities become engaged, the imperative to demonstrate that we cannot be coerced may come to the fore, even if it requires accepting higher costs than the objective involved appears to be worth. Bravado may then lead decisionmakers to take risks that cool, detached analysis might suggest they should not.

Concepts and Context

A number of holdovers from Cold War modes of thought get in the way of dealing effectively with this question because most defense professionals lived with them so long that they became, as Eliot Cohen has written, "hard-wired into our strategic mentality."[1] Virtually all of modern deterrence

theory was grounded in the particular situation of the East-West conflict. These modes of thought can continue to channel thinking in directions that differ from probable future cases. For example:

- Most attention to what would deter the United States from initiating military action focused on the Soviet nuclear threat against the United States, and how that would inhibit NATO's escalation in the face of Soviet conventional attack on the Central Front. Comparatively little thought was given to how we could be deterred by weaker enemies from acting against them.
- The United States got used to fighting small enemies during the Cold War—from Korea to Grenada—because of their link to big enemies (the Soviet Union and transnational communism). As a result, it became easy for strategists to lose sight of the difference between small threats to US interests and big ones, and easy to rationalize paying high costs to defeat small threats.
- For practitioners as opposed to theorists, the word "deterrence" came to be a buzzword covering almost anything related to defense. Any seemingly desirable capability or operational doctrine could be billed as a "deterrent," eventually obscuring what is fundamentally at issue in deterrence. Strictly defined, a deterrent is a credible threat to do something in response to behavior that would make an opponent wish he had not acted, and that will therefore make him decide not to act in the first place. This means preventing action by ensuring that the costs of acting will exceed the opponent's anticipated gains. In principle there are two ways to do this. One is to threaten denial of an adversary's ability to achieve his military objectives, blocking an attack by deploying an effective defense. The other is to threaten retaliatory punishment; this usually (though not always) involves readiness to strike civilian assets in the attacker's society and economy.
- Most of the focus in the United States was on deterrent strategies that entailed massive requirements, as opposed to "finite" deterrence. Conventional deterrence required the capacity to hold against hordes of Soviet tanks in central Germany. Nuclear deterrence came to be identified in the United States with, at a minimum, "assured destruction"—the capacity to destroy around 200 Soviet cities—or, at a maximum, capacity to dominate a counterforce exchange. Finite deterrence assumes that the ability to destroy a handful of enemy cities would suffice to deter, because no plausible gains that the enemy could expect from aggression would exceed the costs of losing ten million people or so. This was the bedrock of British and French strategy, since they lacked the capacity to do

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more, but it was taken seriously in the United States only by doves, most of whom remained outside government.

The focus on massive requirements desensitized American defense professionals to the potential efficacy of threats to use small numbers of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Today, however, such threats from weak adversaries may be highly effective if they can make the costs of acting for the United States greater than the costs of not acting. As long as the cases at issue involve disputes outside our borders, it should not be hard for an adversary armed with some sort of WMD to deter the United States. A threat to destroy the downtown of one or two American cities would be puny, indeed infinitesimal, by comparison to the old standard of Soviet capabilities. It could, however, more than offset whatever is at stake in a confrontation with some Third World troublemaker or non-state actor.

- The Cold War framework channeled concern into calculations about the US-Soviet military balance, fine-tuned assessments of conventional and nuclear capabilities, and an obsession with maintaining our advantage at the cutting edge of high technology. Today, however, net assessment in the standard military sense is hardly an issue. Few potential targets of US action who might want to deter us have capabilities worth stacking up against ours analytically. The military balance was an issue in regard to Iraq in 1990-91, given concern about going up against "the world's fourth largest army," but few of the opponents we are likely to be worrying about in the next dozen years are in that league. Most of them will have to consider relying on asymmetrical and finite threats, making our orientation to comparisons of military capability less relevant to the deterrents we may face.

- The Cold War accustomed us to thinking about deterrence in terms of well-worn scenarios. Ninety-five percent of official thinking on the subject was about nuclear exchange calculations and conventional war on the Central Front. We are far more likely to encounter novel forms of deterrence that have not been thought through and analyzed dozens of times in Pentagon or interagency analyses, simulations, and games. Abrupt confrontation by unanticipated cases and threats raises the risk that strategists will have to wing it in a crisis. Decisionmakers and their staffs will have to figure out quickly how to react to specific threats, and will have to do so under stress, without assurance that all the questions and pitfalls of various options have been considered or that all the angles of the problem have been revealed.

- Cold War arguments about deterrence became ecclesiastical debates in which schemes for deterrence, or assertions about what was necessary, feasible, or counterproductive for deterrence, became surrogates for basic hawkish or dovish policy preferences in regard to the general East-West competition. In order to fight political battles over budgets, procurement programs, arms control negotiating positions, and doctrinal innovations, players became accustomed to overselling the benefits and underselling the costs of their preferred policies. This

behavior was understandable because we were engaged in a long-term competition in which the *immediate* danger of war with the main adversary was rare—the Berlin crises and Cuban missile crisis were the only cases in which we came close to open armed conflict with the Soviets. That same behavior, however, helped to reinforce our official reliance on a highly risky strategic doctrine, the NATO doctrine of deliberate escalation to the first use of nuclear weapons to counter a successful Soviet conventional attack. Diplomatic necessity led analysis as well as rhetoric to blur the distinction between security and survival; to promote security by protecting allies, the United States committed itself to a strategic doctrine that raised the risks to survival. We got used to living with the notion that credibility depended on high-risk commitments, taking it for granted, often not even feeling troubled by it. This experience suggests that we may not appreciate how easily we *should* be deterred in some prospective circumstances.

What Is to Be Deterred

Whether and how the United States might be deterred from taking action depends on the international incentives the United States has to act, the disincentives posed by the enemy trying to deter us, and domestic political constraints on US action. As to the first, there are three main situations of interest:

- *Conventional military intervention in a local conflict.* This case is the most likely we can foresee, and will be discussed in the next section.
- *Escalation of a crisis after the United States has become committed, but where the US government has not planned for the situation that develops and, under political pressure, must assess and react to it quickly.* These are potentially the most worrisome simply because there are so many potential cases of this sort in the New World Disorder. Cases that have not been thought through in advance pose the danger of either precipitate action or paralysis.
- *Nonmilitary coercion by the United States, such as economic warfare.* These situations may be the least worrisome. Few adversaries are likely to risk a catastrophic escalation just to deter US economic pressure. Trade sanctions are not as serious a challenge as a prospective military attack by the United States that would threaten the country's sovereignty or its leaders' survival. An adversary might get some leverage, however, by publicizing how US economic sanctions would hurt the country's innocent masses rather than the ruling elite.

Domestic political constraints matter because the efficacy of any adversary's deterrent threat is likely to vary with who is in power in the US government, and with the tenor of public opinion. There is no good systematic evidence so far about just when, how, and how well foreign governments can manipulate either US public opinion or officials. It is also not easy to predict which US political leaders would be most easily deterrable. A President who has been restrained in the international arena and has been criticized for insufficient backbone might be more inclined to lurch into action in a crisis than one with several successes under his belt.

We have no experience with one case, which has been only a science fiction scenario so far. It is far from implausible, however, and is the one in which public opinion could be crucial. That case is a public deterrent threat by adversaries to use weapons of mass destruction within the United States if Washington takes action against them: "Don't attack us, or a nuclear weapon will go off in some East Coast city" or "Don't interfere with us, or we'll let anthrax loose in Chicago." This would of course be very risky for the would-be deterrers, since—assuming they are a government with an address, rather than a shadowy subnational group—they would be provoking Washington to make counter-threats to annihilate them. At the same time, however, how would the US public and Congress react: with unified outrage and staunchness, or with confusion and panic?

Finally, the political context of strategic choice would be complicated by confusion or disagreement about whether indeed the adversary was acting in a defensive and deterrent manner or not. Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. Americans are not accustomed to thinking of themselves as a threat to anyone else, and therefore tend to think of deterrence as something that we do to someone else—not something that our opponents ever have a reason to do to us. If the adversary believes his motives are defensive, but US officials see them as aggressive, then the logic of deterrence is shaken, and the disagreement can lead to posturing and escalation.

Strategies of Deterrence

For attempts to deter by either denial or punishment, there are three main levels of force that might be used against us. The analysis in this section is summarized in Figure 1 on the next page.

- *Conventional military defense against attacking US forces.* This is the least worrisome option that Washington has to face. After the collapse of Cold War bipolarity, the United States is utterly unmatched in either actual or potential capability—GNP, technology, quality of standing forces, and cutting-edge doctrine and military systems integration. Most of the likely targets of US attack lack any allies of military consequence. Except for great powers like Russia or China acting in their border areas, it is not likely that any potential adversaries could deny entry and occupation by US forces.

Conventional deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, is a different matter. The prospect of inflicting high costs on US military forces in the process of an inevitably successful US intervention, or just of costs disproportionate to the value of the target, is a reasonable strategy by which a weak state or group might hope to deter US action. US policies toward Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1993, and Bosnia for several years illustrate different possibilities.

The war against Iraq showed that it may not even always be possible for a strong, well-armed middle-power to inflict high losses against a determined US air or ground campaign. The emphasis, however, should be on

INSTRUMENTS	OBJECTIVES	
	Denial	Punishment
Conventional	*Low Probability.* Only possible for great powers in border areas (Russia, China).	*Medium Probability.* Inflict high casualties while losing (Cuba, North Korea).
Subconventional	*Medium Probability.* Inflict moderate casualties while protracting (guerrilla war).	*Slight Probability.* (No effective deterrent; costs posed by threat are too low.)
Weapons of Mass Destruction	*Low Probability.* Chemical weapons against US military targets.	*High Probability.* Nuclear and biological weapons; finite deterrent threats against US or allied civilian targets.

Figure 1. Probability of Deterrent Effectiveness.

"determined." The US government had decided that vital interests and high stakes were involved in the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait, and that a real mid-sized war was worth fighting over the issue. This was true in only two of the cases of US military intervention during the Cold War, Korea and Vietnam. It is unlikely to be true of many prospective situations in which the United States might wish to act militarily after the Cold War, when stakes in local conflicts will usually be limited. The Somalia case showed that vividly, when 18 fatalities were enough to shift US policy into reverse. Policy toward Bosnia has shown that the prospect of a large-scale imbroglio has been enough to preclude commitment to ground combat in support of diplomatic rhetoric.[2]

The two most obvious cases where a deterrence-by-conventional punishment rationale would serve US adversaries well are Cuba and North Korea; the latter is now probably supplemented by a finite nuclear deterrent (see below). Nothing could keep US forces from subduing these two countries, but the cost probably would be high. Terrain differences severely limit opportunities for Desert Storm-style US blitzkrieg operations. Without the Cold War linkage to Soviet power, or a threat to deny access to vast portions of crucial resources like Middle Eastern oil, neither country is likely to pose such a clear threat to genuinely (as opposed to rhetorically) vital US interests. Consequently Washington could be deterred from a decisive military engagement with either country by the prospect of high casualties.

- *Subconventional military resistance or guerrilla warfare.* It is more feasible to mount a threat that promised to hamstring a US intervention, making it prolonged and indecisive, than to deny occupation by the United States altogether. If an adversary can keep the credible capacity to sustain low-level insecurity and prevent the establishment of order that would survive US with-

drawal, Washington may well be deterred from engagement. US policy toward Somalia, Bosnia, and Cuba may reflect the deterrent value of such a strategy.

This category focuses the issue of how effective a threat to inflict casualties on US forces will be in deterring the United States from undertaking an intervention. It has become axiomatic that Americans will not tolerate many body bags in the course of an intervention where vital interests are not at stake. There is no clear evidence for this conventional wisdom, however, and ample evidence to the contrary. What is crucial for maintaining public support is not casualties per se, but casualties in an *inconclusive* war, casualties that the public sees as being suffered indefinitely, for no clear, good, or achievable purpose. Public support for war varied inversely with US casualty levels in Korea and Vietnam (two protracted wars in which classic victory was not in sight), but not in World War II (when casualty rates were far higher, but coincided with evidence that US forces were winning).[3] US casualties in Grenada in 1983 and in Somalia a decade later were identical, but the first operation was quick, successful, and popular, while the second was none of those.

- *Weapons of mass destruction.* Two great powers with large numbers of nuclear weapons remain potential concerns for the United States: China and Russia. For Russia, however, the tables are turned from the situation that governed US-Soviet mutual deterrence in the Cold War. Then, the perception of Soviet conventional superiority in Europe fostered the NATO doctrine of deliberate escalation—massive retaliation under Eisenhower, flexible response under his predecessor and successors, but in all cases the expectation that the West had more reason to rely on threats of first-use than did the East. Now, however, Russian conventional forces are much reduced from those of the Soviet Union. They are pushed back hundreds of miles from where they were positioned in the center of Germany, within striking distance of the English Channel, and their intervention in Chechnya has called into question their effectiveness. Unlike the United States, Russia has no significant allies—indeed the former Warsaw Pact allies of the Soviet Union, and many of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union itself, are now not even neutral but tacitly aligned with NATO. In this situation it is Moscow, not NATO, that may perceive an imperative to rely on nuclear first-use to redress a conventional imbalance.

This hardly matters if we assume that the United States and its allies will never have any interest in aggression against Russia, thus obviating any plausible reason that such a Russian deterrent might be brought into play. The critical exception, however, is the danger of a crisis over Russian attempts to reincorporate former parts of the USSR, such as Ukraine or the Baltics. It would be extraordinarily risky for the United States to commit itself to defense of those new states' independence, but political pressures to do so might be intense. In that case the logic of who was trying to deter or compel whom would be quite muddy—both sides would be likely to see themselves as the party defending vital interests against aggression.

The same sorts of dilemmas, contradictions, and confusion between material incentives for restraint and emotional incentives to act could erupt in the event of a Chinese attempt to settle the Taiwan issue by force. Beijing could claim in a crisis, as it always has, that Taiwan is an internal security matter (a long-standing Chinese Chechnya, as it were), and remind Washington that the United States has accepted the de jure unity of China since the Shanghai Communiqué. If at the same time the United States was considering moves to support Taipei militarily against invasion, would a Chinese threat to interdict US naval support with nuclear weapons not be credible? And would Washington have a perfectly obvious reason to risk nuclear war over Taiwan, after it so long ago abrogated the mutual defense treaty with Taipei and recognized the PRC?

Apart from the disturbing scenarios involving Ukraine, the Baltics, and Taiwan, the interesting questions are about how weak adversaries might use weapons of mass destruction to deter US action against them. For example, what if Iraq had possessed a handful of nuclear weapons in 1990, declared that it had no quarrel with the United States, and threatened to set a few of them off in US cities if Washington attempted "aggression" against Baghdad and the new order in Kuwait? Would that have made a difference in the US response? One might cite the failure to use chemical weapons against attacking US forces, or the lack of conventional means of delivery against the continental United States, as reason to denigrate the potency of a putative nuclear threat. But such arguments are limited comforts at best.

In regard to the first point, it was clear that the US and its coalition allies had imperfect yet quite substantial defenses against chemical attack. The Iraqis' use of such weapons might have done little to the military force arrayed against them, while provoking retaliation with even stronger (nuclear) weapons that Baghdad could not match. Second, it would be foolish to take comfort from an argument based on the distance of US territory from an adversary state. The task of smuggling components and assembling a few devices in the United States (a country unable even to restrict the inflow of illegal drugs to levels low enough to cramp consumption) cannot be considered beyond the capacity of these governments. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, or Libya do not need ICBMs to threaten American territory; assuming that they do reflects residual Cold War thinking.

In the case of North Korea a finite deterrent threat against one or two US cities also would have great credibility because the regime in Pyongyang gave regular and impressive demonstrations over the course of 40 years that it was willing to take high risks.[4] Moreover, with the exception of the initial attack in 1950, the North Koreans got away with all of these extreme provocations—not one led to forcible US retaliation. Most recently, the North Koreans found that digging in their heels and refusing to rectify their violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty led not to sanctions, but to the reverse—material aid from outside powers. The agreement to freeze North Korean nuclear facilities entailed the promise of $4 billion in assistance for new reactors and oil in the

interim. All this experience offers leaders in Pyongyang scant reason to believe that making nuclear threats in a crisis would not be to their benefit.

The small number of nuclear weapons likely to be available to proliferators in coming years makes it unlikely that the weapons would be committed to tactical rather than strategic purposes. Thus the common expectation that such proliferation represents more a threat to US conventional forces on the battlefield than to the American home front is probably misplaced. Thinking of a small enemy nuclear force as a tactical problem—or as a threat to civilian society only in allied countries closer to the scene, such as Japan—is too comforting. In contrast to the early 1950s, when concern with clandestine insertion of nuclear weapons was substantial, we became accustomed to debunking the idea as we focused on the intercontinental reach of the highly developed Soviet nuclear force. In terms of good old Cold War deterrence theory, the logic of using such a limited threat to deter US intervention makes perfect sense. Whatever the reason for a small rogue regime to confront the United States, the stakes could not plausibly outweigh the loss of one or two American cities.

In this context the North Korean nuclear threat becomes more interesting if they have five or more weapons rather than the one or two they may have already. Five would give them one to detonate for demonstration purposes, to make their threat credible, and one or two for each of their main adversaries—South Korea, Japan, and the United States. If the recent agreement to freeze North Korean facilities succeeds, therefore, it may produce a worthwhile restraint on the country's strategic options even if the agreement remains undesirable in other respects.

As for other forms of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons are probably overrated and biological weapons underrated. The tactical utility of chemical weapons is limited by the existence of moderately effective defenses for military forces, while their utility for threatening mass casualties among civilian populations is limited by the difficulty of delivering massive quantities at long range. Only artillery, which would need a successful ground force advance to get within range of a city, would be able to deliver vast amounts of chemical weapons over a large area both cheaply and effectively.

Biological weapons, on the other hand, more accurately represent the "poor man's nuclear weapon." They are relatively easy to manufacture, and the facilities for manufacturing or storing them should be easier to disperse and hide from identification and attack than bulkier nuclear installations. More easily than chemical weapons, biological weapons could be devastating on a huge scale. It might also be hard to trace who was responsible for an attack with biological weapons, a point that makes them especially frightening as an instrument of coercion by stateless terrorists without an address. As a deterrent against US intervention, biological weapons could be as effective as the threat of clandestine insertion of nuclear weapons. And an attack on the United States would pose less danger of blowback on the population of the attacking country,

something that would be a bigger problem for contiguous adversaries as, for example, if one of its neighbors were to use biological weapons against Israel. In this respect the traditional security advantage provided to the United States by two huge oceans could become more of a liability than an asset.

Conclusion

Two questions stand out when evaluating what it will take for a foreign power to deter American action:

• *What does it take to make the costs of US action exceed the benefits?* In many cases of conventional or subconventional deterrence the answer will be "not much." This is most likely when US stakes in the issue or region are low and the deterring country (or group) has enough political strength or social mobilization to pose even modest resistance or the prospect of prolonged instability. Somalia underlined the point, and Haiti does not invalidate it; in the latter instance, the decision to invade was made with the expectation that resistance would be negligible. For countries with the ability to package and deliver nuclear and biological materials, it should also take little to deter us where the stakes for the United States are limited. This means that a very small arsenal of weapons of mass destruction could have great value, since the possessor would have to threaten only a few US targets to make the US costs of opposing the adversary greater than those of refraining.

• *What does it take to make US leaders realize that costs would exceed gains, and that they should refrain from acting?* Threats intended to deter sometimes provoke instead. American Presidents are not accustomed to being intimidated, and they worry about their credibility, about the diplomatic and domestic political costs of appearing weak. They sometimes make rhetorical commitments from which it becomes hard to back away. If the issue comes up in an unanticipated form, in a fast-developing crisis, it is not clear that US leaders would react coolly and analytically rather than emotionally, or would decide on the basis of economic calculation rather than vague grounds of national and personal honor. This prospect is especially worrisome: in some cases the only outcome worse than being deterred would be *not* being deterred.

NOTES

The present article is derived from work prepared by the author for the Institute for National Security Studies at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

1. Eliot Cohen, "The Future of Force," *The National Interest*, No. 21 (Fall 1990), 9.

2. As this article goes to press, a peace agreement in Bosnia raises the possibility that up to 25,000 US troops might be dispatched to assist in policing the accord. President Clinton's refusal to send troops before the agreement reflects the questionable assumption that the implementing force will not be involved in major combat.

3. John Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973).

4. The North Korean propensity to do wild and crazy things includes attacking South Korea in 1950, constantly infiltrating paramilitary forces into the Republic of Korea in subsequent years, raiding the Blue House and seizing the USS *Pueblo* in 1968, tunneling under the DMZ, downing a US EC-121 in 1969, killing President Park's wife in 1974, hacking two American officers to death in the 1976 DMZ tree-cutting incident, blowing up half the South Korean cabinet with a bomb in Rangoon in 1983, downing the KAL airliner in 1987, and occasionally kidnapping and imprisoning South Korean citizens.

The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks

MICHAEL R. BOLDRICK

"Having invented a new Holocaust
And been the first with it to win a war
How they make haste to cry with fingers crossed
King's X — no fair to use it any more!"
— Robert Frost, 1946

Downplaying the future role of atomic arms, Defense Secretary William A. Perry released the results of the Pentagon's first post-Cold War nuclear policy review during a press conference in Washington, D.C., on 22 September 1994. In his opening statement, Dr. Perry offered one of those sound bites that can compress momentous events into a ten-second clip on the six o'clock news: "The new posture . . . is no longer based on Mutual Assured Destruction, no longer based on MAD. We have coined a new word for our new posture which we call Mutual Assured Safety, or MAS."[1] Indeed, times were changing.

In the question and answer session that followed, the assembled Washington press corps was much more interested in ongoing peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Dr. Perry's surprising observation that the US nuclear arsenal would henceforth be more noted for safety than intimidation did not prompt a single question or even make the evening news. Nor did anyone recall an ominous event that had occurred ten months earlier in Moscow. In November 1993, as the Pentagon kicked off its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which greatly reduced both the operational tempo and size of the US nuclear arsenal, Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin rescinded his nation's "no first use" nuclear weapons policy.[2]

Yeltsin's announcement erasing Leonard I. Brezhnev's June 1982 pledge before the United Nations General Assembly that "the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons"[3] hardly created a ripple. Even Russia's current three-to-one advantage in nuclear firepower[4] causes little alarm inside the Pentagon. Had such an imbalance occurred during the Cold War, US strategic forces would have dusted off their advanced DEFCON checklists.

Nuclear arms get little respect from official Washington today. Shortly before his retirement in 1994, General Charles A. Horner, commander of US Space Command, told defense reporters, "The nuclear weapon is obsolete. I want to get rid of all of them."[5] About the same time, Dr. Ashton B. Carter, undersecretary of defense for international security policy, outlined the Clinton Administration's long-term vision for US forces, "Our intention is to have a military that doesn't need to use [nuclear, biological, and chemical] weapons." Carter, who also cochaired the NPR, added, "We can use conventional forces to prevail anywhere in the world."[6] Going a step further, the Commander-in-Chief relegated the nuclear threat to history's dustbin during a June 1995 speech commemorating the United Nations 50th anniversary in San Francisco: "Today, the threat to our security is not an enemy silo, but in the briefcase or the car bomb of a terrorist."[7]

Arms control treaties, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the success of high-technology conventional weapons during the 1991 Persian Gulf War have collectively accelerated efforts to fold this nation's nuclear umbrella. Also fueling the move back to less-menacing armaments is the still-haunting specter of Hiroshima. The *Enola Gay* received more flak this year in the short hop from the Smithsonian's Silver Hill, Maryland, restoration facility to the Air and Space Museum than it did on the long flight from Tinian to Hiroshima in 1945. The Smithsonian's attempt to question the necessity and morality of the atomic bombing of Japan pitted veterans against revisionist historians, resulting in yet another Hiroshima "casualty"—this time museum director Martin Harwit, who resigned when the forces of political correctness suffered a highly publicized defeat.

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Against the backdrop of a supposedly vanquished superfoe, long simmering discomfort with things nuclear, and rapidly declining defense budgets, the stage was set for a reappraisal of nuclear policy. Chilling language of the atomic age—"assured destruction," then "massive retaliation," followed by "flexible response" and its corollary "unacceptable damage," and finally, "mutual assured destruction"[8]—had no place in the post-Persian Gulf War revolution in military affairs. From the Reagan buildup to the fall of the Berlin Wall, US nuclear strategy had come full circle to former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's proposition that "nuclear warheads are not military weapons in the traditional sense and therefore serve no purpose other than to deter one's opponent from their use."[9]

Guidelines for conducting the NPR, stated in Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's September 1993 Bottom-Up Review, were consistent with McNamara's proposition. According to the Bottom-Up Review, the pending review of US nuclear posture would concentrate on the deterrent, not warfighting, capabilities of nuclear weapons. In the post-Cold War world, US nuclear forces had only two missions: to "provide an effective deterrent while remaining within START I/II limits, and to allow for additional forces to be constituted, in the event of a threatening reversal of events."[10] By the time NPR results were released, Dr. Perry had modified his predecessor's charge. According to the Defense Secretary, the NPR dealt with two great issues: "How to achieve proper balance between what I would call leading and hedging," (meaning setting an example by accelerating warhead reductions while, at the same time, retaining a capability to reconstitute nuclear forces should Russian reforms fail) and achieving "benefits of improved safety and security for the residual force of nuclear weapons . . . both in the United States and in Russia."[11] The latter refers to operational restrictions such as detargeting ICBMs, adding Permissive Action Links to missile-firing submarines, restricting their patrol areas, and US aid to Russia for deposturing nuclear forces.

The NPR was a DOD-wide collaborative effort under the direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Neither the civilian cochairman, Dr. Ashton Carter, nor his military counterpart, Admiral William A. Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are strong advocates of nuclear forces. Dr. Carter has publicly stated a desire to rely on conventional forces for national security, and Admiral Owens is a proponent of placing all nuclear weapons under United Nations control. Other participants included representatives of the joint staff, all four services, CINCs from the operating commands, and defense intelligence, security, and nuclear agencies. Recommendations were divided into six areas: strategic forces; non-strategic nuclear forces; infrastructure; safety, security, and use control; command, control, communications, intelligence, and operations; and threat reduction and proliferation. This article focuses on the first three areas.

Strategic Forces

In the end, the NPR opted to retain a scaled-down version of today's strategic nuclear forces, but only after low-intensity conflict erupted between the operational commands and the panel's civilian cochairman. At issue was the structure of the nuclear triad.[12] Running at flank speed against recommendations of the strategic working group, Dr. Carter introduced a monad concept that would scrap all US ICBMs, mothball all nuclear-capable bombers, and put the entire US deterrent aboard just ten Navy submarines.[13] At any one time, half would be at sea and half in port, where they would be sitting ducks to even a second-rate nuclear power. Dr. Carter's all-eggs-in-one-basket plan would field only 1550 warheads,[14] well under the NPR-stipulated goal which coincides with the START II limit of 3500 nuclear weapons.

Dr. Carter's monad plan first surfaced in an article he wrote for the Winter 1991 issue of *Daedalus*. Then on Harvard's faculty, Dr. Carter criticized the triad's capability of "assuring hefty retaliation to a first strike."[15] Rather, he favored a "deterrent that could calmly sit out a crisis without taking any actions that might aggravate it, and that could ride out a first strike until the *enemy had done his worst* and then patiently wait for the *president* or his *successors* to *deliberate*"[16] (italics added). The NPR cochairman could achieve his goal of adding due process to nuclear deterrence only by eliminating bombers and silo-based missiles—most effective when launched minutes after an attack and before the first warheads impact on US soil—and replacing them with more survivable submarines.

This didn't sit well with the military. In an almost unprecedented countermove, deputies for operations of all four uniformed services sent a classified letter to the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Admiral Richard Macke, alleging Dr. Carter had rejected recommendations of an NPR working group in favor of the monad trial balloon.[17] Despite objections from the senior military officers, apparently Dr. Carter did present the submarine-only proposal, along with at least one option that retained some bombers but eliminated land-based ICBMs, during a 23 April 1994 NPR in-process review to Deputy Defense Secretary John Deutch.

Senator Strom Thurmond then joined the fray, firing from the high ground of Capitol Hill. In a statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Unified Commanders Strategy and Operational Requirements, the South Carolina lawmaker vigorously opposed the Clinton Administration's position:

> For fifty years now we have had a bipartisan national security policy where the very survival of the United States was at issue. Ten administrations agreed . . . we would enforce a policy of deterrence with a surely survivable Triad of nuclear forces. . . . Now, I am afraid . . . that unanimity of policy [will] begin to slip away. . . . [T]he Nuclear Posture Review . . . recommended a force roughly like

> we have now, a strong Triad. But the Chairman of the group, Assistant Secretary Carter, is reportedly going to recommend . . . we abandon ICBMs! . . . [I]t appears like this administration is committed to a nuclear policy . . . based on guilt and shame.[18]

Four other Republican senators appealed directly to President Clinton, asking him to reject Assistant Secretary Carter's end-run around the NPR. The letter, signed by Senators Conrad Burns, Dick Kempthorne, Alan Simpson, and Malcom Wallop, stated, "We should not even consider the elimination of any leg of the triad. Such an act of unilateral disarmament would not save significant amounts of money, but would . . . be highly destabilizing and imprudent."[19] The senators noted that both Russian and Chinese ICBM forces had the capability to launch a crippling preemptive strike against the US force structure Dr. Carter was pushing.[20]

During testimony before a 20 April Senate hearing, Admiral Henry Chiles indicated a policy option to ride out nuclear attacks before retaliating was also under review by the NPR. Delayed retaliation was related to the "SLBM-only" force posture, as it was in Dr. Carter's 1991 magazine article. The US Strategic Command CINC cautioned, "It is a step that would have to be taken with the absolute greatest concern about the future because the President, I believe, needs the capability to face down rogue leaders in the world. And part of that, I believe, is having a degree of carefully thought-out or measured ambiguity in the mind of the leader he is trying to deter."[21]

In the end, academic ideology retreated before the combined arms of experienced military professionals and vocal politicians. There would be, at least for the moment, no amputation of the triad. By the time the NPR results were released in September, calm had returned to the seas of civilian-military conflict. During the NPR press conference, a reporter asked Dr. Deutch if all the uniformed services were now in agreement with the civilian side.[22] The Deputy Secretary of Defense replied, "There was no serious disagreement. There was no serious disagreement."[23] The triad had proved to be an effective deterrent, even against the post-Cold War revolution in military affairs.

The post-START II force structure recommended by the NPR calls for 14 Trident submarines, 66 B-52 bombers, no more than 20 B-2 stealth bombers, and either 450 or 500 Minuteman III ICBMs downloaded to carry one, rather than three, warheads.[24] With no new strategic systems on the drawing board, this force package leaves the United States with an aging fleet of nuclear delivery vehicles through at least 2020. Production of the B-52 ended in 1964 and Minuteman III deployment was completed in 1975, yet these systems will comprise 61 percent of US nuclear delivery vehicles and will carry 42 percent of the warheads allowed under the START II 3500 limit. Two of four modern weapon systems developed during the Reagan strategic modernization do not appear in the NPR lineup. All 50 MX missiles will be

"In the end, academic ideology retreated before the combined arms of experienced military professionals and vocal politicians."

destroyed in compliance with a START ban on multiple-warhead ICBMs. All B-1B bombers will be converted to a nonnuclear role to comply with another provision of the strategic arms control accords. Of the two remaining modern systems, only Trident subs and their D-5 missiles provide a significant capability. B-2 bomb bays will carry only 12 percent of the US nuclear warhead count. Even if more are built (the original production run was planned at 132 aircraft), the Clinton Administration will limit any additional Spirit bombers to a nonnuclear role.

While Moscow hasn't released a post-START II lineup of strategic nuclear forces, Russia's triad—also constrained by arms control agreements—is expected to be much more modern than its American counterpart. If projections compiled by *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* are correct, fully 75 percent of the delivery vehicles postured by Russia after START II will have been produced after 1985.[25] The corresponding US figure is 38 percent, with only Trident D-5 SLBMs and B-2 bombers qualifying as post-1985 weapons.[26]

Admiral Chiles acknowledged potential dangers of an aging triad in a letter to Secretary Perry immediately before the public release of the NPR findings. The commander of US nuclear forces warned, "With no new strategic systems anticipated for the foreseeable future, the challenge is to maintain existing systems in the absence of a supporting production base. Preservation of key strategic industrial-base capabilities is required to attract and retain the experienced personnel that will be needed to resolve inevitable problems with aging systems."[27] Minuteman life-extension programs and funding for enough bombers to meet Bottom-Up Review conventional force requirements and NPR nuclear force levels are not high-priority items with the current Administration.

With the bomber and ICBM legs of the triad subject to aging and funding problems, the United States may be headed toward a blue-water deterrent. "By 1997, the United States will be carrying half its nuclear warheads on submarines, with relatively few on bombers or in missile silos."[28] Dr. Carter may have lost the NPR battle, but his ideas could prevail in a longer struggle to revolutionize the US strategic posture.

Besides the age discrepancy and a consequent growing dependence on submarines, there is another imbalance between the NPR force structure and its opposing armada. Russian forces will hold a significant survivability

advantage. START allows either side to deploy up to 1100 mobile, single-warhead ICBMs. Russia is expected to field at least 600 road-mobile SS-25 Topal missiles, currently being produced at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant. The Pentagon canceled the small ICBM, or "Midgetman," ground-mobile missile program shortly after Senate confirmation of START I, thus opting out of an arms control provision that would have increased survivability of land-based missiles. The Topal is many times more survivable than US silo-based Minuteman ICBMs. In two wars, superior US technology has yet to claim a single "kill" of a mobile missile. During the Persian Gulf War, coalition air power claimed no confirmed kills of deployed Scuds. In World War II, despite overwhelming air superiority over Europe, Allied forces did not destroy a single mobile V-2 rocket during the Battle of Britain. Conversely, no fixed-based V-2 sites escaped destruction from the air.

Russia also holds a significant advantage in air defenses. At least 64 Galosh anti-ballistic missiles ring Moscow, protecting the capital and approach corridors to rocket force bases from missile attacks. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty allows both sides to deploy limited missile defenses, but the United States demolished its Safeguard ABM system in 1975. Also, the massive Soviet bomber defenses remain intact, unconstrained by arms control. While the 20 B-2 stealth bombers can avoid radar, the small B-52 fleet's ability to evade overlapping rings of surface-to-air missiles is very much in doubt.

While a professor at Stanford University, and more than a decade before becoming Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry defined four characteristics of an effective deterrent: lethality, survivability, penetrability, and command and control connectivity.[29] The NPR force structure comes up short on Dr. Perry's second and third characteristics when compared to Russian capabilities.

Tactical Nuclear Forces

Military requirements for tactical nuclear weapons date back to the formation of NATO in 1949. At that time, 175 divisions were massed behind the Iron Curtain on Western Europe's eastern flank. At least 96 NATO divisions were required for an effective counterforce. With the Western democracies politically unable to provide either the financial or manpower resources to field so large a force, NATO turned to battlefield nuclear weapons. By 1969, over 7000 small nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe supporting 30, not 96, NATO divisions.[30]

Deploying battlefield nuclear weapons with conventional forces achieved two goals: a balance of power could be achieved with fewer forces, as was the case in NATO; and routine mixing of conventional and atomic capabilities with land and sea forces increased the credibility of overall nuclear deterrence.[31] By putting links in the chain reaction of nuclear deterrence, a measure of escalation control, later known as extended deterrence and flexible response,

was established. If the initial use of nuclear weapons could be constrained to a counterforce strike against battlefield military targets, diplomatic initiatives could occur before all-out escalation to population centers. At least this was the theory, and it held until the breakup of the former Soviet Union.

Even before the NPR, the linkage between US strategic and tactical forces was eroding. On the eve of his retirement in 1993, JCS Chairman General Colin Powell noted, "The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Army now totally rely on the Air Force for any potential nuclear weapons they need on the battlefield."[32] The NPR endorsed General Powell's initiative by eliminating the capability to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on Navy surface ships (Tomahawk cruise missiles aboard submarines retain a latent capability to carry small nuclear warheads), and reducing NATO's tactical nuclear stockpile from 10,500 to 1500 weapons.[33]

During the NPR press conference, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch noted Russian reluctance to match US efforts to retire tactical weapons. Dr. Deutch said,

> One of the most important parts of the Nuclear Posture Review is to notice that this decline, which we anticipate will take place in non-strategic nuclear forces, has not happened. Currently, Russia has between [6000] and 13,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, while we have a much reduced number from that. We are anticipating going significantly lower . . . and you have to encourage the Russians [to do the same]. There are no treaties requiring them to reduce non-strategic nuclear forces.[34]

Drastic reductions in tactical nuclear weapons would be consistent with Dr. Carter's objective to "use conventional forces to prevail anywhere in the world." Administration plans to counter proliferation with conventional forces remain a currently unattainable goal. But, according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, the United States is "behind the power curve. . . . [W]e need to have more tools in our toolbox to deal with weapons of mass destruction."[35] A RAND Corporation study estimated it would take between $50 and $100 billion for a force posture to fight effectively against a dispersed arsenal of up to 20 nuclear weapons.[36]

The Pentagon seems to have forgotten an early Cold War lesson: an effective mix of battlefield and strategic nuclear weapons is a force and dollar multiplier in deterring either nuclear or conventional war.

Infrastructure

In three short years between 1942 and 1945, the Manhattan Project built a formidable array of factories and laboratories—as large as the entire automobile industry of the United States at that time—to develop the atomic bomb.[37] Through neglect, budget-cutting, and application of environmental restrictions, that infrastructure is in precipitous decline. The last new warheads came off the Pantex production line near Amarillo, Texas, five years ago,[38] and tritium has

not been produced in the United States since 1988.[39] Without a steady resupply of this radioactive hydrogen isotope, whose half-life is only 12.3 years,[40] US nuclear weapons will gradually lose their punch. Currently, stockpile requirements are met by recovering and then purifying tritium gas from retired weapons, but a new source will be required by 2011.[41] Under the current Administration, the Energy Department has taken a strong anti-nuclear-weapons stance, and is hesitant in taking the first steps to restart tritium production, a process expected to take 10 to 15 years at a cost of several billion dollars.[42]

Meanwhile, Russia continues to manufacture new nuclear weapons and weapon-related materials, including highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and tritium.[43] China, which during the Cold War built the long-range DF-6 missile to attack the Panama Canal, thus keeping the United States from reinforcing its Pacific fleet in wartime,[44] is currently conducting nuclear weapon tests. China is apparently perfecting high-yield warheads for employment on three new ICBMs currently in development.

Because of a self-imposed, open-ended moratorium on even underground nuclear tests, the United States is launching a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, founded on a science-based approach as opposed to traditional test-based methods, for assessing the viability of its aging nuclear arsenal. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in May, the Energy Department's assistant secretary for defense programs said, "Science-based stewardship and management of the US stockpile has never been done before. Meeting the challenge will be neither inexpensive or without risk."[45] The director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, and one of only 40 nuclear weapon designers still employed by the Energy Department, added another cautionary note: "Weapons out there now are deviating from design. The parameters of the original design change with age. Understanding the performance of an aging weapon is much harder than designing a brand new weapon. And it's not understood."[46]

In his NPR press briefing, Deputy Secretary Deutch offered an observation apparently contradictory to the Administration's decision to constrain nuclear production, testing, and stockpile maintenance capabilities. Dr. Deutch said, "Let me remind you that Russia has little prospect of returning to the kind of conventional force structure they had at the height of the Cold War, given the collapse of their economy and change in political system. It is a less expensive and less demanding matter for them to return to a much more aggressive nuclear posture. So if something does go wrong in Russia, it is likely that it is in the nuclear forces area that we will face the first challenge."[47] If that happens, it may well take another effort of the magnitude of the Manhattan Project to restore a matching US nuclear capability—assuming the time, resolve, and dollars are available to rebuild what is being scrapped in the afterglow of the Cold War.

For Want of a Threat . . .

US efforts to downgrade and deemphasize its nuclear capability are based on the premise that there is, currently, no significant threat to national security posed by hostile nuclear forces.[48] Funding and force structures are being tailored to fit arms control agreements, political expectations, and dogma, rather than pure defense needs. Reluctant to match US rates in retiring strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, Moscow continues massive training exercises replicating Pearl Harbor-like nuclear attacks against the United States,[49] and a steady modernization of China's nuclear triad is greeted with yawns inside the Beltway. While Defense Secretary William Perry talks about a new era of Mutual Assured Safety, Russia continues to operate a "Doomsday machine" capable of unleashing a nuclear strike based on electronic pulses rather than human decision.[50] Chinese missile scientist Hua Di notes, "We don't need a lot of sophisticated controls over our weapons. The briefcase carried by the man behind your President—we don't have that."[51]

Historian Donald Kagan, in his book *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*, concludes a case-study analysis of the underlying causes of the Peloponnesian War, the second Punic War, World Wars I and II, and the Cuban missile crisis with this observation:

> A persistent and repeated error through the ages has been the failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as war does. In the modern world, especially, the sense that peace is natural and war an aberration has led to a failure in peacetime to consider the possibility of another war, which, in turn, has prevented efforts needed to preserve peace. Perceiving the source of a new war in a time of peace is, to be sure, a difficult task.[52]

Kagan cites both ancient and modern examples of how policies of minimal deterrence increased, rather than diminished, the likelihood of war. Deterrence, Kagan notes, requires the creation of fear. That's precisely why Mutual Assured Destruction worked and Mutual Assured Safety won't. Today's answer lies somewhere between these two extremes. Proliferation, Russia's certain dependence on nuclear weapons to retain status as a world power, and the growing rift with China dictate a robust US strategic nuclear capability backed by sufficient tactical nuclear firepower to shield conventional forces from numerically superior adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Racked by dissension between civilian and military officials, caught in a crossfire of political and military viewpoints, constrained by budget decisions favoring conventional forces, and blinded by unbending trust in arms control agreements, the Nuclear Posture Review fell short of completing an objective analysis of US national security needs. That failure may come at a

terrible price. The status of the United States as the world's only remaining superpower cannot rest on superior technology and smart weapons alone in a world likely to see more, not fewer, nuclear-armed states.

NOTES

1. Dr. William A. Perry, from transcript of Defense Department Briefing, *Nuclear Posture Review*, 22 September 1994, p. 1

2. Sonni Effron, "Russia Discards Soviet Legacy of No First Use of A-Weapons," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 November 1993, p. A1.

3. Ibid., p. A17.

4. Estimate by the author using information from various sources including queries to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, reports from the "Nuclear Notebook," recurring column of *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, public statements of defense officials, and reading of *The ICBM Ear*, an informal newsletter published by defense contractors supporting ICBM operations and development programs. From this data Russia is believed to have as many as 13,500 tactical nuclear weapons and slightly fewer than 8000 deployed strategic warheads. US officials have acknowledged that US strategic warhead counts have dropped below the START I ceiling of 6000 weapons, and the tactical nuclear weapon count is approximately 1500. The estimated three-to-one advantage for Russia is based on this data: approximately 23,500 postured Russian nuclear weapons compared to a US total of 7500 nuclear weapons available for military operations.

5. John Diamond, "'I want to go to zero,'" *Santa Maria Times*, 16 July 1994, p. A1.

6. Jim Mann, "New US Nuclear Policy to Focus on 'Rogue' Regimes," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 May 1994, p. A8.

7. John M. Broder, "Clinton Says U.N. Bloated, Needs Reform," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 June 1995, p. A12.

8. "Assured destruction" was coined in the early 1950s when US forces were virtually unchallenged by the Russians. At the time, Strategic Air Command's second CINC, General Curtis E. LeMay, boasted that his forces "could have destroyed all of Russia without losing a man to their defenses." In 1956, NATO adopted a policy of "massive retaliation" to discourage superior Soviet ground forces from attacking Western Europe with conventional weapons. As the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union developed a credible nuclear capability, Robert S. McNamara introduced the term "flexible response" in 1962. If conventional war broke out in Europe, NATO could slow the Russian advance with limited use of theater nuclear weapons, backed up by US-based strategic forces capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage." The idea was "nuke a little, talk a little," until rationality dictated the end of hostilities before escalating to an all-out nuclear exchange. "Mutual Assured Destruction" reflected the delicate balance of equivalent nuclear forces guaranteed by the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). Together with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (also signed in 1972) that virtually eliminated effective defenses against a massive attack, both superpowers maintained the capability to annihilate each other until the end of the Cold War.

9. Robert S. McNamara, *Blundering Into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 16.

10. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense publication, *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era*, 1 September 1993, p. 16.

11. Dr. Perry from transcript of 22 September 1994 NPR press conference, p. 2.

12. The triad concept dates to 1960 when the Eisenhower Administration adopted the first Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) identifying targets for nuclear forces. To assure effective retaliation, US forces were parceled into three equally capable elements: land-based ICBMs, long-range bombers, and sea-launched ballistic missiles. Each, after surviving a first strike, was required to maintain a capability to destroy 50 percent of the military and industrial targets in the SIOP data base. This assured overkill accomplished two key deterrent goals: even in a worst-case scenario, the United States maintained enough firepower to retain a secure reserve force, after a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, capable of countering other potential belligerents such as China; and, it permitted a hedge against any technological breakthrough that might negate one leg of the triad (such as the capability to "see through water" thus exposing all SLBMs to interdiction).

13. Elaine M. Grossman, "Carter Presents Option To Put All Nukes On Subs, Creating 'Monad,'" *Inside the Air Force*, 6 May 1994, p. 4.

14. Elaine M. Grossman, "DoD Eyes Reducing to 1,500 Nuclear Weapons Under Alternative Force Posture," *Inside the Air Force*, 20 May 1994, p 1.

15. Ashton B. Carter, "Emerging Themes in Nuclear Arms," *Daedalus*, 120 (Winter 1991), 235.

16. Ibid., pp. 236-37.

17. Elaine M. Grossman, "Four Services Sign Letter to Block Carter's Nuclear Posture Briefing," *Inside the Air Force*, 28 April 1994, p.1.

18. Statement of Senator Strom Thurmond before the Committee on Armed Services, Unified Commanders Strategy and Operational Requirements, Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1995, Hearing, 20 April 1994, pp. 1-3.

19. "Senate Republicans Appeal to Clinton Not to Eliminate ICBM Force," *Inside the Pentagon*, 29 April 1994, p. 9.

20. Ibid.

21. Grossman, "Four Services Sign Letter to Block Carter's Nuclear Posture Briefing," p. 10.

22. Transcript, "Nuclear Posture Review Defense Briefing," p. 16.

23. Ibid.

24. "Nuclear Posture Review" slide briefing (Press/Public Version), slide 17.

25. William M. Arkin and Robert S. Norris, "Russian (C.I.S.) Strategic Nuclear Forces—End of 1994," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (March-April 1995), pp. 78-79.

26. *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* projected Russia would field 1223 strategic delivery vehicles after START II is fully implemented in 2003 (same reference year used by the NPR for US projections). Russian systems manufactured after 1985 or later (my definition for "modern" production) include: 695 SS-25 ICBMs; 120 SS-N-20 and 112 SS-N-23 SLBMs; 25 supersonic Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, and 50 Tu-95 Bear H6 and H16 bombers. The prop-jet Bears have been around as long as US B-52 bombers, but the H6 and H16 versions were manufactured late in the production cycle that ended in 1992. Boeing ended production of the B-52 in 1964. The only projected Russian post-START II systems dating to before 1985 are 105 SS-19 ICBMs (deployed between 1972 and 1984), and 176 SS-N-18 SLBMs first deployed in 1979.

27. Letter from Admiral H. G. Chiles, Jr., Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command, to the Honorable William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, 12 September 1994.

28. Art Pine, "US Ponders What to Do With Its Nuclear Arsenal," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 May 1994, p. A16.

29. Barry M. Blechman, ed., *Rethinking Strategic Policy* (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1982), p. 129.

30. McNamara, pp. 21-23.

31. Blechman, p. 21.

32. "Draft RAND Study: Adequate Missile Defense Requires Major USAF Sacrifice," *Inside The Air Force*, 21 April 1995, p. 11.

33. "Nuclear Posture Review" slide briefing, (Press/Public Version), slides 21 and 36.

34. Transcript, Nuclear Posture Review briefing, p. 6.

35. Mann.

36. "Draft RAND Study: Adequate Missile Defense Requires Major USAF Sacrifice."

37. Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 605.

38. William M. Arkin and Robert Norris, "US Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, July 1995,"*The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (July-August 1995), p. 78.

39. William B. Scott, "Aging Arsenal Poses Dilemma," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 17 July 1995, p. 26.

40. Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, comp. and ed., *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington: US Department of Defense and the US Department of Energy, 1977), p. 608.

41. Scott.

42. Bill Gertz, "The New Nuclear Policy: Lead but Hedge," *Air Force Magazine*, January 1995, p. 37.

43. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr, "Wrong Way to Face the Future Nuclear Threat," *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 November 1993, p. A14.

44. Hua Di (Center for International Studies and Arms Control fellow), quoted from a Stanford University noontime seminar "Conversion of China's ICBM's from East Wind to Long March," 13 December 1993.

45. Scott, p. 24.

46. Ibid.

47. John Deutch, quoted from NPR press conference transcript, p. 7.

48. Of the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, Russia currently retains approximately 29,000 nuclear weapons (about 23,500 deployed; remainder in reserve); France between 500 and 550; China, between 350 and 450; and Britain, between 200 and 250. Weapon counts for the three de facto nuclear capable states are: Israel, up to 200 warheads; India, around 20, and Pakistan, about 10. South Africa built six nuclear weapons but later destroyed them. (Compiled from multiple sources).

49. The START accords require advance notice of strategic forces exercises. On 22 June 1994, Russian forces test-launched an SS-25 ICBM, an air-launched cruise missile, and an SLBM in a mock attack on the United States. A similar exercise was conducted in 1993. Neither was reported to the US State Department.

50. Gaffney.

51. Patrick E. Taylor, "China Upgrades Nuclear Arsenal as it Re-Examines Guns vs. Butter," *The New York Times*, 26 October 1994, p. A4.

52. Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), p. 567.

The Next Nuclear Questions

PATRICK J. GARRITY

With the agreement in May 1995 to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely, it might appear that the international ground rules for a new nuclear order are in place.[1] There remain the recognized nuclear problems associated with safely reducing and controlling the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, and dealing with a few rogue states like North Korea and Iran. But there are certainly no indications that rapid or widespread proliferation is imminent. The number of aggrieved or ambitious states that might seek security or gain through nuclear capabilities is fairly limited. The barriers, domestic and international, for most states to go nuclear remain very high, although not insurmountable.

The actual situation is in fact more complex, if more subtle, than this sketch would suggest. We are likely to see attempts to regulate the conflicting patterns of proliferation and denuclearization, and especially attempts to establish new relationships among the nuclear weapon states (actual and declared), and between those states and nonnuclear powers. The development of new relationships began to take place globally in the context of the NPT Renewal and Extension Conference, but this mechanism is by no means the sole or most important location for working out the boundaries of nuclear cooperation and competition. Much will also occur at the regional level, often through unilateral actions and bilateral negotiations on topics in which nuclear weapons are addressed indirectly, if at all, but where the implications for nuclear security could nonetheless be highly significant. Military doctrine and force structure will then alter over time accordingly. Finally, states will undoubtedly hedge against uncertainty—especially the rapid nuclearization of international or regional affairs or, less likely, the collapse of nuclear legitimacy.

The United States needs to recognize and plan for the emergence of this new nuclear order—to understand what is at stake, to be ahead of the political, military, and technical curve wherever possible, and to avoid overreacting to unexpected developments. This article explores the types of issues

that might emerge in the near and medium term, and suggests how policymakers might want to think about those issues.

The presentation may at first glance appear pessimistic, in that it seems to focus on what might go wrong in nuclear matters, and not on the positive trends and possibilities, such as the enormous and beneficial change in the US-Russian nuclear relationship. I would certainly not deny these trends, but instead would point out that there are many different and perhaps less desirable prospects in play as well. To move events in a more advantageous direction, we must understand the pitfalls as well as the promise.

Nuclear Weapons and the Great Powers

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons conferred some sense of distinction in the international hierarchy—obviously on the part of the so-called superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, but also with respect to Britain, France, and the Peoples' Republic of China, each of which sought nuclear weapons, to a greater or lesser degree, because of the special status they conferred. The fact that after 1971 these five declared nuclear powers were also the only permanent members of the UN Security Council reinforced this sense of status. With the end of the bipolar order, the relationship between the possession of nuclear weapons and international status has come very much into question. This issue is likely to play itself out in a complicated fashion, as various states with great power aspirations seek to define the future role of nuclear weapons in such a way as to provide maximum support for their interests and ambitions.

In the case of Russia, nuclear weapons are now seen across the political spectrum as Moscow's principal ticket to the great power club, given Russia's economic difficulties and its inability to pose a conventional military threat to Western Europe.[2] To maintain the pretense of political parity with the United States, any regime in Russia will insist upon appearing equal in the nuclear arena to the Americans and superior to China, France, and the United Kingdom. But for the moment, Russia must play its nuclear card in an odd way, as part of an overall strategy of seeking "independence through weakness." That is, the Russian government plays upon Western fears about the nuclear-related consequences of Russia's political turmoil to gain outside support for

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Moscow's efforts to hold the federation together and to maintain the semblance of Russian great power status.

For example, in the case of Chechnya, Clinton Administration spokesmen have justified their conditional support for Russian actions on the grounds that the breakup of Russia would lead to serious new questions about the possession and control of nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise. The Yeltsin government has generally become adept at playing on Western fears of the nightmare of a much larger Yugoslavia with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At the same time, Yeltsin has insisted on defending Russian interests with respect to such issues as NATO expansion and Bosnia. He has done so in part by using the threat that failure to accommodate Russia will lead to a nationalist backlash and to even greater dangers that a future leader (e.g., Vladimir Zhirinovsky) would brandish nuclear weapons in a much more dangerous fashion. The Russians act as if this nuclear card will allow them substantially to determine the conditions for Western financial assistance, and otherwise to limit intrusions on Russian sovereignty.

This is not to predict that Russian cooperation with the West will break down (Yeltsin's threatened "cold peace"), or that a resumption of the East-West conflict is in order.[3] But the Russian strategy is already starting to wear thin in the United States, and especially with the Republican Congress, which is particularly skeptical of the cooperative activities designed to use US funds to support the dismantlement of the former Soviet nuclear establishment.[4] The Clinton Administration has acknowledged that the Russians have been much slower than the United States in implementing START I, and that Russia continues to possess a very large advantage in tactical nuclear weapons (which are not covered by formal arms control agreements). Although these asymmetries are not now regarded as strategically significant, they point to very different values being placed by Washington and Moscow on nuclear weapons, and not just to the physical difficulties of disarmament. Along these lines, the ratification and implementation of START II is by no means assured, as many Russians believe that they received much the worst of this deal. Future American-Russian nuclear relations thus may be marked as much by friction as cooperation, even if START II comes into effect and if there is no resumption of an overt nuclear competition—which thankfully seems unlikely at present.

China's great power ambitions may also raise a series of nuclear questions for the United States and the nations of East Asia. The current leadership in Beijing expects that its growing military power, undergirded by a modestly sized but increasingly capable nuclear arsenal, will be an essential element in China's rise to greater international status. One certainly should not exaggerate the magnitude or urgency of this military buildup. And in any case, future Chinese leaders will be forced to make tradeoffs at some level between the security and influence that might be provided by traditional military instruments, and the need to develop peaceful economic relations, which

presumably would be harmed by what seemed to be an excessive Chinese military capability. That said, the Chinese do not believe that nuclear weapons have lost their utility, and they will accordingly maintain and modernize those capabilities, within limits. This apparently involves the development of a mobile land-based ICBM, a more effective SSBN/SLBM combination, and possibly multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Such modernization is apparently at the root of China's ongoing nuclear test program, despite international political pressures for a moratorium prior to the completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.[5]

Nuclear weapons are still viewed by the current leadership in Beijing as providing "soft power," or international prestige and status.[6] Chinese leaders have consistently seen nuclear weapons as a ticket into the great power club. This is not just the prestige associated with becoming a nuclear state: after all, India, Israel, and Pakistan are also nuclear states and Beijing does not consider them to be on the same status level. Major power status also requires commensurate nuclear capabilities, and here China seems informally to have used France and Britain as the best available metric. The Chinese also have seen nuclear weapons as representing "hard power," in the sense of possessing military utility. In the future, a more flexible and capable nuclear posture will be intended to support China's emerging military posture. This posture is focused mainly on improved conventional forces, so as to develop the capability for limited warfare along China's periphery, while deterring or being able to respond to intervention by outside powers.[7] This latter deterrent requirement is served in part by the PRC's nuclear capability.

The ongoing drawdown of Russian and American nuclear forces increases the relative strength of the Chinese in this arena, and it raises the question whether China will ultimately be satisfied with using Britain and France as its nuclear metric. China may decide to acknowledge START II levels as the bottom line for Russian and American nuclear forces, but Beijing could press the nuclear superpowers to accept a position of rough parity with China (1000 nuclear weapons, perhaps as low as several hundred), as yet another mark of the PRC's increased international standing. Alternatively, China could begin to build its nuclear forces toward Russian and American levels.

The fact that Russia and China are likely to maintain nuclear forces as an element of their claim to great power status raises the issue of whether Germany or Japan might try to level the playing field for themselves by acquiring an independent nuclear capability. This prospect is highly unlikely. There are considerable barriers to a German or Japanese decision to go nuclear, which would be overcome only if there are major adverse changes in the regional security environment, probably coupled with direct military threats to their territory, a significant loss of confidence in the US security guarantee, and domestic political changes leading to a "cure" for their respective "nuclear allergies." Elites in both countries understand fully the adverse domestic

and international implications of their acquisition of a nuclear capability. Any signs that they were even considering such a step could provoke dangerous reactions from their neighbors.[8]

Although Germany and Japan will not want to become members of the nuclear club, we can expect that they will seek an increasing say in policy decisions related to nuclear issues that affect their immediate interests. Influence, rather than possession, has long been Germany's route to nuclear security, and we can expect this to manifest itself for the Japanese as well, although perhaps in a less direct fashion. For example, a common Japanese complaint about US policy during the North Korean nuclear crisis was the lack of effective consultation. American officials dispute this point and insist that Tokyo was kept apprised, but Japanese leaders will undoubtedly want to develop better decisionmaking mechanisms in the future—without necessarily taking on themselves the public burden of assuming responsibility for those decisions. Surely, the Japanese will not want the United States to commit Japan's financial resources in future nuclear deals without full and prior consideration. By the same token, Germany will want some considerable say in the process by which its alliances (whether NATO or the European Union) engage in military operations in nuclear-armed regions, as well as in any nuclear arrangements that might be made if NATO expands to the east. In short, Germany and Japan will seek to prevent "taxation without representation" that supports what they see as questionable American political bargains with would-be proliferants. Germany and Japan also will seek to avoid being drawn into nuclear crises or conflicts triggered by American assertiveness (or equally by American weakness or vacillation).

Berlin and Tokyo will likewise expect assurances that their nuclear self-denial will not be the grounds for political discrimination. French-German and Chinese-Japanese relations, in particular, could be adversely affected if Paris and Beijing should overtly oppose German or Japanese membership on the UN Security Council by playing upon their own nuclear credentials.

If the security environment deteriorates and the Americans are thought to be unreliable, Germany could explore nuclear protection through a European security and defense identity (Japan has no such obvious alternative). And if such alternatives by outside powers cannot offer completely satisfactory security assurances, Germany and Japan still have other options short of nuclearization. Appeasement of nuclear-related threats is one. Another would involve becoming "virtual" nuclear powers—that is, make it clear to the world that Japan (or Germany) is easily within reach of deploying nuclear weapons and that only political will restrains such a deployment. Outside powers making long-term calculations about the military balance would conservatively have to plan for a Japanese (or German) nuclear force. This would provide a "virtual" deterrent, but neither Tokyo nor Bonn would have to face the immediate consequences of having made a decision in this direction. In Japan, for example, government

officials occasionally observe that Japan considered, and then rejected, a nuclear option in the 1960s—effectively pointing out that Japan could reconsider this decision in the future.[9]

New Nuclear Relationships

As various powers and actors seek their place in the emerging international order, we can expect to see ongoing efforts to reconfirm or develop new nuclear relationships among states to assure their respective interests and security. Indefinite extension of the NPT provides a framework for this process, but it is only a beginning. The process of developing a new nuclear order will involve, inter alia, agreements to extend and accept nuclear deterrence, offer nuclear reassurance, and promote denuclearization. The United States has taken the lead in this process, but a number of parties have a decided interest in its course and outcome.

The development of these new nuclear relationships is unlikely to be straightforward—it will be difficult to satisfy everyone, and to ensure that parties to various nuclear bargains have the same understanding of the terms. For instance, the United States and the international community will be faced with the possibility of bidding wars over the price of denuclearization, especially given the financial and political package that North Korea was able to exact. This will be combined with ongoing concern whether the proliferant will try to renegotiate the agreement, whether other supportive parties might seek to back out of their end of the bargain, and whether unwelcome third parties might attempt to participate in or benefit from the denuclearization agreement. In the North Korean case, this is illustrated by Pyongyang's continued reluctance to accept parts of the Framework Agreement (e.g., South Korean reactor technology); by the possibility that Seoul or Tokyo might later balk at meeting their financial commitments; and by Russia's efforts to become a political and economic partner in the bargain.

In a different context, the extension of NATO membership to the east-central European states will be complicated by the issue of whether and how the alliance should extend a nuclear guarantee.[10] Nuclear-related aspects of NATO expansion, if not handled properly, could anger the Russians, frighten the West Europeans, and disillusion or divide the candidate members. Also, disagreements might develop over the extent and character of offers of positive security assurances to states such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Even with good faith on all sides, during a future crisis with a hostile third party (e.g., Russia), Kiev or Almaty could be more "assured" than is warranted in Washington's or Moscow's eyes, leading to miscalculations, recriminations, and potential escalation.[11]

The United States will not necessarily be at the center of all new nuclear relationships.[12] If Washington cannot or does not step forward to broker or guarantee such arrangements, will other nuclear powers step in,

especially to extend nuclear deterrence? In the past, with very limited exceptions, no other power has been willing to do so. With the end of the Cold War, it is widely assumed that the nuclear weapon states will contract their definition of vital interests precisely to avoid making such commitments.[13] But if states like Russia or China—or even some regional powers with nuclear weapons—are serious about their status, they may feel compelled to offer some sort of nuclear protection to nonnuclear states. Alternatively, they may try to discourage other nuclear powers from offering such assurances.

Thus, efforts to define such new nuclear relationships may be *competitive*, in the sense of one nonnuclear party trying to outbid another for the favor of a relationship with a nuclear weapon state; or various nuclear "haves" could try to outbid each other for preferred relations with "have nots." The competition might conceivably manifest itself in *conflicting* nuclear relationships, such as between a Russia-Iraqi combination, on the one hand, and an Iran-PRC combination, on the other. New nuclear bargains also could include possible informal nuclear arrangements in various regions. For example, it is not impossible to imagine a tacit understanding between some elements in North and South Korea regarding the maintenance of a viable nuclear weapons capability in the context of reunification.

To the extent that such a stable relationship among the five regional powers in East Asia cannot be realized, China's nuclear potential will assume increasing strategic importance, and Beijing may be inclined to seek favorable bargains with neighboring nonnuclear states. For example, China could offer nuclear protection to a united but nonnuclear Korea as a hedge against Russian or Japanese pressure, or to certain ASEAN states as a hedge against growing Japanese or Indian assertiveness. Moscow is another regional nuclear player that could, in a highly militarized strategic environment, seek nuclear bargains with the Koreans or the Japanese.

The nuclear relationship between Russia and the other former Soviet republics, especially a denuclearized Ukraine and Kazakhstan, will be of similar long-term interest to Moscow. Russia is clearly seeking to recentralize security responsibilities through the agency of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as through bilateral agreements. If Russian national security policy and military doctrine becomes relatively dependent on nuclear weapons to deal with "external" threats, this must perforce affect Kiev and Almaty, situated as they are along the Russian strategic periphery. Will future Russian ballistic missile defenses, oriented toward the theater ballistic missile threat to the south, protect other former Soviet republics? Is Moscow prepared to extend nuclear deterrence to cover these republics from such threats? Will Russia be required to build or maintain ballistic missile defenses or strategic nuclear facilities outside Russian territory (e.g., radars, missile interceptors)? Will Russia seek to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons into some of the former Soviet republics after having withdrawn those weapons

during the breakup of the USSR? Although some of these questions could be answered unilaterally by Moscow, others might necessitate formal bargains or informal understandings with former Soviet republics.

If confidence in the American security guarantee declines in Europe, while nuclear-related threats to European security rise to the east or south, some sort of new nuclear bargain could be sought among the major European powers. The obvious solution here would be a deterrent force under the auspices of the European Union, or arrangements reached bilaterally or multilaterally by non-nuclear states with the British or French, separately or together. Most observers now see any sort of a European deterrent force as highly unlikely, given the long-standing reluctance of London and Paris to make such commitments.[14] But the alternative to a European-wide deterrent would be a national approach to nuclear security, with the Germans (and conceivably the Italians) either seeking independent nuclear capabilities or attempting to propitiate the source of the trouble. Under such circumstances, Britain and France would have strong incentives to try to develop a common nuclear policy. Although analysts may doubt that such a crisis point would ever be reached, there is enough uncertainty in Europe over the long-term staying power of the Americans that such questions are inevitable, and hence some political and even military hedging among the West Europeans will probably be in order.

Different types of nuclear bargains could emerge in the Middle East. A nuclear-armed Iran or Iraq might seek to use that capability for political and economic leverage over neighboring states, especially those in the Persian Gulf. For instance, Iraq might attempt to employ its nuclear capability to help develop a "protection racket," guaranteeing the security of some Gulf states at the expense of others (e.g., Kuwait) and to the exclusion of outside powers. Iran might try to persuade other Middle East oil producers to cut production and increase prices. On another front, it seems improbable at present that Israel would seek to extend direct nuclear guarantees to other states. But if proliferation in the region continues, the Israelis might find themselves informally supporting moderate Arab or Islamic states against radical, nuclear-armed opponents, which could not help but bring Israel's deterrent force into play, at least indirectly. Under some circumstances, the Israelis might be interested in covertly providing nuclear capabilities or assistance to friendly states somewhat removed, such as Turkey.

As power in the international system becomes more diffuse, and as candidates for great and regional power status begin to assert distinct interests and ambitions, nuclear relations among states could take on more of a multipolar character. To be sure, not all poles are created equal, and true nuclear multipolarity is unlikely to emerge for some time, if ever. Still, as the old nuclear order and relationships decay, new relationships are bound to emerge, and these may be more complex and interrelated than we have previously experienced. Multipolarity could develop globally (e.g., China-Russia-US),

regionally (Russia-China-US-Korea), or trans-regionally (Israel-Iraq-Iran-Pakistan-India-China-Korea-Russia-United States). As these examples imply, some states could be involved in more than one set of relationships, and smaller nuclear powers could play some role in the game. Such multipolar relationships could be even more complicated as the nuclear dimension interacts with weapons of high leverage, such as zero-CEP cruise missiles, and with other weapons of mass destruction.[15]

Regional Crises and Conflicts

In almost any future major regional crisis or conflict in the Middle East, South Asia, or Northeast Asia, the "shadow" of nuclear weapons will influence the course and possibly the outcome of events—even if those weapons are never actually used. At the very least, the conduct of conventional war will be affected by the possession of nuclear weapons, actual or feared, by one or both sides. This could involve limiting or expanding political objectives and could produce altered operational and tactical deployments and military objectives. One or both sides could seek to promote and take advantage of the horizontal escalation of the conflict, by making nuclear threats that draw in outside powers, or attempt to employ nuclear deterrence to keep outside powers from intervening. There also will be the constant danger of inadvertent escalation through attacks on command and control systems. The future status of the nuclear weapon programs in the region may become an important factor in any peace negotiations.[16]

Even if they are not immediately involved in such regional crises or conflicts, those nations that claim great power status cannot be indifferent to nuclear-related instabilities. Although it is possible that the nuclear danger would serve to discourage great power involvement, it is equally conceivable that such powers, especially the United States, could insist upon the necessity of intervening despite—indeed, because of—the associated nuclear danger. Few developments would affect national, regional, or global security more than a series of nuclear detonations, or even just one. This could lead to a more expansive definition of great power interests, for it is hard to be indifferent to circumstances in which there is a high risk of nuclear use or nuclear accident (e.g., the experience of Chernobyl).[17] Great power intervention, whether political or military, could have the purpose either of preventing the emergence of new nuclear powers, or of managing and terminating violence before the regional conflict began to acquire a nuclear dimension. The ability to do this could become a critical determinant of what it means to be a great power. Great power status might be enhanced through regional or global institutions that legitimize the use of force and help build international coalitions. Or the great powers could disagree fundamentally or in specific instances about whether, how, and against whom to intervene.

To the extent that interstate relations involving large or small nuclear powers become less cooperative, changes in nuclear relationships probably will

manifest themselves first through an arms competition rather than through overt crises, tests of strength and resolve, or war. The essential elements of such arms competitions are being put into place by a growing number of states which seek to establish legitimate industrial competencies that could also be exploited for military purposes. Such a competition would be complex and would not necessarily be limited to increases in the quantity or improved quality of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and command and control. The competition might involve, and even be characterized principally by, nonnuclear programs designed to counter or otherwise offset the competitor's nuclear capabilities. Syria provides the case of a nation that has sought to develop and improve an asymmetric military capability—chemical weapons and ballistic missiles—to serve as the functional equivalent of a nuclear deterrent, without the attendant costs and political risks. Japan might rely on a combination of tactical ballistic missile defenses and advanced conventional weapons to deter North Korean nuclear use against the home islands, either as a replacement for or as a complement to the American nuclear guarantee.

Any new military competition involving nuclear powers initially might be bilateral in character and thus be relatively limited. But if it becomes truly multipolar, where the members of the system feel threatened by more than one opponent, the arms competition would be much larger, more dynamic, more unpredictable, and more likely to break out into political and military crises.

The possibility of nuclear crises involving great powers certainly cannot be dismissed. Although the great nuclear game between the United States and the Soviet Union has thankfully been relegated to history, future Russian-American difficulties are always possible. Russian contingency planning is concerned primarily with the need to conduct limited military operations within and along the periphery of the federation.[18] This includes deterring, or defending against, intervention by outside powers in conflicts in and near the Russian Federation (especially among the "near abroad"). Deterrence against outside intervention relies heavily on posing general nuclear risks to an outside power. In particular, the Russians have stressed the fact that conventional attacks on their command and control system—similar to those which the US-led coalition employed against Iraq in the first phase of Operation Desert Storm—could lead to strategic nuclear retaliation against the aggressor. If a more nationalistic Russian regime were to become involved militarily along its periphery, and if the United States or other Western powers indicate diplomatic disapproval of such actions, Moscow might interpret this as a precursor to intervention, and make nuclear threats (or go on nuclear alert) accordingly.[19] Such a scenario might today appear far-fetched, but the consequences of such a crisis are so serious that they should not be ignored.

Similarly, unexpected nuclear-oriented crises between the United States and China could emerge, especially in the event of Chinese pressure or military action against efforts to establish an independent Taiwan. A future war

on the Korean peninsula, or Chinese military action against American allies resulting from territorial disputes in the South China Sea, are also possible triggers. Although American officials have given some thought to the possibility of such crises, they may not fully appreciate their nuclear dimension, especially if the PRC should threaten nuclear use as a way of deterring or limiting American actions. Even if the crisis is resolved, the fact that one or both sides made or implied nuclear threats could strongly harden an "enemy image" in the Sino-American relationship. The shock to the American public would be particularly acute, once it was driven home that the PRC has a capability, however limited, to strike the United States. From Washington's perspective, a China bent on destabilizing the international environment to the disadvantage of the United States could also do so by actively promoting nuclear proliferation, and by offering overt political and diplomatic support to emerging nuclear weapon states hostile to Washington, such as North Korea or Iran.

Nuclear Surprises and Shocks

During the Cold War, especially after the Cuban missile crisis, the political and intellectual landscape surrounding nuclear weapons became familiar and, in retrospect, quite stable and predictable. This situation has obviously now changed, and it opens up the possibility of a "nuclear surprise"—for example, the sudden, as opposed to gradual or generally anticipated, appearance of a real or feared nuclear capability, or a major change in the expectations and policies surrounding nuclear weapons.

With respect to the emergence of new nuclear powers, there has been a standard assumption that it would take ten years for a proliferant to develop a nuclear capability, and that there will be certain obvious signs that the proliferant was moving in this direction. But we now face so-called horizontal or unconventional proliferation, where states or even non-state actors could develop nuclear capabilities through paths other than the traditional ones of diverting materials from ostensibly civilian capabilities or developing hidden programs over time. Most notably, a nation or actor considering proliferation could conceivably now enjoy immediate access to nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge from the former Soviet Union, and potentially from other sources. But in addition, there may be "no signature" paths to nuclear weapons—programs designed deliberately to avoid the traditional trip wires that alert the international community that proliferation is taking place. For advanced industrial states, there may also be high-technology paths to provide relatively quick and sophisticated nuclear capabilities.[20]

The possibility of a nuclear surprise is generally understood. American officials have publicly judged that it would take the Iranians at least eight to ten years to develop their own nuclear capability, but they acknowledge that this time could be shortened considerably if there is substantial assistance from external powers. Despite this recognition, there is a good chance that revela-

tions about new or suspected nuclear capabilities by a nation such as Iran, especially during a crisis, could prove to be a "shock" rather than a "surprise." The US government was well aware that the Soviet Union had the potential to place a satellite in orbit in 1957, but it did not fathom the domestic and international political effects that the launch of Sputnik would produce. By the same token, the sudden assertion of an Iranian nuclear capability during, for example, a future crisis over shipping access to the Strait of Hormuz, could gravely affect the direction and resolution of that crisis.

A nuclear surprise could occur in a variety of ways. It could involve planted or inadvertent leaks of information about a nuclear program, claims of nuclear capabilities or intentions by the suspected proliferant or by a third party, a nuclear demonstration, or the actual use of the weapon. A further complication is that claims or suspicions about a nuclear surprise may well be viewed as credible despite the lack of hard evidence. Previously, this possibility might have been dismissed on the grounds that it was technically impossible. In late 1990, for example, when rumors of an Iraqi nuclear capability surfaced, they were not given any real credence. In a future crisis, given what is now known about Iraqi progress toward such a capability, these rumors are likely to be taken far more seriously by at least some of the interested parties—in this example, by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran, as well as the United States.

On the opposite side of the equation, the danger of a nuclear surprise may cause other states in the region, or outside powers, to assume the worst even when that judgment actually is not warranted. Although this assumption may induce greater caution, it also could provoke diplomatic and military actions to preempt the emergence of a new nuclear power. In the regional context, a state like Iran (against Iraq), or China (against Taiwan), might decide to strike on the suspicion or pretext that a nuclear surprise is imminent. At the global level, the United States and other advanced industrial powers might broaden their definition of nuclear contraband and expand intrusive means of inspection and intervention in order to get a better handle on nontraditional paths to proliferation. Such a policy could trigger even greater resentment in parts of the developing world, on the grounds that this was actually part of a broader Western scheme to keep unfavored countries down—to deny access to the advanced technology and capital that they need to develop modern, and independent, economies.[21]

For the most part, concern over a nuclear surprise has been limited to the usual suspects, or what the Clinton Administration calls "rogue states": e.g., Iran, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. In all these cases, the domestic and international imperative to develop a clandestine nuclear capability remains strong. Iraq and North Korea may still be pursuing nuclear weapons through channels not covered by the formal denuclearization process, while the international community looks for the key under the lamp post. However low a probably one might assign to a sudden nuclear breakout by Baghdad or Pyongyang, this will remain a nagging uncertainty that could affect the diplo-

matic process over time—and such concern would rapidly come to the surface during a major crisis.[22] One also cannot rule out the possibility that rumors may surface concerning the nuclear capabilities of an "unusual suspect"—e.g., Serbia, Syria, or Cuba.

There is also the category of what might be called "friendly surprises": regional powers with whom the United States has good or correct relations, but whose strategic character puts them in a position where a nuclear capability might seem attractive or necessary at some point. Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Poland might fall into this category. (Relatedly, there is the special case of potential nuclear recidivists: South Africa, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.) Most of these states are in unstable regions where other nuclear powers exist or could emerge, but whose confidence in the American nuclear guarantee or international support might come into question at some point. A friendly surprise is not now an imminent prospect; the barriers and disincentives, domestic and international, to pursuing a nuclear capability remain strong. Perhaps stated more precisely, leaders in these countries have evidently given little thought to this possibility. Whether these barriers remain in place over the longer term will depend largely on how the overall strategic environment evolves. But the shock of one of these countries unexpectedly going nuclear might have even greater effects than an "unfriendly surprise"; it might signal the breakdown of US-sponsored regional security orders, and have a cascading effect among similar powers.

Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that new nuclear powers, or established nuclear powers facing a hostile security environment, might depart from expected or traditional paths with respect to nuclear weapons. At the low end of the scale, we might see the emergence of unexpected capabilities from small nuclear powers—e.g., more modern fission designs involving more efficient use of nuclear materials; the development of smaller, lighter-weight warheads that could be delivered by a wider variety of delivery systems; higher-yield weapons, including two-stage designs; and weapons that employ tailored effects. Israel and India already have reportedly made, or pursued, improvements along these lines. Others may follow, especially if expertise concerning advanced nuclear weapon technology should flow out of the former Soviet Union.

But there are even more serious discontinuities to consider. For example, a regional power with ambitions far beyond its ordinary means—or a great power led by someone like Vladimir Zhirinovksy—might provoke a series of nuclear crises to destabilize the security environment and open up major diplomatic opportunities for itself. (Many in the West were concerned that the Soviets might resort to such an approach during the Cold War; the fact that the Kremlin ultimately proved to be relatively cautious is in itself no assurance that other powers might not try this strategy.) Nuclear brinkmanship would be particularly attractive to those espousing a revolutionary doctrine that was fundamentally at odds with global or regional order, and who were

willing to run high risks in order to destroy that order. Such an attitude might especially prevail in the early stages of a political revolution. There is also the prospect of a "nuclear Napoleon"—a political or military genius who might seek to devise ways to use nuclear weapons in unexpected fashion for strategic purposes. For instance, a regional power might use nuclear weapons not against cities or military targets in the region, but for demonstration purposes. This would be designed to deter outside (principally American) military intervention and convince other regional states that they cannot rely on US security guarantees, so that the aggressor can achieve its foreign policy objectives without going to war.

Finally, events over the past five years in the former Soviet Union serve as a reminder that future nuclear surprises may not stem from the actions of unified, coherent states, but as the result of circumstances in which there is a question about political control of nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities; civil war or unrest involving or proximate to things nuclear; or the emergence of new nuclear entities as a consequence of the breakup of a nuclear weapon state.[23] The Russian Federation and Ukraine for some time will remain problematic in this respect, and it is not inconceivable that China or India could fall into this category. But one must also include problems with such nuclear or near-nuclear states as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq, should there be a coup attempt or significant domestic unrest.

In the event of fragmentation or civil war in a nuclear weapon state, there will be obvious concerns about accidental or deliberate use, and the leakage of nuclear material. But nuclear materials or facilities could conceivably be used as bargaining chips in a struggle for internal power, or as negotiating leverage with external powers. If there were two rival claimants to the government in China, for example, the international community would be far more inclined to treat with the side that could plausibly claim to control that country's nuclear forces. Civil unrest involving the control of nuclear weapons and materials might also draw in outside powers with divergent agendas—e.g., China, Japan, and the United States in a fragmenting Russia; the United States, Germany, and Russia in a fragmenting Ukraine.

Denuclearization

Although the nuclear surprises described above would represent a dramatic move toward the (re)nuclearization of regional or global politics, the opposite course is also possible. That is, the secular trend toward denuclearization among the great powers since the end of the Cold War could be accelerated by a sudden change in international attitudes about the legitimacy of nuclear weapons in any form. A major unilateral or bilateral initiative toward complete nuclear disarmament on the part of one of the nuclear weapon states—particularly by the United States and Russia together—would not necessarily result in the immediate abolition of nuclear weapons, but it might

well change fundamentally the ground rules that govern relations among nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states.

The most probable path to general, if not complete, disarmament would unfortunately be caused by a catastrophic nuclear accident, or the use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict. Such an event could precipitate widespread revulsion against things nuclear, and extensive international demands that the possession of nuclear weapons effectively be criminalized. But as desirable as this end state might be in principle, the transition period might be highly chaotic and dangerous. Difficulties would naturally result simply from the mechanics of disarmament efforts, even with the good will of all parties, but the pressure of international and domestic opinion would not act evenly on all affected states. A major accident involving the North Korean nuclear program that spread high levels of radiation across the region would not necessarily have the same political effects in Pyongyang that it might in Tokyo, Washington, Seoul, or Beijing.

The pressures for rapid disarmament on powers for whom nuclear weapons play a crucial psychological as well as political-military dimension—e.g., France, Russia, and Israel—could be enormous and divisive. The political and military demands on powers potentially called on to enforce the ban—particularly the United States—would be extensive, and could lead to disagreements with other nations (over issues such as burdensharing and sovereign rights). This raises the prospect of an asymmetrical and highly destabilizing situation, in which some states are rapidly denuclearizing while others try to resist pressures to denuclearize, or are trying to take advantage of the situation by developing or increasing their nuclear capabilities.

Nuclear Use

The actual use of a nuclear weapon would be a shock of the first order, and it would tend to move international politics toward the extremes of large-scale proliferation or nuclear delegitimation. The particular effects of such a detonation would be highly contingent on the circumstances in which a nuclear weapon is exploded, including whether by accident or design. The effects also would be contingent on the immediate physical consequences of the detonation, locally, regionally, and globally.

Take the most likely case, in which a nuclear weapon is used deliberately by a regional power in the midst of a conflict with one or more regional powers. If the use is "successful"—in the sense of determining the outcome of the war without provoking the intervention of an outside power or causing environmental catastrophe—this would provide an "existence proof" of the utility of nuclear weapons, as well as the risks associated in not having such a weapon. The likely result would be one of increasing and rapid proliferation, not necessarily limited to the region at hand. The incentive to proliferate also would increase if it were perceived that the regional power's nuclear force

deterred outside intervention in the conflict, or if nuclear use itself defeated such intervention.

It is precisely to avoid this perception that the great powers will have considerable incentive to intervene in a regional conflict where nuclear weapons have been used, as discussed above. How this might play out in the event is quite complicated. Such intervention need not be military in character, but could come in the form of reassurance, coercion, sanctions, or economic rewards to cease and desist. Conceivably, however, the intervention could result in military action, either to prevent forcibly the further use of nuclear weapons, or more expansively to stop the conflict altogether. (Some regional powers, such as Israel and South Africa, arguably developed their nuclear programs in part with such a catalytic effect in mind, precisely to provoke outside involvement to their advantage.) If great power intervention is successful in preventing the further use of nuclear weapons, without seeming unduly to reward the perpetrator, interest in nuclear proliferation probably would be curtailed. But there is also the possibility that intervention will fail, in the sense that some great powers might support, and others oppose, efforts to punish or reassure the particular state that employed nuclear weapons. Great power dissension could serve to spark renewed interest in proliferation, as regional states develop nuclear capabilities to attract great power sponsorship or otherwise play one outsider off against the other.

The use of nuclear weapons by a regional power also could be "unsuccessful" because it did not have the desired political or military effect, or because a nuclear exchange proved inconclusive. An unsuccessful use would tend to dampen incentives to proliferate. But the greatest effect along these lines would be caused by the use of a nuclear weapon that had truly horrific consequences—the immediate death of hundreds of thousands, well covered by the international media, with the spread of fallout causing panic and affecting the health of tens of millions outside the combat zone. The reaction, regionally and globally, would undoubtedly be severe, perhaps leading to extraordinary pressure for international punishment of the guilty parties and a general revulsion against nuclear weapon programs in all states.

The actual use of nuclear weapons by one Eurasian power against another could result in horizontal as well as vertical escalation—that is, it could draw in other regional states as well as great powers. In a crowded geographic environment, a nuclear war might be more likely to spread both deliberately and accidentally. For example, nuclear detonations that disrupted command, control, and communications over a wide area could lead other, uninvolved states to believe that they too were coming under attack. Regional nuclear powers that were not initially engaged might also take advantage of the circumstance to launch an attack of their own on a preoccupied rival. The anticipation of such blind-side attacks could lead the likely recipient to launch

a preemptive strike of its own, not only against its immediate opponent, but against a feared third party, such as Israel.[24]

Although the potential for the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons in a terrorist mode may be exaggerated, it will nonetheless be in some fashion on the policy agenda, given the bombings of the World Trade Center and the gas attacks in the Tokyo subway. (If nuclear terrorist threats became public, they could have many of the same political consequences as the actual use of a weapon.) State-sponsored nuclear terrorism could be used to deter or retaliate against outside intervention in a regional conflict, for example, Iraq versus the United States. Such acts also could serve to retaliate against the actions of a regional adversary, or to destroy the improvement of relations, for example, between Israel and moderate Arab states or factions. Finally, nuclear terrorism might emerge in the context of a civil war, such as that in Russia or Ukraine.

It should be recognized that nuclear terrorism could be aimed not only at punishing or extracting concessions from the targeted state, but simply at bringing down that state or otherwise striking at the stability of the international system. One could imagine revolutionary states or actors, without regard to their own particular fate, determined to set off bombs in a handful of US cities in an effort to cripple the United States as a world actor. To be sure, the United States may be a less likely target in this respect than US allies, or Russia, but successful subversion of any major state would have consequences for the international community, not least the United States.

Policies to Shape the Nuclear Future

None of this is to say that the prospects for a stable and reasonable nuclear order are poor. There are a number of positive trends, including the voluntary denuclearization of some states, reductions in superpower nuclear stockpiles, efforts to enforce international nonproliferation norms in Iraq, and constructive developments in Latin America. There are certainly no indications that rapid or widespread proliferation is imminent.

Still, there is a wide range of possible nuclear futures, depending on such myriad imponderables as the future of reform in Russia, the potential for changes in the political culture in Germany and Japan, the terms on which the Koreas might be unified, and so on. Most nations are now reacting to events, rather than trying to direct them. But over time, the leaders of nations or peoples will try to anticipate what the new nuclear environment might look like. They will then seek to shape that world to their advantage, to the extent that is possible, or at least prevent it from being shaped to their disadvantage. At the same time they will create, or at least not rule out, new political and military options for themselves, especially should events go in a less-than-optimum direction.

All this suggests that the next few years will be marked neither by uncontrolled proliferation, nor by a consistent and successful effort to denuclearize international relations. There will be some of both. We are likely to

see attempts to regulate the conflicting patterns of proliferation and denuclearization, and especially attempts to establish new relationships among the nuclear weapon states (actual and declared), and between those states and nonnuclear powers. The United States must recognize the existence and complexity of this process, and take a leading role in working out acceptable boundaries for nuclear cooperation and, if necessary, competition.

First, American policymakers should especially understand that there will be a subtle nuclear dimension to many of its political and military interactions, with both greater and lesser powers. For the most part, the United States should not make any particular effort to make visible that which is hidden. It is in the American interest for nuclear weapons to fade into the background of international relations, insofar as that is possible. But neither should Washington ignore the fact that such varied decisions as expanding NATO eastward, strengthening relations with Ukraine, or allowing leaders of Taiwan to visit the United States as private citizens, could at some point have nuclear-related repercussions. And because nuclear weapons ultimately raise fundamental questions of sovereignty and survival for all nations, accounting for these repercussions is essential, even if they must be addressed in a low-key manner.

Second, with this in mind, the United States should take a realistic view of its nuclear relations with Russia and China. Neither of these nations is destined to become a US adversary, and some degree of nuclear cooperation with and among these powers should be explored. But the United States should not expect that nuclear cooperation (e.g., the Nunn-Lugar program) can carry the burden of those relations. Nor should it assume that disagreements and even competition about things nuclear can necessarily be avoided. Early recognition of this fact may actually help avoid unnecessarily exacerbating future political affairs. Along these lines, the United States should appreciate the fact that future nuclear crises with Russia or China are not impossible, and should work accordingly to minimize or moderate this possibility.

Third, Washington should both understand the need for and promote cooperation with leading nonnuclear states, especially Germany and Japan, in dealing with nuclear-related questions in regions of mutual interest. Although the United States will generally exercise leadership in these circumstances, Berlin and Tokyo will increasingly want to have their voices heard, as part of the implicit bargain by which they remain nonnuclear states. Although the Japanese officially accepted the Framework Agreement with North Korea, the sudden apparent change of direction by the United States in making that bargain is not the ideal way to handle such a situation with American allies in the future.

Fourth, and relatedly, the United States must appreciate the broad necessity of reassuring its allies and key regional powers of its continuing commitment to their security from hostile nuclear threats. The old verities of extended deterrence will not necessarily hold in the future. To be sure, the nuclear dimension of US alliance relationships will be less important, as there

is no longer an overarching Soviet danger against which friendly nations need protection. The issue of nuclear assurance will probably be raised and settled in the context of resolving more general concerns about reliability and durability of US security commitments. The United States should pay as much attention to friendly states that might be inclined to develop a nuclear option if their nuclear security is not accounted for in some fashion, as to the nuclear programs of rogue powers.

Fifth, the US military should devise plans and forces for a wide range of contingencies involving nuclear weapons. The focus is now on a canonical blue versus red problem—in this case, operating against a nuclear-armed Iraq or North Korea. But this analysis suggests the possibility that American policymakers may also want options for influencing a regional conflict where the United States is not immediately involved (e.g., Pakistan and India), but where Washington may seek to prevent nuclear weapons from being used—or to contain or minimize the effects of their use. Although widely-publicized war games have indicated that American officials will want to avoid such intervention, domestic and international political realities may be such that US action must be seriously considered, and the US military should be prepared for that eventuality.

Finally, while policymakers cannot anticipate all potential nuclear surprises or shocks, neither should they assume that the future will be merely a linear extrapolation of the past. In many ways, sensible diplomacy and flexible military forces are the best way to hedge against surprise, but these may not be sufficient to overcome the effects of a truly revolutionary event involving nuclear weapons. This means asking and answering a series of hard "what if" questions—e.g., What happens if there is a civil war in Russia? What happens if a unified Korea attempts to retain a nuclear capability? What happens if a major nuclear accident creates enormous domestic and international pressures for denuclearization? What if Pakistan threatens to use nuclear weapons against India unless the United States intervenes to stop an Indian military invasion? By seeking answers to such hard questions, the United States may identify steps that can be taken in advance to prevent or mitigate such surprises, or at least provide itself with realistic options to deal with a highly uncertain strategic environment.

NOTES

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15. See Aaron L. Friedberg, "Nuclear Multipolarity," unpublished paper prepared for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, June 1994.

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Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation Decision

DONALD W. BOOSE, JR.

"The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within . . . Korea north of 38 north latitude . . . shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East . . . . [A]ll ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in . . . Korea south of 38 north latitude . . . shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific."[1]

— General Order Number 1, Military and Naval
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
2 September 1945

During the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific, attention has focused largely on those events that were obvious historical turning points: the detonation of the atomic bombs and the surrender ceremony that marked the end of the Japanese Empire. But even as General MacArthur was accepting the Japanese surrender on board the USS *Missouri*, an American occupation force was preparing to sail for Korea. This other operation, the result of a series of US wartime decisions, seemed very much a sideshow compared to the main event taking place in Tokyo Bay. But it was a sideshow with serious consequences, for the movement on short notice of an occupation force to Korea not only assured US access and influence and preserved half the peninsula from communism, it also established the conditions that led to the Korean Conflict and thus played a role in shaping the bipolar US-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War.[2]

Korea had always been a sideshow from the US perspective. Before World War II, Americans took little notice of Korea, which had been a Japanese colony since 1910. Even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Korea was incidental to US operations in East Asia. In the Pacific, American efforts were directed at holding a line against the Japanese assault and establishing a system of bases and lines of communications in preparation for a counteroffensive. The strategic policy toward China was to keep that country

fighting without a major investment of US forces.[3] Korea, whether viewed in terms of the Pacific or of China, was far from American forces and as inaccessible as the Japanese islands themselves.

Initially, American leaders tended to see Korea as largely a Chinese concern. But as the war continued, tensions with the Soviet Union increasingly influenced American policy. The problem was that until near the end of the war, the United States sought Soviet intervention in East Asia to place additional pressure on Japan and thereby reduce American costs and casualties. At the same time, American officials also realized that postwar access and influence in Northeast Asia was important to the United States and, if the USSR did intervene in the Pacific, it would very likely end the war in occupation of Manchuria, Korea, and perhaps even part of Japan.[4]

Until his death in 1945, President Roosevelt was the ultimate arbiter of US policy. While his motivations remain subject to debate, he clearly saw cooperation with the Soviet Union as essential to the prosecution of the war and to establishing postwar peace and stability. He made great efforts to enhance that cooperation in the face of Stalin's growing suspicions. Yet his actions reflected a pragmatic view, and he took a number of steps to limit Russia's postwar influence in East Asia. At the same time, the President avoided making unequivocal statements or supporting actions that would reinforce Russian suspicions or disrupt US public support for the war effort.[5]

US policy toward Korea was part of that pattern. Thus, Korean exiles seeking diplomatic recognition for a Korean Provisional Government in China met with polite rebuff, at least in part to avoid stimulating Soviet reaction. There were other reasons as well, including a desire not to "compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish."[6] Roosevelt sought to sidestep this government-in-exile issue and avoid a confrontation over Korea while still assuring postwar US influence by proposing an international trusteeship in which the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union would participate.[7]

When the Cairo Declaration was issued by Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 1 December 1943, it read in part: "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."[8] While trusteeship was not specifically mentioned in the declaration, the concept was discussed by the Cairo partici-

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pants, as well as by Roosevelt and Stalin at the Teheran Conference, and the term "in due course" clearly indicated that some temporary period of external supervision was to be imposed on Korea. Military planners assumed that the trusteeship mechanism would come into effect at the end of the war, but while the Allies discussed the concept from time to time, the Allied leaders never reached a formal agreement on the structure and operation of a trusteeship.[9]

In late 1944, with invasion of the Japanese home islands under active consideration, the United States stepped up its efforts to obtain Russian intervention.[10] Preliminary US-British-Soviet talks took place in the fall of 1944. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed that Russia would enter the Pacific War two or three months after the defeat of Germany. His conditions, accepted by Roosevelt and Churchill, included Soviet control of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands and (subject to agreement by Chiang Kai-shek) preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia, Soviet access to the Manchurian port of Dairen (Lüda), control of the Port Arthur (Lüshun) naval base, and Soviet railroad rights in Manchuria.[11]

As the war entered its final stages, Korean exile groups made new proposals to contribute to the war effort. Although the United States continued its policy of nonrecognition of any exile group, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) believed that individual Korean exiles might play some kind of role in psychological operations or in clandestine direct action missions. To that end the OSS recruited agents and established training camps in China, but the war ended before any missions were carried out.[12]

By the spring of 1945, the US Pacific commanders were formulating a plan for the successive invasion of the southernmost Japanese home island of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) in November 1945 and of the main island of Honshu (Operation Coronet) in June 1946.[13] US military planners briefly considered Korea as an alternative to Kyushu for an advanced base from which to tighten the blockade and prepare for the final assault against Honshu. But an assault on Korea, it was believed, would cost even more American lives than the Kyushu operation, and US forces would still be far from their ultimate objective. Soviet intervention was no longer considered essential to the success of the operation, although such intervention would, if properly timed, unquestionably shorten the war and reduce casualties. Moreover, the JCS was reluctant to commit US forces on the Asian continent. In June 1945 they told President Truman:

> With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.[14]

Although the JCS still saw Soviet intervention as useful, if no longer critical, US-Soviet relations had deteriorated markedly after the Yalta Confer-

ence. Among the factors contributing to this development were the death of President Roosevelt, the influence on President Truman by advisors who favored a strong line toward Russia, US frustrations over Soviet attitudes toward lend-lease and combined operations, and conflicting US and Soviet views on the postwar treatment of Germany and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland).[15] Military planners were not insensitive to these political considerations. Mid-1945 saw a marked reduction in American efforts to achieve Russian cooperation in carrying out preparations for the forthcoming offensive. The JCS canceled plans to send US liaison teams into Russia and to establish air bases in Siberia, and postponed discussions on a Pacific supply route to Russia.[16]

In May, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew had sent memoranda to the Secretaries of War and Navy requesting their views on the political effects of Soviet entry in the Pacific War. He suggested that prior to any implementation of the Yalta Agreement, the United States should seek a firm commitment on the part of the USSR to the future freedom and independence of Korea and an agreement that Korea be placed under a four-power trusteeship immediately upon liberation. In reply, the two service Secretaries expressed a belief that the Soviets would enter the Pacific War at a time of their choosing "with little regard to any political action taken by the United States." The United States had little political leverage with regard to the Yalta Agreements, they pointed out, since those concessions were "within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of US military action short of war," and since Russia was "capable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto [Sakhalin], Manchuria, Korea, and Northern China before it would be possible for the US military forces to occupy these areas." In spite of these reservations about the effectiveness of such a move, the Secretaries agreed that it would still be desirable to attempt to obtain the suggested commitments from the Soviet government.[17]

In May 1945, US Special Representative Harry Hopkins traveled to Moscow as a preliminary to the upcoming Potsdam summit. Although he was provided with extensive briefing papers and a detailed draft agreement on Korean trusteeship for negotiation with Stalin, Hopkins' message to the President on the meeting stated only that "Stalin agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States."[18] This verbal agreement and a subsequent one made by Stalin to Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong appear to be the only accords on trusteeship in existence when the war ended.[19]

Nor did any substantive talks on the Korean trusteeship issue take place at the July 1945 Potsdam Conference. The Combined Chiefs of Staff met with Soviet Chief of Staff, General Alexei E. Antonov, and his staff to discuss the coordination and division of operations between US and Soviet forces when Russia entered the war, including the coordination of air and naval

boundaries near Korea. Nevertheless, except for a brief and inconsequential exchange on 22 July, the political leaders apparently did not discuss Korea.[20]

While nothing of substance regarding Korea took place in the tripartite forum, behind the scenes at Potsdam, in Washington, and at the Pacific commanders' headquarters on Guam and in Manila, US leaders made decisions that would have important consequences for Korea. These decisions appear to have been influenced by a number of factors: concerns about Soviet actions and intentions, a new confidence that had emerged with the successful test of the atomic bomb immediately before the summit, and consequent realization that Japan might surrender without an invasion, allowing the United States to establish a presence in Korea without expending American lives in the process.

After he was informed that the atomic bomb test had been successful, President Truman asked Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to query General Marshall as to whether or not Soviet intervention in the Pacific was still desirable. Stimson talked to Marshall on 23 July and interpreted the Chief of Staff's comments to indicate "that now with our new weapon we would not need the assistance of the Russians to conquer Japan." But, Marshall cautioned, the Soviets, with troops massed on the Manchuria border, were in a position to strike anyway, and thus get "virtually what they wanted in the surrender terms."[21]

On the following day, General Antonov asked General Marshall if American forces could conduct operations "against the shores of Korea" in coordination with the Soviet units that would conduct an offensive in the Korean Peninsula. Marshall replied that no amphibious operations against Korea were planned, at least until after the Kyushu invasion, because they would expose American shipping to Japanese suicide attacks in the Sea of Japan and would divert assault ships from the landings on Kyushu. On 26 July, air and sea boundaries were established, but no provision was made for ground boundaries. President Truman later recorded that "no lines were set up for land operations since it was not anticipated by our military leaders that we would carry out operations to Korea."[22]

The President would have been more accurate had he said there were no intentions of carrying out *combat* operations. In fact, the United States had begun planning for the noncombat occupation of Korea and stepped up the pace of those preparations at the very time Marshall was coordinating with Antonov. In August 1944, the JCS had directed the Joint War Planning Committee to "prepare plans for the occupation of Japanese-held strategic positions in the event of withdrawal of Japanese forces, collapse of the Japanese Government, or surrender."[23] Little was done in this regard until after the outline plans for the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu had been completed. It was May 1945 before the Joint War Plans Committee turned its attention to the problem of contingency planning for Japan's surrender. The Joint Planning Staff recognized that there were areas "other than Japan proper" which the

United States might find it necessary to seize. By June, the joint planners were including Korea (as well as places in Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], Indochina, and the China Coast) as being among those areas.[24] On 14 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to prepare plans "to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as sudden collapse or surrender, to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes."[25]

By 10 July, the Joint War Plans Committee had refined their outline plan. They anticipated that the United States would be responsible for the occupation of Japan proper, Korea, the Shanghai-Nanking area of China, the enemy-held Pacific islands, and Formosa, in that priority.[26] The JCS followed this up prior to the Potsdam talks by directing the Pacific commanders to broaden their plans to include Korea. In response, MacArthur suggested that Tokyo and Seoul should have first priority for occupation, with Pusan and Kunsan having second and third priority. Thus, as the Potsdam Conference convened, the Joint War Plans Committee in Washington, General MacArthur's staff in Manila, and Admiral Nimitz's staff on Guam had all made considerable progress on occupation plans.[27]

On 25 July, during the Potsdam conference, Marshall provided Truman a memorandum on the status of planning for a sudden Japanese surrender, informing the President:

> Instructions were issued in June to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to prepare plans for occupation of Japan in event of a sudden collapse or surrender. Further instructions were issued to these commanders last week to include Korea in their plans and both commanders were informed that collapse or surrender might occur before Russia entered the war. General Wedemeyer [Commanding General, US Forces, China Theater] was also informed.[28]

On the same day (the day after his initial talks with Antonov), Marshall directed Lieutenant General John E. Hull, Chief of the War Department Operations Division (OPD), to be prepared to move some troops into Korea. Hull did some preliminary planning with regard to possible ground boundaries between US and Soviet forces in the peninsula. Since it was considered necessary that at least two major seaports be included in the American zone (presumably for logistical support), a tentative line was drawn north of Seoul, "not on the 38th Parallel but near it and, generally, along it."[29]

Marshall then wired MacArthur, advising him that "it appears likely that decisions may be reached in the near future on the occupation, control and treatment of Japan after the Japanese capitulation," and requesting MacArthur's views on the occupation of Japan and Korea. At the same time, Hull dispatched a message to OPD requesting them to "forward immediately gist of available information on MacArthur's plans for occupation of Japan and Japanese held areas in event of Japanese collapse or surrender in immediate future."[30]

Both Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur had prepared occupation plans in the event of a sudden Japanese surrender in response to the JCS directive of 14 June. The Navy plan (Campus) called for the initial occupation of Tokyo by naval forces followed by landing of Army units in principal areas throughout Japan. MacArthur's plan (Blacklist) provided for the landing of strong forces from all three services in Tokyo, followed later by the occupation of secondary areas. A JCS plan, a combination of Campus and Blacklist, was also developed. But this plan was still under discussion when Japan surrendered, and in fact it was Blacklist ("with ad hoc modifications") which was used.[31]

The Blacklist plan was still under development, however, when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Two days later, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov summoned Japanese Ambassador Sato and informed him that a state of war would exist between the Soviet Union and the Japanese Empire as of 9 August. On 9 August the US detonated the second atomic bomb, over Nagasaki, and Soviet troops crossed the Manchurian border in an attack against the Japanese Kwantung Army.[32]

On 10 August, the Japanese government indicated its willingness to surrender and asked for an armistice. This initiated days and nights of frantic and confused activity as American officials, planners, and action officers in Washington and the Western Pacific redirected their efforts from combat operations to preparations for the occupation and administration of Japan and its conquered territories. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and the Joint Staff Planners began a series of long conferences to develop the necessary instruments of surrender.[33]

A key document would be General Order 1, the first paragraph of which designated in detail the particular Allied authority to whom the Japanese forces in each area of the Far East were to surrender. This explicit information was intended to forestall jurisdictional quarrels between Allied commanders and to prevent attempts at opportunism on the part of Japanese commanders who might otherwise use promises of surrender to cause dissention among the Allies. Colonel C. H. Bonesteel III, Chief of the OPD Policy Section and member of the SWNCC Far Eastern Subcommittee, was directed to write a draft of General Order 1 for the consideration of the Joint Staff Planners and the SWNCC. Proposals for this document had been developed by the Joint Postwar Committee as early as December 1944, but the early versions did not provide explicit instructions as to who would accept the Japanese surrender in which areas.[34]

Colonel Bonesteel and another member of his section, Colonel Dean Rusk, retired to an adjoining room to clarify these points. With regard to Korea, the problem was to reconcile State Department guidance that the boundary should be as far north as possible, with the inability of the United States to move troops to Korea quickly. Soviet troops were known to be advancing rapidly toward Korea, while the US forces designated for the occupation of the peninsula (and the forces closest to Korea) were on Okinawa with priority for



Jim Kistler, USAWC

troop movement going to those elements that would occupy Japan. A major consideration was the desirability of including three specific areas in the American zone: Seoul (the capital of Korea and the area designated for the initial Blacklist landings), Kaesong (an ancient capital city), and prisoner of war camps near Seoul. The previous discussions at Potsdam by General Marshall and General Hull concerning a US-Soviet boundary in Korea and the Blacklist Plan, although known to Colonel Bonesteel, influenced his deliberations only insofar as they reflected the time and space factors involved in the transportation of US troops to Korea.[35]

An important consideration, as Bonesteel later described it, was the nature of the boundary line to be selected:

> A first matter for choice was whether the line should serve Korean provincial boundaries or be a more non-political designator. The Allies, at the summit conferences, had agreed that Korea would be removed from Japanese hegemony and in due course become again an independent nation. However there was considerable vagueness in how this formula would be carried out and it was felt that every effort should be made to avoid the implication that the line for surrender had any political connotation in regard to the evolution of an independent Korea. Thus the choice of a parallel of latitude over the perhaps more recognizable provincial boundaries.[36]

With these considerations in mind, Bonesteel and Rusk recommended the 38th Parallel as the boundary in Korea, dividing the country roughly in half and placing Seoul, Kaesong, and the prisoner of war camps in the American zone. The draft first paragraph of General Order 1 (which covered the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the Far East as well as Korea) was put in the hands of Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, Chief of the OPD Strategy & Policy Group, who, in the early hours of 11 August, presented it to the Joint Staff Planners.[37]

One of the Joint Planners suggested that the boundary should be moved up to the 39th Parallel, a line which, if extended into the Liaotung Peninsula, would put the Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur in the American zone. General Lincoln suggested that the Soviets would be unlikely to accept a boundary that excluded them from Dairen and that it would be difficult to get American forces to the two seaports before the Russians arrived. A telephone call was put through to Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, who expressed a view that Korea was considered politically more important to the United States than Dairen. Accordingly, the 38th Parallel recommendation was retained when the Joint Planners passed the draft of General Order 1 along to the SWNCC.[38]

While these deliberations were taking place, there were ominous signs from Moscow that would directly affect the Korean question. Edwin W. Pauley, the Presidential Representative on Reparations, reported that the Soviets were becoming truculent in the reparations negotiations. Wiring from Moscow, Pauley urged the President to occupy as much of the industrial area of Korea as possible until a satisfactory agreement on reparations was concluded. Ambassador Harriman warned the President that Stalin was making increasing demands on the Chinese Foreign Minister and recommended that the United States send troops to Korea and the Kwantung Peninsula.[39] At the same time, Russian troops continued to advance in Manchuria and Korea. Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov's Twenty-fifth Army crossed the Tumen River and attacked overland while Soviet naval task forces conducted amphibious operations along the northeastern Korean coast.[40]

On 15 August, the SWNCC sent a clean draft of General Order 1 to the White House. President Truman approved the order and sent copies to Moscow and London. General Lincoln recommended that if the Russians refused to accept the proposed boundary in Korea and occupied Seoul ahead of MacArthur's troops, the American occupation forces should be sent to Pusan. As it turned out, however, Stalin made no objection to the 38th Parallel proposal.[41]

On Okinawa and in the Philippines, the forces designated to occupy Korea began frantic preparations to move to Seoul.[42] The Blacklist plan designated General Joseph W. Stilwell, former US commander in China, as the commander of the Korean occupation. Stilwell spoke Chinese and had years of experience in East Asia, but he had often clashed with Chiang Kai-shek and had left China in October 1944. Now he commanded the Tenth Army on Okinawa and had been preparing to play a major role in the assault on Japan when the war ended. His occupation force was to include Tenth Army Headquarters, two infantry divisions, plus combat and support elements from Lieutenant General John R. Hodge's XXIV Corps. Hodge and his headquarters would remain behind to garrison Okinawa.[43]

Major General Frank D. Merrill, Stilwell's Chief of Staff, announced on 11 August that Tenth Army would occupy Korea 27 days after "B Day"—the day on which peace talks would begin and occupation operations would be initiated. During the next two days the Tenth Army staff reviewed the Blacklist plan. Almost immediately, however, a significant change in plans was announced. On 13 August, General Stilwell flew to Manila to confer with General MacArthur and to undergo minor surgery. While he was there, Tenth Army Headquarters received a message advising them that Blacklist was amended: XXIV Corps would assume responsibility for the Korean occupation, and the Tenth Army Headquarters would remain on Okinawa. It would not be Stilwell, the old Asia hand, who would command the Korean occupation, but Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, a solid combat commander, but a man with no particular qualifications to administer a liberated Asian nation. The reasons for this change are not completely clear. MacArthur shared with Stilwell the gist of an "eyes only" message from Washington. Apparently, Chiang Kai-shek had heard that Stilwell would command US troops landed on the "China coast" and Truman had assured him that this was not true. Since Korea might, in Washington, be considered a part of the "China coast," MacArthur decided to pull Stilwell from the Korean occupation. "So, they cut my throat again," Stilwell mused in his diary. "Why did they let me come out here if they were not going to back me up?"[44] This change in the occupation commander had serious consequences. During the occupation Hodge proved to be insensitive to the complex and volatile Korean environment and made decisions that aggravated an already difficult situation.[45]

On 15 August, President Truman announced that the Japanese government had accepted the terms of surrender. General Merrill advised the XXIV

Corps staff that 15 August was B Day; serious preparations for the move to Korea now began. The Blacklist plan designated who would go where in the course of the occupation and gave a general idea of what they would do when they got there. When the war ended, however, almost none of the preliminary actions necessary to implement the plan had been carried out. Although the corps headquarters and the 7th Infantry Division were on Okinawa, the other units assigned to the Korea occupation force were located on Iwo Jima, Angaur (southernmost of the Palau Islands), and various islands throughout the Philippines. They would have to be embarked, transported to Okinawa, and then moved to Korea. Shipping was at a premium at the time, and movement of the massive occupation force to Japan had first priority. Responsibility for this difficult transportation task was assigned to Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey's Seventh Amphibious Force. Admiral Barbey and his staff were at Manila and his ships were scattered across the Western Pacific, some as far away as New Guinea.[46]

While Admiral Barbey marshaled his transports and warships, the XXIV Corps Army Support Command (24th ASCOM) began developing loading plans and accumulating the supplies required to support the occupation troops. An enormous quantity of supplies had been stockpiled on Okinawa in preparation for the invasion of Japan. The reallocation of those supplies to the occupation force was a major task which had to be performed in a very short time. Confusion was inevitable. General MacArthur's headquarters warned the occupation commanders that because supply ships were being diverted from other duties to support the occupation force, supplies and materials arriving in occupied areas would not be those that would ordinarily be shipped to meet requirements for support of troops.[47] XXIV Corps was moving from a tropical area to one where a severe winter could be expected. All the corps troops were in summer uniforms and had no winter equipment. Fortunately, a cargo ship full of woolen uniforms, stoves, and tents was discovered en route to Alaska. The ship was diverted and arrived at Inchon shortly after the occupation force.[48]

While the 24th ASCOM labored to prepare men and supplies for loading on Admiral Barbey's ships when they arrived, General Hodge worked to find out what was going on in Korea. His immediate problem was a lack of information about what the Russians and Japanese were doing. By 22 August it was clear that the Russians had occupied Manchuria, but the situation in Korea was obscure. General MacArthur, still under the impression that the occupation was to be on a quadripartite basis, sent a message to the War Department requesting information on the agreements reached with the allied nations (especially Russia) regarding Korea. The SWNCC sent a reply to General MacArthur on 1 September, advising him:

> In the absence of declared intentions by the United Kingdom, China, or other United Nation, initial occupation of Korea will be by US and Soviet forces only. . . . The matter of international arrangement with regard to Korea is under urgent consideration by the State Department.[49]

Before he received this message, MacArthur sent a letter to Hodge advising him that "Consideration must be given to the possibility that the Russians may occupy the Keijo [Seoul] area prior to the landing of the XXIV Corps." General MacArthur concluded that US forces were "clearly" authorized to enter Keijo to receive the surrender. Furthermore, he desired that they do so even if Russian forces were already present. General Hodge was therefore ordered to proceed to Inchon and, if Russians were there, to make prior contact with them. MacArthur should be notified and the landing delayed, if "events indicate that international complications will result."[50]

On 29 August, General MacArthur radioed the Japanese government that the landing in Korea would take place on 7 September. He ordered them to direct the Japanese commander in South Korea to establish contact with General Hodge by 31 August and gave instructions concerning the preparations to be made to receive the occupation force. Radio contact was finally established with the Japanese military commander in Seoul on 1 September. Hodge now knew for certain that Russian forces had not moved into South Korea.

An advance party from Hodge's headquarters flew to Korea on 4 September. Since the Russian consulate had continued to operate in Seoul throughout the short Russo-Japanese War, the advanced party had no difficulty in carrying out General MacArthur's order to make prior contact with the Russians.

Although the Japanese surrender occurred before the plan for the movement of occupation forces to Korea was complete, the plan as it existed had provided enough guidance so that troops, transportation, and equipment could be marshaled and the landings accomplished within the time schedule originally established. The occupation, in the tactical sense, was carried out with as fair a degree of success as could be expected of any hasty military operation. With regard to military government and civil affairs, however, the situation was far more serious.

To begin with, General Hodge's command suffered from a lack of trained civil affairs specialists. For reasons which remain unclear (perhaps because of the relatively low priority with which planners had viewed Korea), the US military did not begin serious efforts at Korea-oriented civil administration training until the end of the war.[51] Whatever the reason, military government personnel had not been assigned to XXIV Corps, nor had any civil affairs units been designated or trained for Korea.

In order to provide a nucleus of officers who could begin planning for the military government, the Tenth Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command was designated to act as the Military Government Headquarters. None of the officers of this command was trained in civil affairs, but an additional 20 civil affairs officers (none with any knowledge of Korea) were later transferred to Hodge's command from Tenth Army. A few additional civil affairs officers were subsequently diverted from Japan to Korea, but none of them arrived until after the

landing at Inchon. Korea-oriented civil affairs training for units slated for Korea did not even begin until September 1945. As a result, in the crucial early days of the occupation the military government of Korea was carried out not by trained civil affairs specialists, but by combat troops.[52] Moreover, there were no Korean linguists. After the long Japanese occupation, most Koreans could be expected to understand Japanese, but they would understandably prefer that the military government use their own language. No Americans on Okinawa could speak Korean. A search of the island finally turned up "six paroled Korean prisoners of war, who were accordingly attached to the XXIV Corps."[53]

An even more serious difficulty was the lack of policy guidance. General Hodge had not received any instructions on such key questions as Korean independence, the severing of Korea from Japanese influence, and domestic Korean politics. Nor was General MacArthur at Manila any better informed. His 22 August message to the JCS urgently requested information for the guidance of the XXIV Corps. In the course of preparing a reply, the SWNCC advised the JCS that "there is no agreed United States view as to the character of administration of civil affairs in Korea."[54] Four days later the US Consul General at Manila advised the State Department that General MacArthur had not yet received any directive regarding Korea. On 18 August General Hodge requested that the State Department send him a representative to provide political guidance. In response, Mr. H. Merrell Benninghoff was dispatched to Okinawa, arriving on 3 September just before the XXIV Corps embarked. His instructions had been scanty and he could add little to Hodge's knowledge of American policy toward Korea. A week after the occupation began, Benninghoff sent a letter to the State Department advising that one of the great difficulties facing the American headquarters was a total absence of any policy guidance. In fact, the *initial* directive on civil affairs administration in Korea was not sent from Washington until 17 October 1945, more than a month after the arrival of Hodge's advance party.[55]

Finally, there was the problem for the occupation force of finding *any* information about the country they were to occupy. One of the few sources of intelligence was the *Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Korea* (JANIS 75), which had been published in April 1945. This document contained some useful data but was superficial. Korean prisoners of war captured on Okinawa were interrogated and provided a small amount of additional information. Since the situation in Korea was obscure and General MacArthur wanted to avoid any incidents prior to the occupation, aerial reconnaissance of Korea was forbidden. However, some recent prints of aerial photographs were discovered, and the XXIV Corps staff persuaded an Army Air Force reconnaissance squadron on Okinawa to fly a few photographic sorties. The resulting photographs, although inadequate for combat operations, were useful for planning the deployment of the occupation troops. Thus, in the absence of any more authoritative information, the former anti-aircraft gunners of the newly formed

Military Government Headquarters planned for the occupation of Korea using War Department field manuals, some illicit aerial photographs, the Cairo Declaration, and JANIS-75.[56]

After Admiral Barbey marshaled his ships and set sail for Okinawa, his arrival was delayed by a series of typhoons, one of which devastated Okinawa and caused a week-long delay in the loading of the XXIV Corps. But by 5 September the lead elements of XXIV Corps were en route to Korea, landing at Inchon on the afternoon of 8 September.[57]

The decisions having been made and the forces having been gathered and deployed across the vastness of the Western Pacific, the American occupation of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude now began. But within Korea lay powerful, pent-up nationalist emotions and deep social and political schisms. While in American eyes Korea still lay in the shadow of Japan and events in Europe, it was, in fact, at the sensitive nexus where American and Soviet interests intersected. The Americans who occupied Korea entered an extraordinarily sensitive, complex, and strangely unfamiliar environment. They did well on a day-to-day basis, but they made many mistakes—some from arrogance, but most from ignorance, lack of forethought, and unpreparedness for their task. In succeeding years, Koreans and Americans would pay a heavy price for the failure to pin down an international agreement on Korean trusteeship, the lack of preparation for civil administration, and the hasty decision in selecting the American occupation commander. September 1945 saw not only the beginning of the occupation of Korea, but also the beginning of the march toward the Korean War.

We can never know how events might have unfolded had the United States not deployed occupation forces to Korea in 1945, but two consequences seem beyond dispute. Without the occupation, Korea would have become a communist state and the Korean War as we know it would never have occurred. The Cold War would certainly have taken a different course, in detail, if not in its fundamental outline. Americans can take pride in the proficiency and professionalism with which a large occupation force was marshaled and lifted across the Western Pacific on short notice. Many may argue that, for all the subsequent cost in blood and treasure, that deployment was a fortunate event. But they may also ponder how much better the outcome might have been had the Americans been as proficient in the politico-military aspects as they were in the operational aspects of the occupation.

NOTES

1. "General Order No. 1, Military and Naval," quoted in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1945 (Washington: GPO, 1969), VI, 659.

2. Any examination of US policy toward Korea and the events leading up to the Korean War must begin with three essential works: Michael C. Sandusky, *America's Parallel* (Alexandria, Va.: Old Dominion Press, 1983) is a meticulous examination of US wartime strategy and policy vis-à-vis Korea. James Irving Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press,

1985) is a thoroughly documented study of both the wartime policy and the subsequent occupation. Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981-90) makes exhaustive use of both English and Korean sources. While my interpretations are my own and I have made use of some additional sources, my debt to these three scholars is substantial.

3. Maurice Matloff, *United States Army in World War II: The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), p. 15.

4. The attitudes of the US military leadership toward Soviet intervention are reflected in a collection of official documents published after the war: US Department of Defense, *The Entry of the Soviet Union Into The War Against Japan: Military Plans 1941-1945* (Washington: Department of Defense, 1955). For mid-level official American interpretations of Soviet intentions, see, for example, State Department Memorandum, "U.S.S.R. Aims in the Far East," 19 August 1943, in *FRUS, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, pp. 627-29; Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, PWC-125/CAC-128, *Korea: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces*, 29 March 1944, in *FRUS, 1944*, V, 1225-26; and PWC-124a/CAC-58a, *Korea: Political Problems: Provisional Government*, 4 May 1944, ibid., 1239-41. For a persuasive interpretation of Soviet policy toward Korea, see Robert M. Slusser, "Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-50: Stalin's Goals in Korea," in Akira Iriye and Ynosuke Nagai, eds., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 127-38.

5. Roosevelt's actions to limit Soviet postwar influence included the use of China as a counterweight, refusal to share the atomic bomb secret with the Russians, and support for plans to establish a system of postwar US bases on the periphery of Asia. See Robert Dalleck, *Franklin Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 388-90, 533-34; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 3-15; Martin J. Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: US Atomic Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941-45," *The American Historical Review*, 78 (October 1973), 945-68; and Stephen Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses," in Bruce Cumings, ed., *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1982), pp. 97-101.

6. *The Department of State Bulletin*, 19 June 1945, pp. 1058-59. Telegrams, "The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State," 28 March and 10 April 1942 and Memorandum, "The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt," 29 April 1942, in *FRUS, 1942*, I, 867, 869, and 873. Correspondence on Korean requests for recognition and support are contained in Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Office of the Director of Plans and Operations, Classified General Correspondence, 1942-45 (hereafter OPD), folder OPD 381 CTO, Case 185, Record Group (hereafter RG) 165, Entry 418, Box 1241, and in Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Security Classified General Correspondence, 1943-July 1949, Civil Affairs Division (hereafter CAD) folder CAD 014 Korea, RG 165, Entry 463, Box 35, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NA).

7. Sandusky, *America's Parallel*, pp. 10-11, 87-88; Matray, *Reluctant Crusade*, pp. 13-21; Cumings, *Origin of the Korean War*, I, 102-10.

8. From the press communiqué, in *FRUS: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943*, p. 566.

9. Draft Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Enclosure to SWNCC 176, "International Agreements as to Occupation of Korea," 22 August 1945, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Office of the Director of Plans and Operations, Top Secret American-British-Canadian Correspondence (hereafter ABC) folder ABC 014 Japan (13 Apr 44), Sec. 17A, RG 165, Entry 421, Box 31, NA. See also, Matray, *Reluctant Crusade*, pp. 38-41.

10. JCS Memo 924, Report by the Joint Planning Staff, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," 30 June 1944, and "Decision Amending JCS 924," 11 July 1944, in *Entry of the Soviet Union*, pp. 28-29; Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-44*, p. 501; Ernest R. May, "The United States, The Soviet Union, and the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945," *Pacific Historical Review*, 24 (May 1955), 160-63.

11. *Entry of the Soviet Union*, pp. 36-37; "Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan," 11 February 1945, in *FRUS, Malta and Yalta*, p. 984.

12. Gye-dong Kim, *Foreign Intervention in Korea* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), pp. 9-17; R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972), pp. 26, 280-82; Kim Ku, *Paekbom Ilji: Kim Ku Chasojon* (Memoirs of Paekbom: Autobiography of Kim Ku) (Seoul: Tongmyong-sa, 1960), pp. 347-50; Chang Chun-ha "Na ui Hoigorok" (My Reminiscences) *Sasangye*, 8 (December 1960), 267; Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 297-98. The most promising operation, code-named "Napko," would have landed seven agents on the Korean coast, but the war ended before it could be carried out. Kim, *Foreign Intervention*, pp. 17-18; Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 1385, *Napko Project*, Report by the Joint Staff Planners, 14 June 1945 and Note by the Secretaries, *Decision on J.C.S. 1385, Napko Project*, 19 June 1945; JCS Message, WARX 53111, 22 August 1945, all in Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic File, 1942-45, Combined Chiefs of Staff (hereafter CCS) folder CCS 385 Korea (3-16-42), RG 218, Box 140, NA.

13. John Ray Skates, *The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 2-7. Skates provides the most complete examination of the plans for the proposed invasion of Japan to date. See also Wayne A. Silkett, "Downfall: The Invasion that Never Was," *Parameters*, 24 (Autumn 1994), 111-20.

14. Minutes, "JCS Meeting with President," 18 June 1945 in *Entry of the Soviet Union*, pp. 77-85.

15. John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origin of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 92-94, 171-73, 199-206, 224-33; Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1960* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), pp. 20-40; Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 69-105; Mark Paul, "Diplomacy Delayed: The Atomic Bomb and the Division of Korea, 1945," in Cumings, ed., *Child of Conflict*, pp. 67-79.

16. JCS 924/15, Report by the JSP, "Pacific Strategy," 25 April 1945 in *Entry of the Soviet Union*, p. 67; JCS 1313/1, Revision of Policy with Relations to Russia," 23 April 1945, JCS 1313/2, same subject, 23 April 1945, and other documents in OPD 336 Top Secret (Case 132), "Implementation of Agreements with the Russians," RG 165, Entry 419, Box 144, NA; John R. Deane, *Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), pp. 262-65.

17. Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, ed. by Walter Johnson assisted by Nancy Harvison Hooker, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), II, 1454-59.

18. The briefing papers and draft agreement prepared for Hopkins are in Letter, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)," 21 May 1945, with enclosure, "Paper Prepared in the Department of State," and letter, "The Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)," 23 May 1945, with enclosure, "Recommended Amendments to be Used as a Basis for Exploratory Conversation and in Light of Accompanying Memorandum," in *FRUS, 1945*, VII 878-87. Hopkins' report is in message, "Hopkins to President," 29 May 1945 in *Entry of the Soviet Union*, pp. 72-73.

19. Telegram paraphrase, "Harriman to Truman and Secretary of State," 3 July 1945, in *FRUS, 1945*, VII, 914.

20. Minutes, "Tripartite Military Meeting," 24 July 1945 in *FRUS, Potsdam*, II, 351-52; Minutes, "Meeting of Chiefs of Staff of U.S. and U.S.S.R.," 26 July 1945, ibid., pp. 410-11. The only reference to Korea in the talks among the political leaders appears in "Thompson Minutes of the Sixth Plenary Meeting," 22 July 1945, ibid., p. 253.

21. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Monday, 23 July 1945, LI, 34-35 (microfilm edition, reel 9), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale Univ. Library, New Haven, Conn.

22. Minutes, "Tripartite Military Meeting," 24 July 1945, and minutes, "Meeting of Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.," 26 July 1945, in *FRUS, Potsdam*, II, 351-52, 410-11. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, I: *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 383.

23. Joint War Plans Committee Directive JWPC 264/D, 22 August 1944, "Occupation of Strategic Positions Upon Japanese Withdrawal, Collapse, or Surrender," in folder CCS 386.2 Japan (4-9-45)* Section 1, RG 218, Box 135.

24. Minutes of the 204th meeting of the Joint Planning Staff, 30 May 1945; JWPC 264/1, "Strategic Positions Selected for Occupation Upon Japanese Withdrawal, Collapse, or Surrender," 8 June 1945, in Folder CCS 386.2 Japan (4-9-45) Sec. 2, RG 218, Box 135, NA. See also Ray S. Cline, *United States Army in World War II: The War Department: Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), p. 344.

25. JCS Message WARX 17064 to Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific and Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet, Information to Commanding General Twentieth Air Force, 14 June 1945, in JCS 1331/4, folder CCS 386.2 Japan (4-9-45) Sec. 2, RG 218, Box 135, NA.

26. "Outline Plan for the U.S. Occupation of Strategic Positions in the Far East in the Event of a Japanese Collapse or Surrender Prior to 'Olympic' or 'Coronet'" Appendix A to JWPC 264/6, 10 July 1945, in folder CCS 386.2 Japan (4-9-45) Sec. 3, RG 218, Box 135, NA. One of the assumptions in the outline plan was that Japan would surrender unconditionally "about 15 August 1945." That was, indeed, the very day that the Emperor announced the unconditional surrender of Japan.

27. James F. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), pp. 2-3. *Reports of General MacArthur Prepared by His General Staff*, vol. 1 supplement, *MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase* (Washington: 1966), p. 2.

28. Chief of Staff "Memorandum for the President," 25 July 1945, in folder ABC 014 Japan (13 Apr 44) Sec. 1A, RG 165, Entry 421, Box 19, NA.

29. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 7; Roy E. Appleman, *United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: June-November 1950* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), pp. 2-3.

30. JCS Message VICTORY 295, Personal to MacArthur, Info Handy, from Marshall, 25 July 1945; JCS Message, VICTORY 294, From Hull Personal to Craig, 25 July 1945 in OPD 1945 series, folder OPD 014.1 Top Secret (Sec. III), RG 165, Entry 419, Box 108, NA.

31. The Blacklist plans and OPD briefs based on those plans are in OPD folders "Australian Ports to BLACKLIST Ed. 1" and "BLACKLIST Ed. 3 to BOLERO," RG 218, Boxes 1776 and 1777, NA. A copy of the CAMPUS plan and OPD brief is in folder OPD 014.1 Top Secret (Sec. IV), Case 58, RG 165, Entry 419, Box 108, NA. The JCS plan, JWPC 264/6, "A Plan for the U.S. Occupation of Strategic Positions in the Far East in the Event of a Japanese Collapse or Surrender Prior to OLYMPIC or CORONET," is in folder CCS 386.2 Japan (4-9-45), Sec. 3, RG 218, Box 135, NA. See also *Reports of General MacArthur*, p. 4; Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, XIV: *Victory in the Pacific* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), pp. 353-54; Daniel E. Barbey, *MacArthur's Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations 1943-1945* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1969), p. 322; and Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 350-51.

32. *Entry of the Soviet Union*, pp. 106-07.

33. The paramount issue to US planners was to assure that the US controlled the occupation of Japan and, to that end, to deploy US occupation forces into Japan as quickly as possible. The insertion of US forces into Korea was the second priority. But at the same time, General Wedemeyer was sending urgent messages calling attention to the civil war then beginning to heat up between the Chinese central government and the Chinese communists. Wedemeyer sought US forces to occupy key areas in China. Meanwhile, the Australians, British, Dutch, and French were all pressing to assure that their particular interests in the Japanese-occupied colonial areas would be protected. On events in China, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), pp. 388-96. Message traffic between Wedemeyer in China and the JCS is in folder ABC 014 Japan (13 April 44) Sec. 18A, RG 165, Entry 421, Box 34; folder CCS 386.2 Japan (4-9-45) Sec. 4, RG 218, Box 136 (which also contains documents relating to British concerns about Hongkong and Southeast Asia), and folder OPD 336 TS (Case 133), RG 165, Entry 419, Box 144. Documents concerning SWNCC and JCS staff deliberations on issues involving the other allies are in folder CCS 387 Japan (2-7-45) Sec. 2, "Unconditional Surrender of Japan," RG 218, Box 137, NA. Sandusky does a good job of providing a systematic description of this chaotic activity in *America's Parallel*, pp. 220-42.

34. On the background to General Order No. 1, see Joint Postwar Committee Memorandum, 28 December 1944, in *FRUS, 1945*, VII, 498-99.

35. Letter, General (ret.) C. H. Bonesteel III to Major Donald W. Boose, Jr., 14 April 1973, hereafter, Bonesteel letter. Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, 12 July 1950, in *FRUS, 1945*, VI, 1039. Documents relating to the development of General Order No. 1 are included in the SWNCC 21 series of documents ("Unconditional Surrender of Japan") in folder CCS 387 Japan (2-7-45) Sec. 2, RG 218, Box 137, NA. Fate ordained that both officers would play important future roles in East Asia. General Bonesteel was Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea at the time of the Pueblo Incident. Dean Rusk was Secretary of State during the first half of the Vietnam War.

36. Bonesteel letter.

37. Bonesteel letter; Sandusky, *America's Parallel*, p. 228.

38. Sandusky, *America's Parallel*, pp. 242-48. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, p. 10; Bonesteel letter. General Bonesteel pointed out that during this hectic time much coordination was performed by telephone and personal discussions. To some extent the policy and planning developed simultaneously. There were historical precedents for the use of the 38th and 39th parallels to divide Korea. According to General Bonesteel, some of the planners may have been aware of these precedents, but they were not an important consideration in the selection of the boundary in Korea. On the contrary, he said, the planners preferred a line which did *not* have permanent political connotations.

39. Telegram, "The Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Truman," 12 August 1945, translation in *FRUS, 1945*, VI, 643. Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 433-34.

40. Sandusky, *America's Parallel*, pp. 204-18; Raymond L. Gartoff, "Soviet Operations in the War With Japan, 1945," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 112 (No. 5, 1966), 53-54; *Naval Operations Against Soviet Russia*, Japanese Monograph No. 106, Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, 24 January 1952, p. 17.

41. SWNCC Memorandum for Information No. 20, "Surrender of Japan," 17 August 1945, contains the texts of the messages sent to Atlee, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek (CCS 387 Japan (2-7-45) Sec 2, RG 218, Box 137, NA). See also Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 10-11.

42. Except where otherwise noted, the account of occupation preparations on Okinawa is based on *History of the United States Army Forces in Korea, 1945-1948*, part 1, vol. 1 (Historical Section, Headquarters XXIV Corps, n.d.), pp. 3-73.

43. *Tentative Troop List by Type Units for "BLACKLIST" Operations*, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, 8 August 1945, in folder "OPD BLACKLIST Ed. 3 to BOLERO," RG 165, Entry 418, Box 1777, NA. For background on General Stilwell's career and his tumultuous relationship with Chiang Kai-shek see Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and The American Experience in China 1911-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1971).

44. *History of USAFIK*, p. 10; General Joseph W. Stilwell, *Diary*, 13 August 1945, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Calif.

45. We can never know if Stilwell would have done better, particularly since he was already ill with the cancer which would kill him in little more than a year. But James I. Matray argues persuasively that Hodge's lack of experience and personal attitudes toward Koreans "caused him to make decisions that greatly increased political polarization in the divided country." In Matray's view, Hodge's selection was "the most important early decision leading to the Korean War." James I. Matray, "Hodge-Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948," *Korean Studies*, 19 (1995), 17-38.

46. Barbey, *MacArthur's Amphibious Navy*, p. 323; James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea* (Washington: Office of Chief of Naval Operations, 1962), p. 15.

47. *Reports of General MacArthur*, p. 16.

48. *History of USAFIK*, pp. 343-44.

49. Message, CINCAFPAC to JCS (CM-IN-21116), 22 August 1945; Draft Message, JCS to CINCAFPAC, SWNCC Memorandum, Enclosure A to JCS 1483, "International Agreements as to Occupation of Korea," 24 August 1945; JCS Note by the Secretaries advising that JCS 1483 was approved and the message dispatched on 1 September 1945, all in Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) folder 014 Korea (8-28-45)* Sec. 1, RG 218, Box 146, NA.

50. *History of USAFIK*, pp. 60-61.

51. Preparations for the civil administration of Korea began as early as February 1944, but after an initial flurry of staff studies and papers, nothing of substance followed, and civil affairs officers were not trained for Korea until the Japanese surrender. The relatively low priority assigned to Korea is the most likely explanation, although there are hints that it may have been a conscious policy. The late Gregory Henderson, a former State Department official with long experience in Korea, says that work on civil affairs handbooks on Korea was "halted by a superior officer." Robert A. Kinney (another American official with years of service in Korea and who worked on East Asian issues as a research analyst in the Army Military Intelligence Division during World War II) believed that it was Roosevelt himself who stopped the work. The rationale was to avoid any action which might feed Stalin's suspicions of US ambitions in the Russian borderlands and thus prompt preemptive Soviet action in Korea. Kinney was outspoken in his postwar criticism of the US failure to prepare for the civil administration in Korea. The initial correspondence on initiating civil affairs preparations for Korea, and the early studies are reprinted in *FRUS, 1944*, V, 1190, 1225-29, and 1239-41. Henderson's comment is in Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), p. 415. Kinney's speculations were related to me in a series of informal conversations in 1975 and 1976. Dr. Michael E. Macmillan of the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii brought to my attention documentation on Kinney's postwar views.

52. *History of USAFIK*, p. 27; E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951), pp. 47-51; Wilson Owen Henderson, "To the Kwangju Station," *Southwest Review*, 35 (No. 4), 233; Donald S. MacDonald, "Field Experience in Military Government: Cholla Namdo Province, 1945-1946," in Carl J. Friedrich and Associates, *American Experience in Military Government in World War II* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1948), p. 366; Duncan Sinclair, "The Occupation of Korea—Initial Phases, *Military Review*, 27 (July 1947), 34-35.

53. *History of USAFIK*, ch. 4, 35.

54. CINCAFPAC Message CX 35718, 22 August 1945 in folder CCS 386.2 Japan (4-9-45) Sec. 4, RG 218, Box 136, NA; "Draft Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," enclosure to SWNCC 176, "International Agreements as to the Occupation of Korea," 22 August 1945 in ABC 014 Japan (13 April 44) Sec. 17A, RG 165, Entry 421, Box 31, NA.

55. Telegram, "The Consul General at Manila (Steintorf) to the Secretary of State," 26 August 1945 in *FRUS, 1945*, VI, 1041; *History of USAFIK*, p. 64; letter, "The Political Advisor in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State," 15 September 1945, in *FRUS, 1945*, VI, 1052; JCS Message CM-OUT-55336 "JCS to CINCAFPAC, Manila," 25 August 1945, in folder OPD 014.1 TS Sec. IV, Case 75, "Assignment of Liaison Personnel," RG 165, Entry 419, Box 108, NA; "Basic Initial Directive to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, for the Administration of Civil Affairs in those areas of Korea Occupied by U.S. Forces," transmitted 17 October 1945, in *FRUS, 1945*, VI, 1074-93.

56. *History of USAFIK*, pp. 21-22, ch. 4, 35; Taylor, "Administration and Operation of Military Government," p. 357.

57. Barbey, *MacArthur's Amphibious Navy*, pp. 324-25.

Commentary & Reply

FRIENDLY FIRE, UNFRIENDLY DATA

To the Editor:

Not enough is being done to address the problem of friendly-fire personnel casualties in ground combat. So, I applaud Colonel Kenneth Steinweg and *Parameters* for keeping this distasteful issue in front of those who might do something about it ("Dealing Realistically with Fratricide," Spring 1995). However, using inaccurate data to support (correct) conclusions can dilute the argument.

Regarding the invasion of Kiska in August 1943, Steinweg says: "The daylight assault was complicated by dense fog, and fighting continued through the night. By the end of the fight a day later, 28 men were dead and 50 were wounded. *There were no Japanese on the island.* This catastrophic 'battle' continued for 24 hours against an enemy who wasn't there. Thus 100 percent of the casualties were fratricide. . . . The Kiska Island experience suggests that fratricide rates five or more times higher than the often-cited two percent are both understandable and reasonable. . . ."

Right conclusion. Bad data.

Twenty-eight men did die in the Kiska fog, and 50 more were wounded—but not all were due to friendly fire. Four men were killed by mines or booby traps left by Japanese defenders before their secret evacuation of 28 July 1943, and a number of the wounded were likewise injured by enemy munitions. I cite the same source as Steinweg: Brian Garfield's 1969 book *The Thousand-Mile War.*

The first landing force of 7300 hit the beach without trouble, but the troops expected enemy contact. As they "climbed slowly . . . here and there, a boot touched off a mine or boobytrap. The explosions startled soldiers, who began to shoot into the fog." A second large force landed a day later near the volcano, and "men fanned into the fog . . . like the parallel fingers of a probing hand. The probes found each other and started shooting in the fog."

Most of the casualties seem to have occurred over two days, 15 and 16 August; by the 18th it was almost certain that there were no Japanese to be found. Garfield does not separate personnel losses by day, but from his account it appears that the misadventures of the 15th were due to mixed causes, while losses on the 16th were probably due to fratricide alone.

Ironically, there were indications beforehand that the Japanese had evacuated Kiska. Veteran airmen reported no antiaircraft fire since 27 July, even though low-level bombing runs by B-24s offered tempting targets. Photographs of bomb damage did not show efforts at repair, and vehicles and barges remained in identical positions for days in a row.

If the total casualties of 313 for Operation Cottage are considered, which includes 71 seamen killed and 34 wounded as the result of a destroyer striking a

Japanese mine and 130 cases of trenchfoot, the proportion of casualties due to fratricide is still much greater than the "often-cited two percent." So, Steinweg's conclusion is valid in terms of the Kiska experience.

Friendly-fire casualties remain a problem for ground combatants. It will not go away because we wish it so, and technology can provide only part of the solution. A better understanding of unit and leader behavior associated with high rates of self-loss, and of battlefield application of doctrinal principles, is necessary to deal more effectively with fratricide. Until such understanding of fratricide is achieved and acted upon, we will remain as much in a fog as those warriors on Kiska.

Charles F. Hawkins
Dumfries, Virginia

The Author Replies:

Mr. Hawkins is entirely correct that some of the casualties counted by me in the Kiska invasion were inadvertently listed as fratricide. Individuals killed or wounded by enemy mines or booby traps do not meet the definition of fratricide. Teasing out these numbers, however, still leaves tremendous fratricide rates considering there was no enemy present!

The major point I was trying to make in this particular example was not the high percentage of fratricide as such, but what confusion, anxiety, and uncertainty on the battlefield do to judgment in firing weapons. These factors, plus exhaustion, are common in almost all combat situations; hence, the need for additional solutions to fratricide, which is one of the major themes of my article. Mr. Hawkins and I are in agreement on that fundamental point.

Colonel Kenneth Steinweg

WWII COMBAT IN EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC

To the Editor:

Colin Baxter's review essay, "Did Nazis Fight Better than Democrats? Historical Writing on the Combat Performance of the Allied Soldier in Normandy" (*Parameters*, Autumn 1995), was most interesting. Unquestionably interpretations of performance on the battlefield will always be largely subjective. But has any comparison been made between the two war theatres, i.e. comparing infantry performance at Normandy with the fighting for Saipan (which took place about the same time as Normandy), the Philippines, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa?

It appears that American servicemen were more aggressive against the fanatical Japanese foe in their Pacific battles than they were at Normandy. In most instances the Japanese fixed defenses in the Pacific also were more formidable than

those occupied by the Germans. If there was a differential in performance, what would account for it?

Perhaps Colin Baxter has some views on this apparent anomaly.

Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC Ret.
Cambridge, Massachusetts

The Author Replies:

In response to Bernard Trainor's important questions, as far as I know a comparative study has not been made of combat performance between the Pacific and European theaters. A comparison that does come to mind is that made by General J. Lawton Collins in his book, *Lightning Joe: An Autobiography*. Collins had commanded the 25th Division on Guadalcanal before assuming command of the VII Corps before the Normandy invasion. He declared that the fighting in the Normandy bocage country was as bad as anything he had encountered on Guadalcanal.

The issue of American aggressiveness toward Japanese is brought out vividly in E. B. Sledge's classic, *With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa*, in which the author notes that the mutual hatred that existed between the Americans and Japanese led to a no-holds-barred style of combat. A colleague of mine suggests that one possibility for any difference in aggressiveness between the two theaters might be explained by the US Army replacement system. In Europe, the replacement system tended to treat soldiers like spare parts, which worked against strong unit cohesion. My colleague suggests that there may have been a stronger identification by the individual soldier with his unit in the Pacific theater.

If American commanders in Europe on occasion complained about a lack of aggressiveness among their troops—that they did not hate the Germans enough—the ordinary GI saw the situation in a different light. In his recent study, *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945*, Michael Doubler points out the staggering casualty rate among American infantry troops. The GI in Europe, writes Doubler, was "participating in the greatest American bloodletting since Grant's 1864 drive on Richmond." If the German soldier did not always fight to the death like his Japanese counterpart, he was nonetheless a very formidable opponent indeed.

Colin F. Baxter

MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS

To the Editor:

In his article "Ready for What and Modernized Against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization" (*Parameters*, Autumn 1995), Jeffrey Record has raised the familiar criticism that the military is "preparing for the last war." Although this argument is an old one, it has gained new relevance in the post-Cold War era. Mr. Record's insightful views are worthy of careful consideration.

In some particulars, however, he is off the mark, both in matters of fact, and in his analysis. First, he claims that the US Marine Corps has not conducted an amphibious assault since Inchon. This is simply not the case. Marines landed in Lebanon in 1958, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in literally scores of instances in Vietnam (Special Landing Force operations). More recently, Marines landed in Grenada, in Liberia, and in Somalia (Operation Eastern Exit). It is also worth noting that in the space of a few weeks in 1983, Argentina's marines seized the Falklands/Malvinas in an amphibious operation, but were themselves defeated when UK forces returned to the islands by means of an amphibious assault of their own.

Second, Mr. Record asserts that amphibious warfare is "a mission whose utility and feasibility are highly questionable . . . acts of last resort." He assumes, apparently, that US forces will be called upon to fight only in places where we have established bases, as occurred in Panama in 1989. This is hardly plausible. Our nation possesses only two capabilities to conduct forcible entry operations: airborne and amphibious forces. The former are difficult to sustain, once deployed, given limited airlift capability. Amphibious forces, however, come complete with up to 30 days of sustainment.

Amphibious warfare is not only relevant, it is a "growth industry" in the post-Cold War security environment Mr. Record described. Deployed Amphibious Ready Groups maintain overseas presence and extend US influence where bases do not exist. In a crisis, they can strike quickly and either remain in place, with their own organic sustainment, or withdraw to sea. Such a capability is critical to national security in the threat environment of "Streetfighter States" described by Mr. Record.

Finally, in decrying the utility of the V-22, Mr. Record overlooks the fact that this aircraft, especially when combined with other systems under development, provides a true "over-the-horizon" amphibious assault capability, allowing Marines to conduct operational maneuver from the sea, while avoiding defended landing sites.

Lieutenant Colonel Len Blasiol, USMC
Pearl City, Hawaii

The Author Replies:

Amphibious operations are not synonymous with amphibious assault. The US Marine Corps has not been called upon to undertake a significant amphibious assault since the Inchon landing of 1950. Since then it has conducted numerous "presence" missions and performed many administrative landings (Lebanon in 1958 was unopposed; Dominican Republic in 1965 was small potatoes). But in combat the Corps has been used mainly in nonamphibious operations.

The declining incidence of amphibious assault since the golden age of the Pacific War of 1941-45 is attributable to several factors. New technologies permit rapid ship-to-shore descents "where the enemy ain't." Adversaries with thoroughly defended coastlines have grown scarce. Essential supporting naval resources such as gunfire support and countermine warfare capabilities have either all but vanished or remain inadequate. Finally, the association of amphibious assault with sig-

nificant casualties has exerted a chilling effect upon a US military and political leadership hypersensitive to incurring casualties on behalf of anything other than the most self-evident and vital of interests.

Operation Desert Storm rejected the option of amphibious assault in favor of an operationally and politically attractive alternative. Future US military campaigns also will look first to nonamphibious options precisely because the option of amphibious assault is almost always the one of last resort.

Former Commandant Al Gray was right on the money in substituting "expeditionary" for "amphibious" in the Fleet Marine Force nomenclature. History has shown that the Corps is first and foremost an expeditionary force that can perform a variety of missions, of which one is amphibious assault.

Jeffrey Record

NAMING NAMES

To the Editor:

I would like to endorse and amplify on Lieutenant Colonel Gregory C. Sieminski's article "The Art of Naming Operations" (*Parameters*, Autumn 1995). It is difficult to overstate the degree of civilian distaste for military personnel or organizations which refuse to acknowledge that their profession is indeed about war, about "killing people and breaking things." This is as true of civilians who are anti-military as it is of those who are generally supportive of the institution.

The issue involves the entire range of language used to discuss military operations. I recall two electric moments in Operation Desert Storm when, with a few well-chosen words and phrases, the military and political leadership of the United States communicated to the American people, and the rest of the world, what our aims were and how we intended to achieve them. The first was the night of 17 January 1991, when Presidential Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater stated to the press that "Desert Shield has become Desert Storm. The liberation of Kuwait has begun." The second, much better known, was when General Colin Powell stated that the mission of our forces was to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait; asked rhetorically how it was going to be done, he said, "First we're going to cut it off, and then we're going to kill it."

What a contrast with the aseptic, programmatic, pusillanimous language of the Vietnam era! Fitzwater's and Powell's remarks made it clear that we were fighting for a righteous cause, no matter what the ambiguities around its edges, and they made it clear that we were going to wage war without apology for the violence war entails. Most important, they said that we were going to *win*, and that we had clear criteria as to what would constitute victory.

So, to Colonel Sieminski's four sound criteria for naming operations, I would add a fifth. Since they are operations of war, make them sound warlike. Put a whiff of gunpowder in them. Before the invention of firearms, soldiers would sometimes prick their fingers and smear some blood on their swords before battle, both to frighten the enemy and bolster their own image of their ferocity and will to

win. We can do the same with operation code names. Our soldiers, our people, and our enemies will notice.

Robert L. Goldich
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.

The Author Replies:

Mr. Goldich highlights the conflict our leaders face in telling the ugly truth about war even as they solicit the public's support for waging it. He rightly suggests that however much our leaders may be tempted to do otherwise, they must not downplay the fact the war is about "killing people and breaking things." They have an obligation to help the public understand that war is a blunt instrument for achieving national objectives. Even if that message risks eroding public support for a potential conflict, it is best to know that before the nation becomes mired in an unpopular war.

Our leaders have a variety of means available for conveying the nature of war to the public, and operation nicknames are among the most potent and perhaps the most essential of them all. The public perceives the labels we apply to combat operations as an authoritative declaration of their nature, so the labels must be accurate. Truth in advertising is essential in war just as it is in the marketplace.

Mr. Goldich's suggestion that operations of war ought to have warlike names is a useful one, though he leaves vague exactly what "warlike" means. By suggesting that names should have "a whiff of gunpowder in them," he implies that warlike names are those that evoke the associations with the battlefield and the profession of arms. In my view, defining the term in this way results in an unnecessarily narrow guideline for accurately communicating the nature of war. What must be communicated to the public is the fact that war involves the use of brute force to compel an adversary to do our nation's will. Understanding the term "warlike" in this way would embrace some of the most widely admired operation names, such as Overlord and Desert Storm, which, while lacking the scent of gunpowder, do convey the essential point that war involves the use of force and, by implication, the potential for destruction. I would therefore broaden and clarify Mr. Goldich's proposed guideline by recommending that the nicknames of combat operations be suggestive of force.

As always, common sense and good taste must prevail in the selection of these operation nicknames. Those that suggest a degree of force disproportionate to the threat, like the name Urgent Fury (used for the invasion of the tiny island-nation of Grenada), are best eschewed. Others, like General Ridgway's Operation Killer, too graphically emphasize war's destructiveness and should be avoided. It is possible to be honest with the public without being gruesome.

It is worth noting that Mr. Goldich considers only "operations of war" in offering his proposal. There is, of course, another category of operations known as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Clearly, operations in this category require different treatment altogether. Rather than emphasizing destructive power, names for OOTW should emphasize their constructive purpose, as the names Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, and Uphold Democracy sought to do.

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory C. Sieminski

Review Essays

Strategic Reading on Latin America: 1995 Update

RUSSELL W. RAMSEY

Appraising comparatively the post-Cold War national security literature on Latin America in my essay "Strategic Reading on Latin America" (*Parameters*, Summer 1994), made sense intellectually in view of the quest for a new paradigm. One year later, two clearly opposed viewpoints are established: the neo-liberal optimists and the neo-collectivist pessimists. Both voices merit the careful attention of strategists and national security architects.

Setting the Sails

Pierre Etienne Dostert's *Latin America 1994* is the best one-volume regional description in the English language. The earlier annual issues still read with authenticity since their origin in 1967. Part of the unique Stryker-Post "World Today" series on the world's regions, the Latin America volume integrates economic, political, and military trends and gives a menu for deeper reading. Longer and more topically oriented is *Security, Democracy, and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (1994, edited by Lars Schoultz et al.). Where Dostert shows the restrained case for the neo-liberal optimist view, Schoultz and his author team are guarded pessimists, with an occasional glimpse of the neo-Marxist themes oft trumpeted by US Latin Americanists in the 1980s. William W. Finan, Jr., displays an intellectual reversal and a structural peregrination of importance to regional security issues. His February 1995 *Current History* issue on Latin America is a gloomy appraisal indeed, in contrast with his hopeful March 1993 Latin America issue. And he has thrown his hat into the ring on the contentious old debate over what defines Latin America; since the early 1500s scholars have disputed the geographic, political, ethnic, linguistic, economic, religious, and cultural determinants of the region. Editor Finan has dedicated his March 1995 issue of *Current History* to an assessment of *North America including Mexico*, a paradigm guaranteed to sting both Ross Perot and the enthusiasts of regional *indigenismo* (translate as "native Americanism") and *Hispanidad* (translate as "Hispanic pride").

National security specialists were long hampered by the relatively fuzzy strategic literature on Latin America. Ironically, in the post-Cold War era there are now three research tools available to those who would calculate power questions about arms, soldiers, money, and resources. The volume *South America, Central America,*

and the Caribbean: 1995, from the 5th edition (1994) of Europa Publications' Regional Surveys of the World, is simply the most comprehensive thing of its kind ever done. This organization also puts out the world's oldest military journal, the (British) *Army Quarterly & Defence Journal*, famous since its founder, the Duke of Wellington, demanded the strategic integration of political, military, and economic affairs. Europa's British rival series, known colloquially as "Brassey's Annuals," offers *The Military Balance* from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and the "Caribbean and Latin America" section in the 1994-1995 volume is the strongest current analysis on Latin America's greatly reduced and rapidly changing military institutions. Professor Claude C. Sturgill's three Latin America chapters in *The Military History of the Third World Since 1945* (1994) is the best work yet done on US security assistance linkage with the military institutions of all the world's developing regions.

Economics: The Science No Longer Dismal

A big movement in Latin American studies not applauded by many academics is the arrival of business administration experts and applied economists. Your reviewer, a historian, welcomes this development, having watched his history colleagues, the social scientists, and the humanists miss the interpretive boat on Latin America for four decades by stressing politics and ideology at the expense of economics. A lively economic literature now emerges, one that is definitely not a dismal science.

Paul W. Drake has edited *Money Doctors, Foreign Debts, and Economic Reforms in Latin America from the 1890s to the Present* (1994). Part of the impressive new Jaguar series from Scholarly Resources, Inc., the essays show how Latin America has been affected by classical laissez-faire commerce, positivism, Keynesian ideas, wartime commodity price guarantees, structuralism and statist economics, neo-Marxism and dependency theory, foreign investment and multinational corporations, raging inflation and indebtedness, mass unemployment, and now the neo-liberal philosophy of privatization and tariff minimization. If Drake's readings tip slightly toward the historical side, readers may spot a more purely economic viewpoint in William C. Smith et al., *Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives for the 1990s* (1994), again part of an excellent series, this one from the University of Miami North-South Center.

Jaime Suchlicki, editor of *North-South: The Magazine of the Americas*, devoted the entire November-December 1994 issue to the December 1994 Economic Summit of the Americas in Miami. Several of the articles relate trade and privatization to national security issues. Sadly, *North-South Magazine* ceases to exist with that issue, which will stand for years as a period statement on Latin American policy questions.

Soldiers & Cops in New Roles

Linda Alexander Rodriguez has edited *Rank and Privilege: The Military and Society in Latin America* (1994), another gem from the Jaguar series. These essays fill the vacuum on such questions as how the great *caudillos* (strongmen) gave way to professional military officers in the 20th century, and whence came the cultural ethos

of the Latin American military officer. Professor Rodriguez' introductory essay is definitive and should be incorporated into a general book of readings on the region. The annotated bibliography is the best short piece of its kind in print. G. Pope Atkins, Professor Emeritus at Annapolis, offers a new 1995 update of his *Latin America in the International Political System*, still the best regional entry in its field.

Scoffers at the notion that Latin America's men-at-arms have changed fundamentally will support Brian Loveman's "'Protected Democracies' and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993," in the *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Summer 1994). In meticulous detail, he categorizes the countries of the region by the degree to which their armed forces accept civilian control over the military forces in several areas, and he concludes that most of them are still *golpistas* (soldiers who overthrow governments) at heart. Pericles Gasparini Alves examines Latin American regional arms limitation and military role restructuring in his edited volume *Proceedings of the Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Research Institutes, 2-3 December 1991, Sao Paulo* (1993). Discussions relating weapons and defense to economic development are excellent. Carlos Molina Johnson has often defended in modern words the doctrine of Diego Portales, a 19th-century Chilean cabinet minister, who argued that it is correct for the armed forces to guarantee a constitutional form of government by force, if necessary. In Molina's "Iberoamerica 2001," published in the School of the America's magazine *Adelante* (Summer 1992), he outlines the several roles for Latin America's armed forces in the next century. A similar taxonomy of future Latin American military roles is offered by Venezuela's Virgilio Rafael Beltran in "La Seguridad Hemisferica y el Nuevo Orden International," *Military Review* (Hispanic ed., September-October 1992). The political economist Margaret Daly Hayes reveals some positive and generally unknown trends in South American naval affairs in her 1995 study *By Example: The Impact of Recent Argentine Naval Activities on Southern Cone Naval Strategies.*

For a US academic appraisal of what soldiers and police south of the Rio Grande ought to be doing, see Gabriel Marcella's edited volume *Warriors in Peacetime: The Military & Democracy in Latin America* (1994). He is less pessimistic than Loveman, to be sure, but also less rosy than Molina and Beltran. And he offers a short menu of his ideas on this vital topic in his essay "Forging New Strategic Relationships" which appeared in *Military Review* (October 1994). William Perry and Max Primorac pull in US regional security policy with their essay "The Inter-American Security Agenda" appearing in the *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Fall 1994), as does your present reviewer in his article "US Strategy for Latin America" in *Parameters* (Autumn 1994).

And Still From the Left . . .

Scholars looking at leftist influence and security threats within Latin America during the Cold War tend to divide into two groups: those who applaud or bewail the demise of the radical left, and those who find it alive but differently arrayed.

Barry Carr and Steve Ellner edited *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika* (1993), one of many titles from Westview Press on the interplay of leftist revolution and national security policy in Latin America. While they are not ready to abandon some of the heady romanticism which gave US

academics an exaggerated view of Karl Marx's influence in Latin America during the Cold War, they nonetheless make a solid case for the part played by the political left in bringing about the era of political pluralization and economic privatization. For a more purely descriptive view, see Marcelo Cavarozzi, "The Left in Latin America: The Decline of Socialism and the Rise of Political Democracy," in Jonathan Hartlyn et al., *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War* (1992). Finally, for an unrepentant view that the far left has done mighty things with more still to come, read Eric Selbin's *Modern Latin American Revolutions* (1993), another Westview title.

Individual Security Topics

Donald E. Schulz and Deborah Sundloff Schulz coauthored in 1994 *The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America*, still another Westview volume. While focused upon war's havoc in Honduras during the 1980s, the authors achieve a coherent portrayal of the Central American region. It is meticulously supported and forms a caveat to future US Presidents who might decide to go a-filibustering once more. Louis W. Goodman and Gabriel Marcella have edited a short summary of their *Conference on Peace and Reconciliation in El Salvador, Sept. 8-9, 1994*, a joint product of the American University School of International Service Democracy Project and the US Army War College. A full-length volume containing the speeches is projected and would be a great contribution to scholarship.

Anthony P. Maingot shows why he is the emerging dean of Caribbean scholarship in the United States with his 1994 title *The United States and the Caribbean*, one of Westview's best ever. Maingot's article on Haiti in the February 1995 issue of *Current History* (previously mentioned herein) is a classic. Two other pieces on the recent US/UN operation in Haiti accompany the Maingot article. An excellent set of essays on Haiti by a mix of diplomats and scholars is found in Georges A. Fauriol, ed., *Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy* (1995). This reviewer's "On Castro and Cuba: Rethinking the 'Three Gs,'" appeared in *Parameters* (Winter 1994-1995). Ten blue-chip national security pieces on the future of Fidel Castro and his role in the Cold War are reviewed there in detail. The October-November 1993 issue of *North-South: The Magazine of the Americas* was devoted to trends in the southern cone: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Subsequent events have shown those articles to have been prescient indeed. Your present reviewer's "Reading Up On the Drug War" in *Parameters* (Autumn 1995) puts that melancholy literature into three categories: participant accounts, policy analysis, and political soapbox oratory.

Barry L. Brewer finds positive linkage between US military training conducted in Spanish for Latin American armed forces, and the long-range growth of professionalism. His study is called *U.S. Security Assistance Training of Latin American Militaries: Intentions and Results* (1995). Your reviewer's article "Forty Years of Human Rights Training" (*Journal of Low Intensity Conflict*, Autumn 1995) examines this sensitive topic in the context of Hemispheric involvement in the Cold War.

Books in Series

In the 1950s Columbia University's Professor Lewis Hanke edited a series of topical books in English on Latin America, known as the Borzoi series (Alfred A.

Knopf Publisher). They were the first affordable paperbacks on the region, and the scholarship was superb. For military and national security professionals, several of the Borzoi classics are still germane. Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., edited *Dictatorship in Latin America*; Luis E. Aguilar edited *Marxism in Latin America*; and British historians R. A. Humphreys and John Lynch edited *The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826*. Donald M. Dozer edited *The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modern Significance*, and Marvin Bernstein assembled *Foreign Investment in Latin America*. The series contained edited memoirs of foreign visitors to the region, and several volumes of collected essays on key countries such as Cuba, Mexico, and Brazil. Now, in the post-Cold War environment, come three excellent series of books on Latin America.

The Scholarly Resources Press of Wilmington, Delaware, offers its Jaguar Series under the editorship of William H. Beezley and Colin M. MacLachlan. Richard Hopper, Editorial Director at Scholarly Resources, is the architect of the series. The North-South Center at the University of Miami, under the leadership of Ambler H. Moss, Jr., has no single name for its recent books on security and economic issues in Latin America. But the titles recently edited by William C. Smith and reviewed herein constitute a topical series of great merit. The North-South Center's *Journal of Inter-american Studies and World Affairs* remains the best thing of its kind. Finally, the Westview titles continue to appear with regularity, and they seem to veer from their previous ideological trendiness into ramparts more enduring.

The Stryker-Post World Today series provides dependable and affordable country-by-country introductions, regionally organized. While the Latin America volume has been excellent since 1966, one gets a better perspective of Latin America by reading the other Stryker-Post works on Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. *Military Review*, of the US Army Command and General Staff College, continues to feature regular and excellent pieces on Latin America; its Spanish and Portuguese language editions carry different articles and play a vital hemispheric role in education and outreach.

Perhaps the most optimistic news is that the demise of the Cold War seems to have fostered a better quality of military and national security issues literature on Latin America than existed from 1947 to 1989. Since failure to understand those issues led to policy blunders by the United States during the Cold War, the trend bodes well for those who love peace, democracy, and economic plenty.

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Review Essay

Gulf War Logistics

CHARLES R. SHRADER

The high-tech whizbangs employed in the 1990–1991 war in the Persian Gulf have obscured the underlying factor in the stunning allied success—superior logistics. Stealth fighters, Patriot missiles, and daring, high-speed armored thrusts across the trackless desert caught the public imagination in a way that C-141 cargo planes, roll-on/roll-off ships, and endless streams of trucks moving to forward bases could not. Thus far, the books and articles that do treat the logistical aspects of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm—including the six works under consideration here—have portrayed the massive logistical operations in the Gulf as extraordinarily successful and have attributed that success in equal portions to internal service reforms following the war in Vietnam and to the energy and innovation of a few key individuals. Undoubtedly, the war was an operational and logistical success, but a close examination of the evidence suggests that many logistical problems, some going back to the Spanish-American War of 1898, remain unsolved. Profound questions about the role of doctrine, the effect of personality, and the effectiveness of ad hoc solutions remain to be addressed in a second wave of analysis.

The Stunning Achievement

President George Bush ordered the first deployment of US troops to the Gulf on 7 August 1990. By 1 March 1991, allied forces in the Gulf region included more than 539,000 US and 270,000 allied military personnel as well as over 12,400 tracked and 117,000 wheeled vehicles, 1800 helicopters, and a naval force of over 210 ships, including two battleships and six aircraft carriers with 360 combat aircraft. For the most part, these forces were moved to the Gulf from the United States and Europe in a period of just over 160 days. It took one full year to move 184,000 soldiers to Vietnam; that many moved to Saudi Arabia in just 88 days.

The US Transportation Command coordinated some 576 ship voyages and 10,002 aircraft sorties to move over half a million troops and 5.7 million metric tons of equipment and supplies over the long supply lines from the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. The first of 13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships began unloading supplies to support the Marines in Saudi Arabia just nine days after notification, and 79 merchant ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet were activated to augment US and foreign charters. Over 15,400 air transport missions were flown, ferrying 524,000 tons of cargo and 484,000 passengers. The Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was activated

for the first time, and more than 100 CRAF planes flew the equivalent of two and one-half Berlin Airlifts in just 16 weeks. In-theater, an additional 9500 military air missions moved more than 100,000 tons of cargo and 75,000 passengers.

Once landed in Saudi Arabia, the troops, equipment, and supplies were moved to giant inland staging bases under the control of the Army's 22d Support Command led by Lieutenant General William G. "Gus" Pagonis. Reception, staging, onward movement, and continuing support of a constantly growing force posed significant challenges for the nearly 300,000 logistical personnel in the theater, many of whom were drawn from the reserve components. The 22d Support Command also coordinated the host-nation support provided by the Saudi Arabian government, a critical factor in allied success. Fortunately, the Saudis were able to offer some of the best modern ports in the world as well as over 2000 civilian trucks, fuel, oil, water, and other supplies and facilities. Providing water alone was a significant achievement: US forces consumed some eight million gallons of water per day, an amount which represents a line of tanker trucks stretching 200 miles. In all, logisticians on the ground pumped more than 2.5 billion gallons of fuel, processed over 44,000 tons of mail, served over 95 million meals, and drove over 35 million miles. And when the war was over, they shipped some 1.7 million tons of ammunition, equipment, and spare parts back to the United States or to other locations outside the Persian Gulf.

The most spectacular logistical feat of the war was the support provided for General Norman H. Schwarzkopf's sweeping left hook deep into Iraq. As one commentator has noted, "Logistics made possible the greatest military deception since World War II"—the massive shift of forces to the west followed by a deep, fast-moving penetration. In the first phase, two large forward logistical bases were established and 150,000 men of the US VII and XVIII Airborne Corps with all their armor, artillery, vehicles, and 60 days of ammunition and other supplies were shifted 150 miles to the west over rudimentary desert roads. The time available for this massive undertaking was limited, and General Pagonis, the Army's chief logistician in the theater, had to pledge that the troops and their equipment would be in position by the 21 February deadline. They were. The entire movement was accomplished in only 21 days. In the second phase of the operation, which began with the opening of the allied ground offensive on 24 February, logistical bases were set up in advance of ground troops who required some 14,000 tons of ammunition and 4.5 million gallons of fuel per day, a large proportion of which was moved into position by air.

Most of what has been written thus far about logistics in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 has concentrated on the achievements just outlined, and particularly on the massive strategic deployment of US forces to the Gulf. In large part, these accounts focus on the statistics, which illustrate the dimensions of the logistical achievement to the detriment of a more comprehensive analysis of the place of that achievement in the overall context of strategy and tactics. In a short study published by the Institute of National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University entitled *Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond*, Scott W. Conrad focuses on the importance of strategic mobility as the key to our stunning success in the Gulf War and the sine qua non of any future contingency operation, pointing out rightly that "Desert Storm euphoria should not overshadow an accurate assessment and clear articulation of transportation successes and failures."

The statistics of the US logistical achievement, specifically those related to strategic mobility matters such as airlift and sealift, are more extensively set forth in USAF Colonel Douglas Menarchik's *Powerlift—Getting to Desert Storm: Strategic Transportation and Strategy in the New World Order.* Menarchik's straightforward account of what happened is a veritable gold mine of statistics, but the first four chapters are little more than a recitation of statistical data. Moreover, *Powerlift* is seriously marred by poor organization and an infelicitous style, confusing the reader by a lack of clear narrative flow, unclear chronology, and repetition. In his final chapter, however, Menarchik redeems himself by providing an interesting and fairly comprehensive analysis of how logistics influenced strategy and operations in the Gulf. Focusing on location, timing, tempo, and outcomes, Menarchik convincingly argues that "logistics, technology, and the American will to persist shaped the essential military outcome of Desert Storm, not military strategy and tactics." Menarchik also expertly outlines the degree to which US civilian and military leaders undervalue the role of logistics in 20th-century warfare and emphasize combat forces at the expense of logistical forces, which are often "*the* limiting factor of American strategy."

Both Conrad and Menarchik focus narrowly on strategic mobility and transportation, but in *Operational Logistics and the Gulf War*, a pamphlet prepared for the Association of the United States Army, the chief US Army logistician in the Gulf, Lieutenant General Pagonis, and his chief logistical planner, Colonel Michael D. Krause, attempt to summarize logistical operations in the Gulf War in the context of the "operational art of war." Their effort is generally unsatisifying, the constraints of the pamphlet format being too restrictive for a comprehensive discussion of such a complex topic. Here Pagonis and Krause recapitulate the statistics of the Gulf War logistical achievement and just begin to touch on the larger role of logistics as a key component of the operational art of war. They do, however, bring out very clearly the interconnection between the allied air campaign and the logistical preparations for the famous "Hail Mary" end-run. They point out that the need to cripple Iraqi observation—a feat accomplished by the allied air campaign—was a necessary precondition for beginning the repositioning of men and materiel for the ground attack in the west, noting that the air campaign was extended for an additional week in order to facilitate the building of the necessary logistical bases and the repositioning of the two corps.

A far more balanced view of the logistical achievements of the allies in the Gulf War, including both the strategic deployment and in-theater logistical support, set in the overall context of strategy and tactical operations, is provided by Robert H. Scales, Jr., and his collaborators in *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War.* Scales' well-organized, well-written, and thoroughly documented general history of the war from the US perspective is unusual in that the author is careful to give logistics its due in proportion to its importance in the overall scheme of things. The author and the team of officers who helped him compose his book provide an altogether admirable discussion of the importance of logistics to the overall victory in the Gulf, of the problems encountered, and of the solutions applied. *Certain Victory* is clearly intended as a general history of the war focused on strategic and operational matters. The reader should not expect—and does not receive—a plethora of detail on logistical matters. But Scales is careful to give logistics its due and set the logistical details in their proper context. *Certain Victory* is an excellent example of how logistics should be treated in a general history focused principally on operational matters.

Pending the publication of a comprehensive logistical history of the Gulf War, the single best account focused on logistics is the Association of the United States Army Special Report entitled *Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: The Logistics Perspective* by James D. Blundell. Blundell provides a clear and concise presentation of the Gulf War logistics story from three perspectives (strategic, theater, and division level) in a highly successful effort to "illustrate the magnitude and complexity of the present-day logistics capability needed by the Army in a contingency operation." The key statistics of what was achieved in the strategic deployment to the Gulf and the establishment of the theater logistical support structure are all there, and Blundell also provides an excellent, if short, analysis of the deployment, positioning, and support of the 24th Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Division to illustrate operational logistics in ground combat. Brief, informative, and thorough, Blundell's pamphlet holds its own against the longer, more detailed accounts that have appeared.

The Same Old Problems

The United States and her allies triumphed over the Iraqis in a ground war which lasted just 100 hours. Logistical support for allied air, sea, and ground operations were obviously sufficient. Nevertheless, a careful examination of the available accounts of the victory in the Gulf indicates that the allied logistical effort was plagued by a number of hoary problems, some of them going back 92 years to the United States' first major overseas deployment—to Cuba in the Spanish-American War. Despite all our experience and the many advances in logistical doctrine, methods, and technology since 1898, it is clear that we have not solved some of the most fundamental problems of overseas deployment. Deploying units did not know what their transportation requirements were and consistently sought to move to the Gulf considerable amounts of extra materiel. Transportation managers faced serious shortages of ocean shipping, and much of what was available was unsuitable to the task or required time-consuming repairs and modifications which significantly delayed the deployment. The efficient use of the scarce ocean shipping was further complicated by problems in calling forward units and cargo to the ports of embarkation, confusion regarding the assignment of transports, and, at the far end of the line of communication, serious shortages in logistical personnel which led to backlogs in port clearance. Identification of cargo was just as serious a problem in 1990 as it had been in 1898. Containers on the pier in Saudi Arabia in 1990, like the railroad cars outside Tampa in 1898, were inadequately marked as to contents and had to be opened one-by-one to determine their cargo, thus hindering offloading operations and adding to the delays in port clearance. The conscious decision to defer the deployment of logistical troops in order to increase the flow of combat forces into the theater of operations also seriously complicated the provision of adequate logistical support.

The eventual victory was not compromised by such logistical shortcomings, which were ultimately overcome in the Gulf just as they had been overcome in 1898. But the recurrence of problems well-recognized nearly a century before and the consequent need to "reinvent the wheel" do call into question the overall efficiency of a system which, despite enormous resources and constant reexamination, cannot seem to solve a problem once and for all.

Stuffy Doctrine and the Heroic Innovator

Why are we unable to provide permanent solutions for persistent logistical problems and why must we constantly relearn our lessons and reinvent the same solutions? The answer may lie in a fundamental American distrust of doctrine and preference for the innovative, ad hoc solution. Americans have never been totally convinced that doctrine and dogma were good things in any context—political, economic, religious, or military. Something about established doctrine and formal procedures simply goes against the individualistic and pragmatic American grain. One of the fondest clichés of American military history is the story of how our forebears clothed in brown and green abandoned the military doctrines of the 18th century and lurked behind trees to ambush and destroy the British redcoats in their well-dressed columns and lines. Even the briefest survey of American military history will reveal a decided preference for innovative, aggressive heroes on horseback such as Stonewall Jackson and George S. Patton, Jr., over "by-the-book" plodders. The prize has always gone to the man who breaks the doctrinal bonds to achieve a brilliant, often idiosyncratic victory, and the long-term results and "might have beens" are conveniently forgotten. Moreover, the tendency to discount doctrine (despite a great deal of lip service and innumerable manhours devoted to its development and teaching) is particularly an Army fault. The Navy and the Air Force always have placed more credence in doctrine and have sought to follow it, often blindly. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Billy Mitchell are revered; Emory Upton and William Depuy are barely known, and the demigods of Army history are the brilliant innovators, not the developers of doctrine.

Doctrine and SOPs are designed for the worst-case, long-term situation and seldom look very effective in an immediate crisis. So it was in the Gulf, and the chief logistical hero was Gus Pagonis. What General Pagonis and his coterie of protégés did to meet the many complex challenges faced by US logisticians in the Gulf was to cast over 20 years of doctrinal development into the trash and invent their own ad hoc logistical systems almost from scratch. Undeniably, they got the job done, but the real question is whether such a jury-rigged system could have sustained a longer, more intense war. There are many indications that as the 100th hour of the war approached, serious cracks were beginning to appear, cracks that the established doctrine, despite its measured pace, was designed to avoid.

What General Pagonis did and how he did it are set forth in some detail in his book *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*, written with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. Firsthand accounts of historical events by key participants are a joy to the historian, but they are more often useful for an insight in the great man's character than as an accurate portrayal of historical events. This is certainly the case with *Moving Mountains*, a perfect example of that genre of memoir in which the protagonist's deeds seem somewhat overstated. The value of General Pagonis's book as a historical document is further compromised by his principal purpose—to describe and illustrate his leadership and management style, a perfectly legitimate undertaking in its own right. But let's face it: the Gulf War was not won by the aggressive activity and often brilliant innovation of Gus Pagonis alone, much less by stand-up meetings or the use of 3x5 cards. As has been noted elsewhere (*Army Focus 91—Operation Desert Storm*, page 13), "Victory in Operation Desert Storm . . . represents over seven months of arduous preparations and over a decade of planning, leader development, training,

and investment." Moreover, Pagonis's focus on his own actions in an Army context obscures the important fact that the logistical support of forces in the Gulf War was a joint and combined undertaking involving the Navy, Marines, Air Force, and allies.

Most analysts of the allied logistical effort in the Gulf War accept the basic assumption that following the established doctrine and procedures could not have produced the desired results and that it was therefore absolutely necessary to bypass the existing system with innovative ad hoc solutions to achieve the necessary levels of support for the combat units. Thus, for superficial analysts and even some senior combat arms officers, the aggressive efforts of General Pagonis and his pick-up crew were the cause of logistical success in the Gulf War. However, this popular acclamation of the innovative go-getter who overcomes all roadblocks by casting aside stuffy doctrine and inconvenient procedures is not shared by all professional logisticians.

Several years ago, I had occasion to discuss this matter with a group of students at the Army War College who had served as logisticians in the Gulf War. In an attempt to provoke reaction and discussion, I advanced the idea that General Pagonis's independent actions were overrated and perhaps unwise, fully expecting the students in the seminar to hand me my head. I was greatly surprised by the ready concurrence expressed by a dozen experienced logisticians. They were practically unanimous in pointing out the many faults in the logistical support in the Gulf and the sensing that, had the war continued, there was a good chance that the whole system could have come unhinged. They were equally unanimous in condemning those who substituted their own ideas for the well-thought-out logistical doctrine that had resulted from so much toil and sweat over the previous 20 years. These officers did not confuse hyperactivity with either effectiveness or long-term efficacy.

Conclusion

There is no question that our logistical system in the Gulf War worked extremely well—for a 100-hour war. However, the assumption that the existing doctrine was inadequate and inflexible and that heroic measures were necessary to get the job done has been accepted uncritically by most writers on the Gulf War and has never been put to an objective examination. Although ad hoc solutions were effective in the short term, the resulting structure may well have collapsed ignominiously had the ground war lasted longer than 100 hours. Problems unresolved since our first modern overseas deployment in 1898 and the casting aside of systematic procedures developed over many years in favor of ad hoc solutions might have led to the collapse of the entire logistical support system at the 101st hour, the 1001st hour, or some other point. The basic defects in Gulf War logistics were masked by wondrous technology (and plenty of it) and the dynamic story of a fast-moving and ultimately successful campaign. They need to be aired more thoroughly in a careful, analytical, objective logistical history of the Gulf War. One hopes that such a work will soon appear.

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Review Essay

Looking Again at World War I

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON

Three recent books—one a reissue of an older work—present a fascinating look at the maturation process of the field of World War I study, commented on by Paul F. Braim in the Spring 1995 issue of *Parameters.*

The first of the three is a 1995 reissue of John J. Pershing's memoir *My Experiences in the First World War* (originally published in 1931 as *My Experiences in the World War*), with a new foreword by Frank E. Vandiver. Pershing's memoir was written—and accepted for years—as "truth." Woe betide anyone who wrote contrary to what the Commanding General had written; the chorus included almost all those general officers who served under him in France and who subsequently wrote memoirs or histories of their units. The most prominent dissident—Peyton C. March, Army Chief of Staff and former Pershing protégé— was also the object of considerable animosity from Pershing and the choir. That antagonism has its most evenhanded treatment in Donald Smythe's *Pershing: General of the Armies* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1986).

Disagreements aside, Pershing's memoir was widely accepted as the definitive truth for years following the war. What Pershing said was taken largely from official documents to which he had free access, but his interpretation of motives, his narrowness of focus, and his utter unwillingness to see anything but his own view diminished the authority of the work to later researchers. One could easily draw some parallels between Pershing's memoir and Brigadier General Bob Scales' *Certain*

Victory, except that Scales was specifically commissioned to write a "Happy Face" history of the Gulf War. He was not motivated to do so for personal or professional reasons. One cannot, however, fully appreciate American participation in World War I without reading Pershing's memoir, since he was the guiding force behind all that the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) did or did not do in that war. Pershing's memoir must be read the same way one reads Schwarzkopf's *It Doesn't Take A Hero*—to understand what the senior commander thinks he thought at the time. And it is good to see reprints of books long out of print, such as the Pershing memoir. The 50th anniversary of World War II has produced many more reissues, to the great benefit of new generations of historians.

In contrast to Pershing's work, *Passchendaele and the Royal Navy*, by Andrew A. Wiest, is a doctoral dissertation significantly revised for publication. It addresses one aspect of the continuing battle over the reputation of Pershing's peer, Sir Douglas Haig, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Wiest's thesis is that Passchendaele, considered in most works about World War I to be the archetypical demonstration of British (Haig's) stupidity and sterility of professional thought, was in fact a reasonable undertaking. It was reasonable because the British Admiralty thought it was necessary to deal with the submarine threat, which had the potential to strangle the British war effort. Further, it offered a golden opportunity for the first independent British action of the war, all those hitherto having been in response to French demands or necessities. The most interesting portion of this book is not its thesis, however, which the author subsequently undermines: toward the end, he includes testimony by the Admiralty that the proposed operation would not in fact affect the submarine war, since no submarines of consequence were stationed in the threatened zone. The fascinating portion of the book, rather, is the planning of the operation, which reflects significant learning by the British Expeditionary Force in the two preceding years. The seemingly mindless prolonging of the attack is not well explained except to link it, almost casually, to the desperate situation of the French army, then in a state of "collective indiscipline."

These two books go together in an unusual way. In both, the Expeditionary Forces Commander is the central figure, and how strikingly similar the two are! Both men are aloof from most of mankind; both bear crushing responsibilities that would clearly have destroyed lesser men; both are insufferably rigid; both are possessed with a deep sense of mission; both are well aware of human fallibilities in others, though not in themselves. There are significant differences as well:

- Haig stands rather alone against his national political establishment (Prime Minister Lloyd George), but Pershing has the full confidence of his national leadership to the extent that he possesses political authority far beyond that of Haig or any of his French counterparts.
- Pershing has an absolute mandate to create an American Army and act in that Army's best interests. Haig is being constantly pressured to cooperate with the French and is eventually presented with the threat of subordination to them.
- Haig and Pershing hit it off together well in their first meeting and, as one would expect of kindred spirits, generally agreed most of the time. But Pershing is urbane, and popular with the French in particular, where Haig is often characterized as almost inarticulate before civilians, particularly those in government.

• Pershing has gone down in most American histories as a model professional soldier, Haig, in most histories, as a mindless butcher. (See Brian Bond, ed., *The First World War and British Military History* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991], for an appraisal of the continuing controversy over Haig among British scholars.) In America, criticism of Pershing has begun to emerge only gradually and, as I noted in a review in the Spring 1995 issue of this journal, the first (other than that of the March school) was done by Donald Smythe in *Pershing: General of the Armies.*

The controversy over Pershing was reignited by an article by Thomas Fleming, "Iron General" (*MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, 7 [Winter 1995], 58-73), over the issue of Pershing's concept of "open warfare," among other things. This concept became the focus of my own Ph.D. dissertation as I attempted to wrestle with how the AEF was trained in the United States, leaving to James Rainey the training in France. What was at stake for the AEF was its basic conception of what kind of war it should train for—how it would go about that training was another matter.

At first, Allied instructors were contracted to come to the United States and assist on the basis of their three years of combat experience. They came to teach tactics, techniques, and procedures at the individual and squad level. When Pershing and his scratch staff arrived in France, one of the first things they did was visit all the Allied headquarters and schools to see how one went about training for this war, of which the Americans knew precious little. (We must recall that Pershing and most American professional Army officers had been more directly concerned with operations in the Philippines or the Mexican Punitive Expedition. Few had any abiding interest in the war in Europe and President Wilson made it quite clear they had no business being interested in it. Even so, the Army War College section of the Army General Staff did publish a number of War Department Documents addressing the most current information from the Allied armies, often simply reprinting Allied manuals.)

At the end of the staff visits, Pershing concluded that the existing *U.S. Army Infantry Drill Regulations* (1911, with 28 changes) was sufficient grounds for training the AEF. It was a fascinating conclusion, since the same body of officers also concluded that the basic structure of field army had to change dramatically. The infantry company, with peacetime strength of 58 and wartime strength of 150, would have to grow to 250! And not only would it grow in number, it would have to employ large numbers of machine guns, grenades (both thrown and rifle), accompanying guns (one pounders), and other technical developments of which it was essentially ignorant. Also, the tactics of trench warfare were distinctly different from those of "open warfare." The problem, of course, was that the trenches had to be overcome before open warfare could ensue. Pershing was unable to grasp all of this, which leads to the third book in this triptych.

Battle Tactics on the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-1918, by Paddy Griffith, is one of those serious studies that seeks the truth of what was going on beyond the public personalities of the commanders and the correspondents' stories of the troops. Like several excellent studies of German tactical innovation (most notably Tim Lupfer's 1981 Leavenworth Paper No. 4, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, and to some extent Gudmundsson and Zabecki's studies of German artillery techniques à la Colonel Georg Bruchmueller), this book attempts to get down to reality. The author argues that tactical innovation was a universal phenomenon, rather than

the sole purview of the Germans, who seemed willing to innovate only in desperation. The larger theme one may extract from this work is that competent militaries, and some that appear not to be so, do think deeply about their profession and attempt to make it more effective within the parameters they have to confront.

It is fairly easy to condemn senior military leaders of shortsightedness in almost any war, as Liddell Hart castigated the British for failing to appreciate the tank. On the ground, however, reality may have a significantly different look. Early tanks were simply not capable of much, and in due course the Germans found ways successfully to deal with them. The later successes of the tanks came when they were integrated fully within the combined arms system that allowed aerial observers to spot antitank artillery and call for suppressive fires upon it, freeing the tanks, if weather and terrain cooperated, to do spectacular things. These are the sorts of things addressed in this book.

It should be noted that John Ferris's review of this work in *The Journal of Military History* (July 1995, pp. 540-42), takes Griffith to task for uneven and somewhat idiosyncratic treatment of certain issues. But in addressing these factors in the depth and comprehensiveness Griffith has, he has raised our study of the First World War another step above the level of myth and prejudice.

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Book Reviews

The Eagles' Last Triumph: Napoleon's Victory at Ligny, June 1815. By Andrew Uffindell. London: Greenhill Books, 1994 (dist. in the United States through Stackpole Books). 272 pages. $40.00.
Reviewed by Colonel John R. Elting, USA Ret., author of *Swords Around a Throne.*

There must now be enough books in all languages on the campaign and battle of Waterloo to stock at least one respectable library. Were they so concentrated however, those shelves reserved for English-language accounts of the part played by Field Marshal von Blücher and his Prussians would be largely empty. (One British regimental history—that of the Coldstream Guards—didn't even mention them!) Andrew Uffindell has tried to fill that gap, and has made a generally commendable job of it.

Though the battle of Ligny is the centerpiece of Uffindell's book, he fits it into the campaign as a whole and links it effectively with the concurrent fight to westward at Quatre-Bras between Wellington and Marshal Ney. He has paid particular attention to the loose-cannon wanderings of French General D'Erlon's corps between those two engagements, and his explanation of this blunder—which would be a major cause of Napoleon's eventual defeat—appears logical. Especially good is his demonstration of how Napoleon at Ligny, outnumbered four to three and handicapped by blundering subordinates, methodically took Blücher's army apart. There are plenty of maps, though not of the highest quality. (The general map on page 21 has misplaced Marshal Suchet and adjacent units and conjured up an army of Napolitans.) These are supplemented by orders of battle, diagrams, and illustrations. As a bonus, Uffindell has included instructions for a self-guided tour of the Ligny-Quatre-Bras area.

Various small errors pop out at the reader—the Imperial Guard cavalry had only four active regiments (a fifth was still being organized) and Jomini's brilliance as Ney's onetime chief of staff existed only in Jomini's own imagination. More serious is the fact that Uffindell, though obviously determined to be thoroughly impartial, does sometimes have his Prussians standing considerably taller than they did in real life. His description of Prussian organization and tactics is good and unsparing. His description of Marshal Blücher misses only one flaw—the "old hussar's" remarkably elastic conscience which saw nothing wrong in violating armistices. His efforts to make Blücher's chief of staff, Von Gneisenau, into "a determined and ruthless man of action," however, lack any real basis in fact. Prussian staff work during this campaign bore a strong resemblance to the American performance the year before at Bladensburg: in fact, the hash that Gneisenau made of getting the Prussians under way from Wavre to support Wellington on 18 June would have appalled a good many American militia colonels. (Uffindell accepts the Prussian alibi that a bad fire blocked Wavre's main street for two hours—though, according to reliable French sources, there is no record of such a fire in the Wavre municipal records.)

The chapter on Waterloo shows similar exaggeration. The Prussians may have had the "light of battle in their eyes" as Uffindell asserts (as proof, he offers the remarkable assertion that no house more than 50 yards from their line of march was looted as they passed), but their actual combat performance was little better than that of Wellington's much-blamed Dutch-Belgian units. They did not show the toughness they had displayed at Ligny. Uffindell also praises the famous "pursuit" that Gneisenau led, comparing it with the one Napoleon launched after Jena. Sadly, this "pursuit" is one of the significant myths of the 1815 campaign. Like many staff officers before and since, Gneisenau longed to be a conquering combat officer. His pursuit lasted for approximately seven miles; the French had no trouble breaking contact and beginning to reorganize the next morning, while—with Gneisenau off playing soldier—the Prussian army remained almost immobilized.

In like fashion, the author's version of the war's last days has a triumphant Blücher preparing to sack and burn cowering Paris. In fact, he had shoved himself into a sack, isolated in a hostile countryside, with Wellington's shattered army a two-day march behind him, and Davout, ablest of the French marshals, between them with a force as strong as their two armies together—truly one of history's most intriguing might-have-beens! Even Blücher seems to have suddenly realized his danger when Davout neatly bagged a brigade of Prussian cavalry.

These are serious flaws, but the book's good points outweigh them. For his next book, however, Uffindell might keep in mind the advice of one of this period's most successful scoundrels, Charles Maurice Talleyrand—"Above all, not too much enthusiasm."

Preparing for the Twenty-First Century. By Paul Kennedy. New York: Random House, 1993. 428 pages. $25.00. **Reviewed by Mr. John B. Nerger**, US Army War College Class of 1994.

As the first millennium came to an end, countless European Christians let their superstitions get the better of them. Their dread had several causes, not the least of which was the Book of Revelation's prophesy that "an angel . . . laid hold on the dragon . . . which is the Devil . . . and bound him a thousand years . . . after which he must be loosed a little season." Fortunately, the year 1000 passed without incident and gave way to a prosperous and progressive period of several hundred years.

Paul Kennedy may not be superstitious, but his message at the end of the second millennium is equally disturbing. While he doesn't predict the devil's unleashing, he argues that population explosion, environmental degradation, and runaway technical innovation may produce similar results. Unlike long-forgotten predecessors, Kennedy is armed with an arsenal of statistics, rigorous reasoning, and computer graphics. *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* is one of what will probably be many expectant looks into the crystal ball by modern-day seers.

English-born and Oxford-educated, the author has been a professor at Yale for the last decade. He is best known for the international bestseller *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, in which he makes a case that entropy is a characteristic of the advanced nation-state. His latest book also applies an interdisciplinary approach and draws from history, economics, sociology, and geopolitics.

Thomas Malthus had a similar message in 1798, when he wrote that England's population growth would lead to poverty and starvation. Kennedy declares the British escaped likely demise because of emigration, industrialization, and the agricultural revolution. No escape hatch is visible today. The trends are more problematic and solutions more elusive. There is a wider separation between where population pressures are mounting and where the world's riches and technologies are to be found.

Kennedy worries whether poor, agrarian societies can deal with their own surge in population. About 95 percent of all population growth is expected to occur in the developing nations. Where will additional land come from to feed the billions of extra mouths? Most of the world's spare agricultural capacity is in places where it's not needed—Europe and North America. If these struggling countries are able to escape the Malthusian trap, the environment will suffer immensely. For who will tell India and China they cannot experience the industrial revolutions being counted on to raise their peoples' standards of living?

The book is a veritable feast for the information junkie nourished by a diet of *USA Today* and *World Almanac*. The statistics, while numbing, paint a disturbing portrait. In 1950, one-fifth of the world's population belonged to the industrial democracies. In 2025, it will drop to one-tenth. Will Western values prevail in a world peopled by societies that did not experience the Enlightenment?

So what are the answers? Kennedy claims even if we are successful in identifying them, we may not be willing to make short-term sacrifices for distant improvements. Since the dangers are less obvious than traditional threats to national security, they seem less likely to elicit determined responses. Essential ingredients in his solutions involve education, the place of women, and political leadership. Kennedy joins other social thinkers who argue that mankind is in a race between education and catastrophe. He also makes a compelling case that the depressed status of women is linked to the population explosion and its attendant poverty and economic retardation. When education is widely available to women, the size of the average family drops. Last, he calls for bold political leadership but displays skepticism that it can overcome a historic unwillingness to tackle long-term problems. Kennedy's diagnoses are well-reasoned, but his prescriptions are vague and not well-developed. Perhaps we'll see them in another book.

Leadership and the Culture of Trust. By Gilbert W. Fairholm. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994. 236 pages. **Reviewed by Brigadier General Howard T. Prince II, USA Ret.**, Dean of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, and former Professor and Head, Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, USMA, West Point, N.Y.

More than any other type of organization, military organizations require a high level of mutual trust between leaders and followers. Military leaders have been exhorted to be trustworthy in leadership manuals and leadership training classes for years. Yet little of our contemporary or historical doctrine on military leadership focuses on the phenomenon of trust in relation to leadership. Why is trust important

to leadership? How is trust created? Though some military leaders have discovered answers to such questions through experience, the literature on military leadership gives us few if any answers to what is a very important, perhaps even the most important, ingredient in combat leadership.

Gilbert Fairholm, a professor at Virginia Commonwealth University, has written an important book about leadership based on trust that challenges more traditional views of leadership. Fairholm argues that in the absence of a culture based on shared values, leadership is very difficult and may even be impossible. A central task then is to build what he calls a trust culture, which is one based on shared vision and values. Within such a culture leaders and followers trust each other to work toward a common purpose so that resort to authority and coercion is no longer or less necessary. Fairholm presents a normative basis for self-control and effective behavior within the organization's agreed-upon values and beliefs which leads people to accept performance and other standards because they believe in them, not because they are afraid of punishment for noncompliance. According to Fairholm, "Shaping a culture in which group members can trust each other enough to work together is the first leadership task. It creates the context within which leaders can lead, followers can find reason for full commitment, and both can achieve their potential."

Gil Fairholm is neither the first nor the only author to write about leadership and the importance of culture-building. Edgar Schein, for example, also has written another treatment of this central leadership task in his important book, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. But Fairholm does more than establish the importance of what he calls the trust culture. He tells us how to create it. And he relates leadership to the tasks of creating, maintaining, and changing such a culture over time.

One of the most novel and useful sections of this book deals with what Fairholm calls "the leadership of trust." He begins with what for many is still a radical notion, that "trust is essential to leadership in organizations because followers are people who *choose* to follow leaders." The trust of followers *allows* leaders to lead. Without high levels of trust, followers are less willing to follow, and leaders resort to greater reliance on coercive control mechanisms. Trust cannot be commanded into being; it must be created over time through human interaction. Soldiers do not choose their commanders, but they do choose their leaders. Fairholm tells leaders what to do to build greater trust as well as clarifying for them why it is so important.

The concept of creating a trust culture is one that is often ignored or taken for granted by small-unit leaders and even by leaders at higher levels. This is so because the Army has such a strong institutional culture, one that is based in large part on the expectation of conformity and obedience to appointed leaders who have considerable legal authority. There are fairly clear expectations about what leaders are supposed to do that transcend a particular unit or assignment. Such expectations are useful and serve, for example, to reduce some of the potentially harmful effects of personnel turbulence on leader-follower relationships in the Army. The Army has had an especially strong institutional leadership culture during the last five to ten years, when the leadership of the Army at all levels has reflected the efforts of so many to reform its culture and leadership in the aftermath of the Vietnam era. But it has not always been so. And the Army cannot rely too much on the larger Army culture at the expense of building leadership based on trust within units, especially in an era of frequent deployment involving great risks to soldiers.

Some military leaders may be put off by notions such as building greater trust so as to not have to rely on the formal and legal authority that the commander enjoys, or of notions such as shared vision and governance. But others will find much of value in this very fine treatment of one of the most basic but least understood leadership concepts. The leader who succeeds in building a culture based on shared values and a shared vision will have no hesitation in deploying soldiers away from his or her physical control because these soldiers will support the commander's intent (another term for vision) and their leader from the heart, not out of fear of their leader. Such soldiers may even risk their lives for their leaders as well as for each other.

Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic Priests In World War II. By Donald F. Crosby, S.J. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1994. 328 pages. $27.50. **Reviewed by Chaplain (COL) Thomas Norton**, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army War College.

Men of faith, saints, and sinners pass in review through the pages of *Battlefield Chaplains*. Donald Crosby has penned a powerful story of clergy in World War II. These happen to be Roman Catholic, but their lives mirrored those of all clergy who served.

The writer eloquently and poignantly uses anecdotal material to describe those trying years in the Pacific and Europe. Stories of heroism as well as legends of some truth abound. He tells of Pacific Fleet Chaplain William A. Maguire, who stood on the deck of the ship *California* saying mass as a Japanese plane flew overhead. He stopped mass and in a most unpriestly manner turned his head and shouted "Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition!" He then fired an antiaircraft weapon at the diving planes. The phrase became one of the most popular of the war. Chaplain Maguire tried to stop the story, but everything he said seemed only to magnify it.

Descriptions of the ministry of Protestant, Jewish, and Catholic clergy during these years are tales of inspiration. Guadalcanal and New Guinea required the full commitment of these men. Five Catholic chaplains were part of the Death March at Bataan.

North Africa and Sicily similarly saw courageous men of devotion ministering to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen. As ships poured across the Atlantic to Africa and later to Europe, the clergy who accompanied the men brought great spiritual comfort to those who were about to go into combat. Even so, at times their work was a topic of concern. At one point when a landing was imminent, a chaplain announced that he would conduct services since many who were landing would surely die—such a religious event could hardly be conducive to boosting morale.

Probably no chaplain saw more of the horrors of war than Chaplain Francis Sampson, destined to become Army Chief of Chaplains. The German army captured him shortly after D-Day when he volunteered to stay with a group of wounded soldiers. A man of great physical and spiritual courage, he became a towering legend among the men to whom he ministered. His spiritual contributions gave great inspiration to those who were captured. They tell the story of the night when a wounded paratrooper

was brought to the aid station in serious need of blood. Chaplain Sampson rolled up his sleeve, gave his own blood to the man, and then continued his day's work. Such stories punctuate this fascinating book.

Three themes are prominent. First is the theme of dedicated, courageous clergy of all faith groups, men who went the extra mile and cared deeply for the people of God they served. The second is that of the humanness of the chaplains who served. They were at times less than saintly men as they did their ministry, but they were truly dedicated men. Whether the subject is the chaplain who carried a weapon, one who may have imbibed too much of the grape, or one whose temper was not under control, here is the great story of real people doing ministry. The third theme is how we as a country still retain our hatred and biases that came out of the war. Hatred for the enemy is still there as the soldiers tell their stories of battle; it is perhaps to be expected.

An insight for the reader is that not only is war destructive to people and things; it is equally destructive to the spirit. This powerful book of clergy under stress is the story of walking with heroes when heroes wanted to be cowards. The book is a story of how the God of the Old and New Testament called men from small towns to places where there was no town to minister to soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

Reading this book provides a marvelous passage through the Second World War. When you finish, you will feel spiritually renewed about the men who were clergy in uniform during those trying times.

Hitler's Last Gamble: The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944 - January 1945. By Trevor N. Dupuy, David L. Bongard, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 565 pages. $30.00.
Reviewed by Dr. Harold R. Winton, author of *To Change an Army*.

This is a fascinating yet infuriating work, whose excellence and comprehensiveness at the tactical level are matched by its unevenness, illogic, and manifest bias at the operational.

The book grew out of an effort by the late Trevor Dupuy and several of his associates to create for the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) a database of tactical engagements during the Ardennes counteroffensive that would validate computer models being used at that time to assess the influence of various force structure and weapon mixes on rates of Soviet advance in a hypothetical European Central Region scenario. To create the database, the authors compiled an abundant resource trove on the German and American ground units that did the bulk of the fighting in the Battle of the Bulge. This information included weapons available, personnel strength, state of training, recent tactical experience, status of officer and noncommissioned officer cadres, military experience of key leaders, nature of tactical mission (offense vs. defense), and results of the engagement in terms of weapon losses and personnel casualties.

Those familiar with Dupuy's previous work will not be surprised to learn that this data confirmed that of his previous research, including the validity of the "Quantitative Judgment Model (QJM)" and the man-for-man superiority of the German soldier based on the efficiency of the German military system. (Whether the data

did or did not validate CAA's existing models we are not told.) The validity of the QJM, however, is beyond the scope of this review. Nevertheless, readers are encouraged to investigate Michael Doubler's recent work, *Closing with the Enemy*, which illuminates the progressive development of American tactical effectiveness in the northwest European campaigns of 1944-45.

The germane point is that the research for CAA armed the authors with a wealth of tactical information that makes this the single best volume yet produced on the battles that comprise the campaign. Throughout the narrative, the reader is treated to succinct unit histories of the divisions on each side, useful personality sketches of division and corps commanders (the research into the German personalities is particularly impressive), keen assessments of the terrain, nicely detailed maps, and pithy summaries of the results of engagements. The coverage is well balanced between the northern and southern shoulders and, unlike many treatments, adequately describes the tough, vicious, gut-wrenching fighting that took place in the month *after* the 2d Panzer Division was halted at Celles and Creighton Abrams broke through to the beleaguered defenders of Bastogne.

Readers who expect similar sophistication at the campaign level will be disappointed. The analysis of Hitler's decisionmaking process takes his 16 September 1944 decision to launch an offensive in the Ardennes as the start point and ignores the German OKW analysis of strategic options after the Allied breakout at Avranches in late July that preceded this decision. The investigation of Allied intelligence and German deception before the offensive is muddled. In Chapter Four, "The Ardennes Offensive . . . Could Have Been Foreseen," the reader is informed by the oracle that the most damning indictment of the Allies is their violation of the basic tenet that "the best intelligence analysis is based on knowledge of an enemy's capabilities rather than assumptions as to his intentions." However, in the epilogue the authors conclude that it is difficult to attribute this classic mistake to the Allies because they "*thought* they were assessing hostile capabilities" (emphasis in original).

The treatment of airpower's role in the campaign is likewise anomalous. The work completely ignores the vital role of the attacks by Eighth Air Force against transportation and oil targets in the late summer and early fall of 1944 in delaying the offensive by three weeks, thus limiting the time for it to proceed under heavy cloud cover to one week instead of four. The role of Allied air superiority is listed as the "first" cause of the German failure before the Meuse; but we are later told that airpower was extremely significant, though not decisive. The reviewer's judgment tends toward the latter interpretation, but was confused by the former.

The most significant operational flaw, however, is an uncritical acceptance of Patton's notion that after the Germans were halted, the Bulge should have been eliminated at its base rather than at its waist. This derives from Dupuy's evident infatuation with Patton as "perhaps one of the ten best generals of American military history" and leads him to conclude that had the overly cautious Bradley and Eisenhower been willing to let Patton attack the base of the penetration, the war would have been over in February or March 1945. There follows a very curious line of reasoning. Dupuy states that the success of this attack would depend on three factors: speed, good weather, and adequate logistical support. Speed, the argument goes, could have been obtained with a bit of Pattonesque élan from Bradley in the south and Montgomery in

the north. The weather, however, was obviously not good; and Dupuy admits that the road net leading south from Elsenborn was inadequate to support a corps-sized attack, which would have been the necessary complement to a pincer from the south. Thus, notwithstanding the operational risk of allowing the German forces concentrated around Bastogne to capture that significant hub and perhaps drive on to sever American lines of communication, two of the three necessary conditions for success of a double envelopment launched at the base of the penetration were not present. What Dupuy cannot bring himself to admit is that while Patton's idea looked good on paper, it was simply infeasible.

Thus the glass is both half full and half empty. Notwithstanding the questionable validity of the QJM, the tactical detail and comprehensiveness of this book are superb. The work's operational judgments, however, leave much to be desired. Given the extensive qualifications of the authors, this is perhaps a telling reminder that the conceptual challenges of uniting Clio and Mars are daunting indeed.

Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s. By Daniel P. Bolger. Novato, California, Presidio Press, 1995. 420 pages. $24.95. **Reviewed by Major Ralph Peters**, author of *The Perfect Soldier*.

Dan Bolger is a remarkable man and soldier. An infantry officer who has served in the inner circle of the Army Staff and who currently commands a line battalion, he also has managed to publish four books, each worthy in its own right. *Savage Peace*, his latest effort to interpret the role of the US armed forces in a turbulent global environment, succeeds on a number of fronts, but is, finally, most interesting as a document revealing the struggle of an exemplary and dedicated officer to come to terms with a confusing, unforgiving world for which his military is not structured and its leaders are not trained. Monumental dedication went into this work, and the research must have been challenging for an officer serving in a series of positions of the sort that thanklessly devour time and energy. Bolger seems fired by a personal as well as a professional need to grasp the elusive problems threatening our tattered foreign policy and the soldiers we misuse to mend it—he realizes the incalculable importance of getting the future right.

In some respects, though, Bolger mirrors the force in which he serves. He is strong on detail, with a vibrant sense of action. He can interpret complex operations for peers and laymen in a manner that orders events logically and brings genuine understanding. He is vivid and accessible. But, like so many of us, he sometimes fails to get at the deeper causes of the events he reports so well.

The bulk of this swiftly paced book recounts a series of US military interventions from the early 1980s to 1994. Citing our contributions to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai as an example of how to execute correctly Operations Other Than War (OOTW), he then turns to our stumble into the Lebanese civil war and the almost-inevitable tragedy of "well-just-do-*some*thing-to-help" missions as a model of how to get it wrong. Further chapters trace US military actions in northern Iraq in support of the Kurds and our blustering, ethnocentric charge into Somalia, ending with a look at the complexities of any potential intervention in

Yugoslavia. The heart of the book beats in the recounting of those two predictable disasters: our unfocused efforts in Beirut and Mogadishu.

When he writes about how leaders decide or fail to do so, or of how inertia and tradition can outweigh common sense, Bolger is incomparable. No one has done a better job of explaining what went wrong *within our military system* in Lebanon or Somalia, and he does a marvelous job not only of clarifying cause and effect internal to the force, and of describing the rush of combat and related military actions, but he manages to make nonfiction as exciting as a good novel. His recounting of the intervention in Somalia is classic and had this jaded reader turning pages anxiously. If Bolger should ever disappoint his many admirers and leave military service, he would make an incomparable combat journalist in the grand tradition. For his accounting of our recent military history and how we in uniform got things right and wrong, this book is unquestionably worth the money, with something to offer both blooded colonels and nervous lieutenants, as well as a broad, interested public.

It would be a disservice to so promising an author, however, to ignore the minor faults of the book, and criticism in this case is intended constructively. Bolger has done his homework. But in the section of geostrategic analysis, in which he looks at the great world and finds it wanting, he seems not to have digested the subtleties of the authors, credited and uncredited, whom he has so clearly studied. While stating that our fractured world environment is complex, he nonetheless paints it black and white. Although he wants to get it right, he suffers from at least a light case of "operators disease"—he never quite understands the opponent, the Other, on his own terms, and brings no empathy to bear. While we may come to hate our opponents under the stress of frayed involvements, the key to success in the sort of conflicts about which Bolger is so justifiably worried lies in knowing our enemies, and provisional friends, better than they know us. This is a difficult and frustrating requirement from which we are often too quick to walk away, relying smugly on our overwhelming power until we discover that—in the wrong environment—it is we who are overwhelmed and our abstract power is inefficient when it is not unusable. In both Beirut and Mogadishu (to say nothing of Saigon), we failed to take the enemy's asymmetrical strengths and non-synchronous psychology into account, and we died for it.

In dirty little wars, and in these even dirtier little "non-wars," penetrating knowledge of the enemy is the most important tool in the commander's arsenal, and such knowledge is rarely a matter of order of battle or tactics after the fashion of the National Training Center. We must learn again how to fight men, not just systems. Bolger comes close to the Clausewitzian sin of dismissing intelligence because his personal experience of it has been disappointing or of only transient utility. A scrap of condescending praise for a lone S-2 is not the same as appreciating the essential nature of intelligence to combat and OOTW success. As Bolger progresses in rank and accomplishment, it will be his duty to drive the intelligence system, and it will be a great failing should he merely dismiss it. In this information age, with its vivid highs and terrible lows, thinking leaders such as Bolger can prompt essential innovation or settle into the role of reactionaries disguised as proponents of "rational" change—the most comfortable persona a US flag officer can acquire. Intelligence is the oxygen of the changing military body. In many of the challenges facing our armed forces in the next century, intelligence will be the one indispensable discipline, the arm for which

there is no substitute. Bolger is fond of citing Sun Tzu. Better still to take Sun Tzu to heart, for that antique Chinese philosopher of war was a prophet for an age of wonders he could understand but not imagine.

The soul of the enemy is our real opponent, not his hands or tools. We all know how the grenade works. The trick is to get at the inner workings of the terribly-foreign man—or woman or child—who tosses that grenade onto a crowded bus or into the middle of a busy market. Operators beware. Being gung ho will often not be enough. Bolger *knows* this, yet he fails to communicate it fully. His bad guys are too often stick figures. We know what our opponents have done to us. But why have they done it?

In the end this quibbling is aimed more at Bolger's future work in print and in uniform than at this fine, worthwhile book. *Savage Peace* is strongly recommended as the best available volume on US efforts to remedy human tragedy through military means; it is difficult to imagine any reader who would be disappointed by the book. I enjoyed it, learned from it, and found it a powerful spur to thought. Dan Bolger, soldier and scholar, is an outstanding example of just how healthy our Army has become. His contribution to all of us is as remarkable as it is unfinished. He will shape the future.

***Ogranichennyy kontingent* (Limited Contingent).** By General-Colonel B. V. Gromov (with Sergey Bogdanov). The "Progress"-"Culture" Editorial Group, Moscow, 1994. 352 pages. Available in Russian only from East View Publications, Minneapolis, Minn. $21.95 (cloth), $16.95 (paper). **Reviewed by Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC (Ret).**

That contradictory sense of duty and divisiveness, camaraderie and trauma, self-sacrifice and betrayal that Vietnam evokes in US military personnel of my generation has an echo in contemporary Russia: Afghanistan. Moscow's ill-considered, costly, fateful, nine-year intervention in that primitive country demoralized the USSR and served as a catalyst for its 1991 collapse. Played out in part against the backdrop of a watershed in Soviet political history—the changing of the guard as Mikhail Gorbachev and others replaced the "gerontocracy" of the Brezhnev-era Politburo and Soviet High Command—Afghanistan represented a dramatic foreign policy failure ironically aggravated by a domestic policy success.

Externally, the operation which the Soviet leadership had envisioned as a temporary measure (two to three years) to prop up the shaky socialist regime in Kabul evolved into protracted partisan warfare with high casualties, painful lessons, few signs of progress, and no hope of success. Not since its suppression of the Prague Spring had Moscow suffered such acute international alienation and isolation. Internally, as coffins began coming home in large numbers and stories of atrocities made the rounds, the quagmire deepened and opposition to the war mounted. Gorbachev's immensely popular policy of *glasnost* (limited freedom of speech) enabled a partially unleashed populace to react with unprecedented anger and criticism.

Rarely had the traditionally patriotic Soviet citizenry enjoyed such freedom; even more rarely did it protest with such passion. Unquestionably, and despite loyal and

inspiring combat reporting by the official media, the USSR lost the war waged on the home front. As was the case in the United States during Vietnam, Soviet *afgantsy*—war veterans—enjoyed no homecoming parades and experienced no popular gratitude. They often could not exercise their limited but important privileges, and the society they had "defended" turned against them as symbols of a multipronged national disgrace. It is indicative that the final withdrawal of the "limited contingent" over the Amu Darya River into Soviet Uzbekistan on 15 February 1989 occurred not only without fanfare, but without the presence of even a single member of the national political leadership or Ministry of Defense. While the Western media covered that landmark event in force, few Soviet reporters bothered. This was a war to be forgotten, not acclaimed.

General-Colonel Boris Gromov, Hero of the Soviet Union and the final commander of the 40th Army (Soviet line forces in Afghanistan), was the last to leave. *Limited Contingent* is his wartime memoirs. A combined arms commander, Gromov was arguably the best known and most experienced Soviet officer of the war—a widely respected young Turk who served 5½ years (three tours) in-country in billets from division chief of staff to army commander. His firsthand knowledge spans nearly the entire period of the Soviet presence.

This book focuses on command issues but addresses the political deliberations that preceded intervention as well. Gromov exploits documents (still with classification caveats) from the newly opened Presidential Archives of the Russian Federation to shed light on the decision to commit troops. Politburo records graphically depict the Soviet leadership's vacillation on this score—and the Afghan government's chutzpa—yet demonstrate that Moscow harbored few illusions. Reluctant to intervene, conscious of Afghan backwardness, recognizing the excesses and faults of the repressive revolutionary government, and accurately predicting world reaction, Moscow nonetheless did invade. Gromov cannot specifically tell us why, which is a failing of the book, but he bitterly regrets that decision. By 1985, Soviet officers in Afghanistan considered the policy a dead end and recommended that Moscow withdraw its forces; it took two more years to make that decision.

When asked for his final thoughts upon leaving Afghanistan, Gromov responded that they could not be put on paper. The many targets of his criticism now include the CASU Politburo; the KGB; the Afghan political leadership, which he charges with manipulating Moscow and failing to exploit Soviet military success; the Afghan armed forces, which he considers indecisive, uncommitted, unprofessional, and infiltrated to the core; and certain Soviet senior generals who, although lacking combat experience in Afghanistan, interfere in tactical operations. On the other hand, Gromov displays professional respect for and extensive knowledge of his one-time mujahedeen enemy, much as US officers did for the Viet Cong.

Gromov has outspoken praise for the sacrifices and valor of his officers and troops. Ever the dedicated commander, he never tires of lauding the performance both of generals and of 19-year-olds who loyally, if not altogether voluntarily, prosecuted a dirty war with inappropriate equipment against an elusive enemy in an extreme environment in the name of a questionable policy. The ingratitude they encountered upon returning home angers Gromov greatly. He pointedly cites torture inflicted by the opposition on prisoners—his command even filmed a captured mujahedeen torture chamber to indoctrinate new arrivals about their enemy—but he remains silent about his own forces' well-documented violations of the law of war.

Gromov is clearly at his best when providing the operational detail and insights that make Soviet military reality come alive. We learn, for instance:

- The Soviet General Staff poorly anticipated the nature of the conflict, initially sending standard motor rifle divisions into country; their tank regiments, missile battalions, some air defense, and other assets proved irrelevant and had to be removed.
- Soviet soldiers, laden with 40 to 60 kg of equipment for mountain operations, would routinely let mortar tubes "slip" into canyons rather than lug them further, depriving battalions of their only integral supporting arms.
- The motor rifle division under Gromov's command became combat ineffective in 1981, when 3000 officers and men (25 percent of personnel strength)—including nearly all the principals—contracted hepatitis.
- Sabotage and shelling of the Soviet pipeline to Kabul caused the loss of as much as 500 tons of fuel per day; 25 tons was considered "normal."
- Despite intense command supervision, an Afghan-Soviet armored vehicle accident in a mountain tunnel led to the asphyxiation and incapacitation of many soldiers.
- By 1987 the anti-air threat (principally from Stinger missiles) had become so potent that aerial resupply, the single option for many outposts, could only be done at night.
- In nine years of war the 40th Army—the strength of which peaked at 120,000 in 1988—suffered nearly 14,000 killed in action (no figure for wounded in action is offered for comparison).

Limited Contingent has tolerable shortcomings. Despite the substantial detail provided, professional officers will want more. The work lacks even a single map, without which only an expert can appreciate Gromov's narration. The photographs provided are poorly reproduced and contribute little of value. Extensive biographic material on an entire gallery of mujahedeen leaders dilutes the focus of this already anecdotal book; a few paragraphs on opposition disunity and internecine conflict would suffice. And redundancies abound—an editorial failure. Most important, the book currently exists only in Russian; it cries out for translation.

Limited Contingent will impress various audiences in various ways. Russian Foreign Area Officers will profit most from it, for the book addresses the meat of their profession and offers insights on operating forces that only close observation would otherwise allow. The language is simplified military Russian, fostering vocabulary expansion without great difficulty. Both analysts and historians will find much to confirm or contest, while commanders will identify with many leadership and professional situations that Gromov describes. Policymakers will note the intensity of his convictions on the proper use of military power. And Vietnam veterans will experience déjà vu.

Today Boris Gromov is no longer just a military figure, but an important actor in the Wild West show that is contemporary Russian domestic politics. Like certain of his brethren, he recently attracted broad attention by publicly opposing the war in Chechnya, breaking with his superior, Defense Minister, and fellow *afganets*, General of the Army Pavel Grachev. This was a decisive step; those who read *Limited Contingent* will understand why he took it.

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From the Archives

Colin Powell's Rules

In autumn 1995, interest soared nationwide in the success story of retired general and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. With publication of his memoir[1] and speculation about General Powell's political prospects, the public was enthralled by a retired military figure as it had not been since, perhaps, the days of Dwight Eisenhower. Admiration for General Powell seems to straddle lines that often divide Americans, reaching across divisions of race, economic status, and political party affiliation. Regardless of his political future, his character has touched a broad spectrum of his fellow Americans.

General Powell's memoir contains a list of "Colin Powell's Rules," adages that he had collected over the years. The list may be unspectacular, but it reveals something of Powell's common touch. In Bob Woodward's *The Commanders*, he referred to the list in discussing the days after Operation Just Cause:

> Powell settled back into a peacetime rhythm. . . . Now the focus was back on the military needs of the post-Cold War era. He spent many hours in his office, being briefed, working the phones, trying to come up with a strategy for change. He was sure that the best way to proceed was to trust his gut instincts, but he also had a collection of rules and maxims he used as a practical roadmap for each day of decisions. Many were on a list he'd drawn up, which he both handed out to visitors and kept in the center of his desktop, on display beneath the glass cover:
>
> Colin Powell's Rules
>
> 1. It ain't as bad as you think. It will look better in the morning.
> 2. Get mad, then get over it.
> 3. Avoid having your ego so close to your position that when your position falls, your ego goes with it.
> 4. It can be done!
> 5. Be careful what you choose. You may get it.
> 6. Don't let adverse facts stand in the way of a good decision.
> 7. You can't make someone else's choices. You shouldn't let someone else make yours.
> 8. Check small things.
> 9. Share credit.
> 10. Remain calm. Be kind.
> 11. Have a vision. Be demanding.
> 12. Don't take counsel of your fears or naysayers.
> 13. Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier.
>
> . . . There was yet another axiom Powell tried to live by, especially in his professional life. He occasionally confided it, but it wasn't written down. Powell didn't need to remind himself of that one: "You never know what you can get away with, unless you try."[2]

NOTES

1. Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995).
2. Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 195-96.